PEOPLE v. BAILEY (2008)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard D. Carruthers, J.), rendered March 24, 2006, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree and two counts of attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 1 1/212 to 4 1/212 years, unanimously affirmed.

 We reject defendant's challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the “intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another” element (Penal Law § 170.30) of his forged instrument conviction (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348-349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). The totality of the evidence, including defendant's statement to the police evincing a consciousness of guilt, and the lack of any reason for defendant to be carrying counterfeit bills in a shopping district other than to pass them, supported the inference that he possessed the bills with the requisite intent (see People v. Dallas, 46 A.D.3d 489, 491, 848 N.Y.S.2d 132 [2007] ).

 The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the statement he volunteered to the police prior to receiving Miranda warnings.   During routine arrest processing and vouchering of property, two officers conversed with each other, within earshot of defendant, about the fact that the bills recovered from his pocket were counterfeit.   This did not constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation, and defendant's spontaneous response was therefore not subject to suppression (People v. Atkins, 273 A.D.2d 12, 13, 708 N.Y.S.2d 109 [2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 960, 722 N.Y.S.2d 477, 745 N.E.2d 397 [2000] ).

The court's Sandoval ruling balanced the appropriate factors and was a proper exercise of discretion (see People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 738 N.Y.S.2d 663, 764 N.E.2d 963 [2002];  People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 458-459, 611 N.Y.S.2d 118, 633 N.E.2d 472 [1994] ).   Defendant's prior convictions were highly probative of his credibility, and the court minimized their prejudicial effect by precluding elicitation of their underlying facts.

Defendant's challenge to the jury charge is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.