PEOPLE v. DANDRIDGE (2006)

 On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15[4] ) and robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10[1] ), defendant contends that the prosecutor's response to a Batson challenge was pretextual.  “ ‘[D]efendant failed to articulate to ․ Supreme Court any reason why he believed that the prosecutor's explanations were pretextual’ and thus failed to preserve his contention for our review” (People v. Anderson, 23 A.D.3d 1037, 1037, 803 N.Y.S.2d 461, quoting People v. Santiago, 272 A.D.2d 418, 418, 707 N.Y.S.2d 906, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 907, 716 N.Y.S.2d 648, 739 N.E.2d 1153;  see People v. Mellerson, 15 A.D.3d 964, 788 N.Y.S.2d 746, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 791, 801 N.Y.S.2d 812, 835 N.E.2d 672).   In any event, by denying defendant's Batson challenge, “the court thereby implicitly determined that the race-neutral explanations given by the prosecutor for exercising peremptory challenge[ ] with respect to th[e] prospective juror[ ] were not pretextual” (People v. Parker, 304 A.D.2d 146, 156-157, 755 N.Y.S.2d 521, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 585, 764 N.Y.S.2d 396, 796 N.E.2d 488).   We conclude that “ ‘[t]he court was in the best position to observe the demeanor of the prospective juror[ ] and the prosecutor,’ and its [implicit] determination that the prosecutor's explanation[s were] race-neutral and not pretextual is entitled to great deference” (People v. Lawrence, 23 A.D.3d 1039, 1039, 803 N.Y.S.2d 460, quoting People v. Williams, 13 A.D.3d 1214, 1215, 786 N.Y.S.2d 684, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 857, 797 N.Y.S.2d 431, 830 N.E.2d 330).

 Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court impermissibly restricted the scope of voir dire questioning (see e.g. People v. Lewis, 248 A.D.2d 554, 669 N.Y.S.2d 903, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 900, 680 N.Y.S.2d 64, 702 N.E.2d 849;  People v. Reed, 244 A.D.2d 782, 783, 666 N.Y.S.2d 262, lv. denied 91 N.Y.2d 896, 669 N.Y.S.2d 10, 691 N.E.2d 1036;  People v. Amaro, 216 A.D.2d 172, 629 N.Y.S.2d 208, lv. denied 87 N.Y.2d 843, 638 N.Y.S.2d 602, 661 N.E.2d 1383), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6][a] ).

 Contrary to the further contention of defendant, the court's alleged violation of CPL 300.10(4) by failing to read the introductory instruction on robbery (CJI2d[NY] Introductory Charge to Robbery) does not implicate the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law (cf. People v. Boston, 75 N.Y.2d 585, 589 n. 2, 555 N.Y.S.2d 27, 554 N.E.2d 64;  People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 487 N.E.2d 894, rearg. denied 67 N.Y.2d 647, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1031, 490 N.E.2d 558;  see also People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371, 394 N.E.2d 1134).   Therefore, preservation of that contention is required (see e.g. People v. Bell, 234 A.D.2d 915, 916, 652 N.Y.S.2d 448, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1009, 658 N.Y.S.2d 247, 680 N.E.2d 621;  People v. Robinson, 220 A.D.2d 465, 632 N.Y.S.2d 158, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 852, 644 N.Y.S.2d 699, 667 N.E.2d 349;  People v. Santos, 202 A.D.2d 258, 260, 608 N.Y.S.2d 645, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 1007, 616 N.Y.S.2d 488, 640 N.E.2d 156). Because defendant failed to object to the court's charge, we conclude that his contention is not preserved for our review, and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6][a] ).

 Finally, defendant contends that the court erred in permitting the eyewitness to identify defendant at trial.   Defendant, however, bases his contention on a ground raised for the first time in his CPL 330.30 motion, and it is well settled that “[a] postverdict motion made pursuant to CPL 330.30 is not, by itself, ordinarily sufficient to preserve a ‘question of law’ within the meaning of CPL 470.05(2)” (People v. Padro, 75 N.Y.2d 820, 821, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233, rearg. denied 75 N.Y.2d 1005, 557 N.Y.S.2d 312, 556 N.E.2d 1119, rearg. dismissed 81 N.Y.2d 989, 599 N.Y.S.2d 797, 616 N.E.2d 152).   In any event, the court properly admitted the identification testimony of the eyewitness because her observation of defendant in the lobby of the courthouse was not arranged by police (see People v. Anzalone, 15 A.D.3d 903, 904, 788 N.Y.S.2d 753;  People v. Valentino, 254 A.D.2d 185, 186, 678 N.Y.S.2d 890, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 1054, 685 N.Y.S.2d 433, 708 N.E.2d 190;  People v. Phillips, 234 A.D.2d 57, 651 N.Y.S.2d 28, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1098, 660 N.Y.S.2d 392, 682 N.E.2d 993).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: