ROSE v. ROCHESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY (2008)

 Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e (5) seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim (see generally Palumbo v. City of Buffalo, 1 A.D.3d 1032, 767 N.Y.S.2d 371).  Although plaintiff has not demonstrated any specific nexus between her infancy and her delay in serving a notice of claim (see Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 N.Y.3d 531, 537–538, 814 N.Y.S.2d 580, 847 N.E.2d 1154), “we do not, under all the relevant circumstances, find such omission [to be] fatal to [her] application” (Abbot v. City of New York, 271 A.D.2d 364, 707 N.Y.S.2d 88).  The record establishes that, at the time plaintiff sustained the alleged injuries resulting from lead paint exposure in premises owned by defendant in which plaintiff resided, defendant was notified both that plaintiff had an elevated blood lead level and that there were lead paint violations at the premises.  Thus, defendant had actual knowledge of plaintiff's specific claim within the limitations period (see Frith v. New York City Hous. Auth., 4 A.D.3d 390, 391, 771 N.Y.S.2d 392;   Matter of Lanphere v. County of Washington, 301 A.D.2d 936, 938, 754 N.Y.S.2d 125;  Matter of Stanley v. City of New York Hous. Auth., 257 A.D.2d 497, 684 N.Y.S.2d 522). Furthermore, defendant is not substantially prejudiced by plaintiff's delay in serving a notice of claim inasmuch as it had the opportunity to conduct a full investigation when it received actual notice of the claim (see Matter of Courtney Nicole R. v. Moravia Cent. School Dist. [Appeal No. 2], 28 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 816 N.Y.S.2d 626).  Whether defendant actually did so is of no moment (see generally Matter of Trusso v. Board of Educ. of Jamestown City School Dist., 24 A.D.3d 1302, 1303, 805 N.Y.S.2d 909).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: