PEOPLE v. BRADLEY (2024)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of riot in the first degree (Penal Law § 240.06 [2]). The conviction arises from an incident at the Auburn Correctional Facility (prison) during which several inmates, including defendant, became violent and several correction officers were injured.

Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court allowed the prosecutor to inquire about defendant's prior conviction of assault in the first degree, but would not allow inquiry into the underlying facts of that conviction (see People v. Lee, 275 A.D.2d 995, 996-997, 714 N.Y.S.2d 177 [4th Dept. 2000], lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 966, 722 N.Y.S.2d 483, 745 N.E.2d 403 [2000]). It is well established that “questioning concerning other crimes is not automatically precluded simply because the crimes to be inquired about are similar to the [crime or] crimes charged” (People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216 [1983]).

Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror, which was based on the prospective juror's failure to include on the jury questionnaire certain information that she later disclosed in response to voir dire questioning. We reject that contention. Here, the prospective juror's omissions on the questionnaire did not demonstrate “a state of mind that is likely to preclude” rendering an impartial verdict (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]), or a “ ‘preexisting opinion[ ] that might indicate bias’ ” (People v. Patterson, 34 N.Y.3d 1112, 1113, 117 N.Y.S.3d 660, 140 N.E.3d 982 [2019], quoting People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 363, 729 N.Y.S.2d 51, 753 N.E.2d 846 [2001]; see People v. Williams, 184 A.D.3d 1125, 1126, 125 N.Y.S.3d 811 [4th Dept. 2020], affd 37 N.Y.3d 314, 156 N.Y.S.3d 129, 177 N.E.3d 1283 [2021]). Although the prospective juror did not disclose on the questionnaire that she had at least one relative who had previously worked at the prison, “there was no indication that the juror knew or had a professional or personal relationship with any of the People's witnesses or counsel” (People v. Ellis, 34 N.Y.3d 1092, 1093, 116 N.Y.S.3d 654, 139 N.E.3d 1234 [2019]). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the prospective juror's impartiality was compromised by the fact that she “had [a relative or] relatives in the same profession” as the People's witnesses (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

To the extent that defendant preserved for our review his contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see generally People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995]), that contention lacks merit (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]). Further, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).

Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the fine imposed as a component of defendant's sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.