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Eugene A. CARCONE and Concetta Carcone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. D'ANGELO INSURANCE AGENCY, Defendant-Respondent, et al., Defendant (Appeal No. 1.).
Contrary to the contention of plaintiffs, Supreme Court properly granted the motion of defendant D'Angelo Insurance Agency (D'Angelo) to dismiss the complaint against it under, inter alia, CPLR 3211(a)(5). The action as against D'Angelo sounds in negligence and accrued, at the latest, in 1995, but it was not commenced until 2001. Thus, the complaint against D'Angelo is time-barred (see 214[4] ). Contrary to the further contention of plaintiffs, the complaint against D'Angelo was also properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to the extent that it purports to assert a cause of action under Insurance Law § 3420 against him. Section 3420 permits “a cause of action on behalf of the injured party against the insurer” (Clarendon Place Corp. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 182 A.D.2d 6, 9, 587 N.Y.S.2d 311, appeal dismissed 80 N.Y.2d 918, 589 N.Y.S.2d 303, 602 N.E.2d 1119; see § 3420 [b][1] ). That statute is in derogation of the common law and is therefore subject to strict construction (see Clarendon Place Corp., 182 A.D.2d at 9, 587 N.Y.S.2d 311). Courts “ ‘have consistently refused to grant any other or further privileges than the statute specifically provides' ” (id., quoting Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 A.D.2d 116, 126, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524, affd. 4 N.Y.2d 488, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329, 151 N.E.2d 881). The statute does not provide for a direct cause of action by an injured party against an insurance broker, agent or agency, and thus plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action against D'Angelo under that statute.
The court properly denied plaintiffs' cross motion seeking leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs failed to establish that any of the proposed additional causes of action against D'Angelo had merit (see Farrell v. K.J.D.E. Corp., 244 A.D.2d 905, 905, 665 N.Y.S.2d 201). Finally, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the court converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. The decision and the order establish that the complaint against D'Angelo was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.
MEMORANDUM:
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Decided: February 07, 2003
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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