PEOPLE v. AUTRY (2002)

 Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1] ), two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.15[2], [4] ), and one count each of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law former § 265.03) and reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25).   We reject the contention of defendant that County Court erred in denying his request to charge attempted assault in the second degree as a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree.   Although attempted assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05(1) is a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25(1) (see, People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722, 729, 586 N.Y.S.2d 234, 598 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 563), there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater (see, People v. Bruner, 222 A.D.2d 738, 740, 634 N.Y.S.2d 862, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 981, 649 N.Y.S.2d 387, 672 N.E.2d 613;  see generally, People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 63, 453 N.Y.S.2d 660, 439 N.E.2d 376).

 Defendant's contention that the verdict finding him guilty of attempted murder in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree is repugnant is not preserved for our review (see, People v. Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985, 987, 499 N.Y.S.2d 378, 489 N.E.2d 1280;  People v. Hooper, 288 A.D.2d 948, 732 N.Y.S.2d 207).   The court properly denied defendant's motions to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence (see, CPL 330.30[3] ).   With respect to the first motion, “[d]efendant did not establish that the evidence could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence” (People v. Carrier, 270 A.D.2d 800, 802, 706 N.Y.S.2d 276, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 864, 715 N.Y.S.2d 218, 738 N.E.2d 366).   With respect to the second motion, defendant failed to establish that the evidence “would probably change the result if a new trial were granted” (People v. Wallace, 218 A.D.2d 718, 630 N.Y.S.2d 937, lv. denied 87 N.Y.2d 852, 638 N.Y.S.2d 610, 661 N.E.2d 1393).

 Defendant did not preserve for our review his contention that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct (see, People v. Scroger, 288 A.D.2d 931, 732 N.Y.S.2d 388;  People v. Gagliardo, 283 A.D.2d 964, 724 N.Y.S.2d 919, lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 901, 730 N.Y.S.2d 798, 756 N.E.2d 86).   In any event, the instances of alleged misconduct were not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial (see, People v. Tobias, 273 A.D.2d 925, 926, 711 N.Y.S.2d 652, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 908, 716 N.Y.S.2d 649, 739 N.E.2d 1154).   The further contention of defendant that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.  “[The] most critical concern in reviewing claims of ineffective counsel is to avoid both confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis” (People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).   Viewing the evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, in totality and as of the time of the representation, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation (see, People v. Baldi, supra, at 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).   Finally, the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: