SMIEDALA v. HALE (2008)

 Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when the stopped vehicle in which he was a passenger was rear-ended by a vehicle owned and driven by defendant-third-party plaintiff, Michael J. Hale. Supreme Court properly denied that part of the motion of defendant-third-party defendant, David A. Andrzejewski, the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger, for partial summary judgment determining that the negligence of Hale was the sole proximate cause of the accident.   It is well established that, “[a]s a matter of law, a rear-end collision with a stopped [vehicle] establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle” (Diller v. City of N.Y. Police Dept., 269 A.D.2d 143, 144, 701 N.Y.S.2d 432;  see Baron v. Murray, 268 A.D.2d 495, 702 N.Y.S.2d 354;  see also Downs v. Toth, 265 A.D.2d 925, 695 N.Y.S.2d 807).   In opposition to the motion, however, Hale submitted evidence that Andrzejewski stopped short and rear-ended the vehicle in front of him prior to being rear-ended by Hale. Thus, Hale raised a triable issue of fact whether Andrzejewski was also negligent (see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: