POWELL POWELL v. MASON (1999)

 Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.   Defendants met their initial burden, and “plaintiff[s] failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant[s], as plaintiff[s'] landlord[s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it” (Arnold v. Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2], 261 A.D.2d 939, 689 N.Y.S.2d 799;  see, Boler v. Malik, 267 A.D.2d 998, 700 N.Y.S.2d 323 [decided herewith] ).   Defendants' knowledge of the existence of peeling paint does not constitute actual or constructive knowledge of a hazardous lead paint condition (see, Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877, 654 N.Y.S.2d 531).  Defendants transferred the property to the mortgagee before receiving notice of the presence of lead based paint at the premises, and thus we reject plaintiffs' contention that defendants are liable for their failure to correct the condition pursuant to Public Health Law § 1373.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: