PEART v. CARRERAS (2024)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered March 21, 2023, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants met their prima facie burden by submitting the medical report of their orthopedic surgery expert, who found normal ranges of motion in plaintiff's cervical spine, lumbar spine, thoracic spine, and left shoulder with no evidence of tenderness or other abnormality (see Stickney v. Akhar, 187 A.D.3d 425, 425, 132 N.Y.S.3d 120 [1st Dept. 2020];  Rodriguez v. Konate, 161 A.D.3d 565, 566, 76 N.Y.S.3d 553 [1st Dept. 2018]).  Upon review of plaintiff's MRIs, defendant's expert concluded that there was no evidence of acute spinal injury or left shoulder injury and that any injuries were degenerative in nature and not causally related to the accident (see Sooknanan v. Pinales, 215 A.D.3d 608, 608, 187 N.Y.S.3d 629 [1st Dept. 2023]).  Defendant's biomechanical engineering expert also opined that, based on his analysis, the low impact of the subject accident could not have caused plaintiff's claimed injuries (see Osorio v. Punjab Enter., Inc., 215 A.D.3d 494, 494, 187 N.Y.S.3d 35 [1st Dept. 2023];  Holmes v. Brini Tr. Inc., 123 A.D.3d 628, 628, 1 N.Y.S.3d 27 [1st Dept. 2014]).  In addition, defendants submitted plaintiff's testimony, in which he stated that he ceased treatment for his symptoms within eight months of the accident (see Green v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 140 A.D.3d 546, 547, 33 N.Y.S.3d 260 [1st Dept. 2016]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as his medical records contain no objective evidence of qualitative or quantitative limitations in any of the affected body parts that were contemporaneous with the accident (see Natera v. Veloz Livery Rentals, Inc., 206 A.D.3d 428, 429, 167 N.Y.S.3d 783 [1st Dept. 2022];  see also Henchy v. VAS Express Corp., 115 A.D.3d 478, 479, 981 N.Y.S.2d 418 [1st Dept. 2014]).  Plaintiff's only submission was a report of a pain management physician, who examined him on one occasion more than two years after the accident (see Atkinson v. Oliver, 36 A.D.3d 552, 552, 830 N.Y.S.2d 30 [1st Dept. 2007]).  We note that this examination also took place a year and a half after plaintiff ceased all treatment for his symptoms (see Alverio v. Martinez, 160 A.D.3d 454, 455, 74 N.Y.S.3d 525 [1st Dept. 2018]).  Without any admissible evidence of plaintiff's condition and treatment contemporaneous with the accident, the examination years after the accident was “insufficient to reliably connect his current symptoms to the accident” (Blake v. Sanchez, 198 A.D.3d 527, 527–528, 152 N.Y.S.3d 806 [1st Dept. 2021]).  Finally, plaintiff offered no explanation for his cessation of treatment, which interrupts the chain of causation and renders his physician's finding of permanency speculative (see Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 574, 797 N.Y.S.2d 380, 830 N.E.2d 278 [2005];  Arias v. Martinez, 176 A.D.3d 548, 549, 112 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2019]).

Defendants met their prima facie burden with respect to plaintiff's 90/180-day claim, as plaintiff testified that he was unable to work for only six weeks after the accident (see Tejada v. LKQ Hunts Point Parts, 166 A.D.3d 436, 437–438, 88 N.Y.S.3d 156 [1st Dept. 2018];  see also Onishi v. N & B Taxi, Inc., 51 A.D.3d 594, 595, 858 N.Y.S.2d 171 [1st Dept. 2008]).  Indeed, plaintiff continued to work at least 40 hours per week in his same capacity as a signal maintainer for MTA within a few months of the accident (see Tsamos v. Diaz, 81 A.D.3d 546, 547, 917 N.Y.S.2d 180 [1st Dept. 2011]), and did not show that he was curtailed from performing his usual activities to a great extent (see Chawdhury v. 3511 Sys. Inc., 193 A.D.3d 541, 542, 146 N.Y.S.3d 618 [1st Dept. 2021]).