IN RE: Donald J. TRUMP (2024)

Petition seeking relief in the nature of a writ of prohibition and an order finding that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by denying petitioner's motion seeking recusal, by issuing orders requiring pre-motion letters setting forth the basis of proposed motions and a conferral period for proposed redactions, and by denying petitioner's motion to exclude certain evidence based on the doctrine of presidential immunity, unanimously denied, and the proceeding commenced pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed, without costs.

Petitioner's CPLR article 78 challenge to the court's August 11, 2023 order, which denied his motion seeking recusal, is time-barred (see CPLR 217[1]).  The petition was also filed prior to the court's subsequent order denying his second motion seeking recusal, and thus, any challenge to the subsequent order was not ripe at the time of filing.

In any event, petitioner has failed to establish that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by denying his motion.  The court had jurisdiction to consider and decide petitioner's recusal motion in the first instance, and a review of the court's discretionary determination may occur in a direct appeal (see Matter of Herskowitz v. Tompkins, 184 A.D.2d 402, 403, 585 N.Y.S.2d 386 [1st Dept. 1992], appeal dismissed 80 N.Y.2d 1023, 592 N.Y.S.2d 671, 607 N.E.2d 818 [1992];  Matter of Concord Assoc., L.P. v. LaBuda, 121 A.D.3d 1270, 1271–1272, 995 N.Y.S.2d 623 [3d Dept. 2014];  Matter of Daniels v. Lewis, 95 A.D.3d 1011, 1012, 944 N.Y.S.2d 239 [2d Dept. 2012]).  Petitioner also has not established that he has a clear right to recusal pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 (see Matter of Kyle v. Lebovits, 58 A.D.3d 521, 870 N.Y.S.2d 360 [1st Dept. 2009];  Ralis v. Ralis, 146 A.D.3d 831, 833, 46 N.Y.S.3d 631 [2d Dept. 2017]).

As for the court's March 8, 2024 order, petitioner does not dispute that the court had authority to implement docket-management measures, including requiring the submission of pre-motion letters allowing the court to preview the parties’ potential motions in advance of filing.  Indeed, the court has general discretion to manage its docket in the interest of judicial economy (see Favourite Ltd. v. Cico, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 01496, *5 [2024]).  Any ambiguity in the court's initial order concerning whether it could deny petitioner the right to file a motion was later clarified when the court specifically stated that its order did not deny either party the right to file any motion.  Petitioner's remaining contentions concerning the March 8, 2024 order are not the proper subject of article 78 review.  Without opining on the merits of the argument, to the extent petitioner argues that the court's discretionary docket-management measures constituted an improvident exercise of discretion, such argument may be raised in a direct appeal.  Again, without opining on the merits of the argument, petitioner's contention that the court's docket-management measures either conflicted with CPL 255.20 or interfered with his ability to present a complete defense may also be raised in a direct appeal (see Matter of Veloz v. Rothwax, 65 N.Y.2d 902, 903–904, 493 N.Y.S.2d 452, 483 N.E.2d 127 [1985];  see also Matter of Lipari v. Owens, 70 N.Y.2d 731, 733, 519 N.Y.S.2d 958, 514 N.E.2d 378 [1987]).

Regarding petitioner's challenge to the court's April 5, 2024 order requiring a brief conferral period to address potential redactions in advance of motion filings, we find that the order constituted a discretionary docket management order.

As to petitioner's challenge to the court's order denying, as untimely, petitioner's motion to exclude evidence based on the doctrine of presidential immunity and for an adjournment of trial, the trial court had discretion whether to hear and decide petitioner's motion (see CPL 255.20[3];  People v. Marte, 197 A.D.3d 411, 413, 151 N.Y.S.3d 43 [1st Dept. 2021]).  The decision whether to grant an adjournment was also within the court's sound discretion (see e.g. Schneyer v. Silberg, 156 A.D.2d 200, 201, 548 N.Y.S.2d 458 [1st Dept. 1989], appeal dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 872, 568 N.Y.S.2d 914, 571 N.E.2d 84 [1991]).  Prohibition does not lie to review the exercise of discretion in this criminal matter (see Matter of Blumen v. McGann, 18 A.D.3d 870, 870, 796 N.Y.S.2d 380 [2d Dept. 2005];  Matter of Quackenbush v. Monroe, 87 A.D.2d 720, 720, 448 N.Y.S.2d 58 [3d Dept. 1982], lv denied 56 N.Y.2d 505, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 437 N.E.2d 286 [1982]).

Finally, even if petitioner had established that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing one of these orders, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not granted as of right, but only in the court's sound discretion (see Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 568–569, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21, 523 N.E.2d 297 [1988];  Matter of Brown v. Schulman, 246 A.D.2d 648, 648, 667 N.Y.S.2d 303 [2d Dept. 1998]).  Exercise of such discretion would not be warranted in this case, where relief would interfere with the normal trial and appellate procedures, and, without opining on the merits, the matters herein identified by petitioner may be raised in a direct appeal (Holtzman, 71 N.Y.2d at 569, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21, 523 N.E.2d 297).

We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Motion to file amicus curiae brief, granted.