HOLLAMON v. VINSON (2007)

 Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries she sustained when the vehicle that she was operating was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by defendant Anthony Dandridge, which in turn had been rear-ended by a vehicle operated by defendant Damon D. Vinson (Vinson).   On appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict of no cause of action, plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred in denying her motion to set aside the verdict and for a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause or, in the alternative, a new trial on that issue, on the ground that the jury's finding that Vinson was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, is inconsistent and is against the weight of the evidence.   We agree with the court that plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict because there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences based upon the evidence at trial that could lead rational persons to the conclusion that Vinson's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident (see Guthrie v. Overmyer, 19 A.D.3d 1169, 797 N.Y.S.2d 203).   Nor can it be said that the verdict is inconsistent or against the weight of the evidence.  “A jury finding that a party was negligent but that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are ‘so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause’ ” (Cona v. Dwyer, 292 A.D.2d 562, 563, 739 N.Y.S.2d 595, quoting Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 527, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142;  see Skowronski v. Mordino, 4 A.D.3d 782, 783, 771 N.Y.S.2d 625).   Further, “ [w]here ․ ‘an apparently inconsistent or illogical verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view’ ” (Mascia v. Olivia, 299 A.D.2d 883, 883, 750 N.Y.S.2d 688;  see Lemberger v. City of New York, 211 A.D.2d 622, 623, 621 N.Y.S.2d 625).   Here, the jury could have reasonably found from the evidence that, although Vinson was negligent in following too closely behind the vehicle operated by Dandridge, plaintiff's conduct in stopping suddenly without signaling was the sole proximate cause of the collision.  “Thus, ‘the finding of proximate cause did not inevitably flow from the finding of culpable conduct’ ” (Skowronski, 4 A.D.3d at 783, 771 N.Y.S.2d 625;  see Inserro v. Rochester Drug Coop., 258 A.D.2d 923, 923-924, 685 N.Y.S.2d 554;  Hernandez v. Baron, 248 A.D.2d 440, 668 N.Y.S.2d 940;  Schaefer v. Guddemi, 182 A.D.2d 808, 809, 582 N.Y.S.2d 803;  see generally Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is affirmed without costs.

We respectfully dissent.   In our view Supreme Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict as inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence and in failing to grant a new trial on the issue of proximate cause.   Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury's “finding of negligence cannot be reconciled with the jury's finding of no proximate cause” (Murphy v. Holzinger, 6 A.D.3d 1072, 1072-1073, 775 N.Y.S.2d 646).   Evidence that plaintiff may have been interacting with people on the street and interrupting the smooth flow of traffic, “while pertinent to the issue of contributory negligence, does not equate with a lack of proximate cause” with respect to the negligence of defendant Damon D. Vinson (Bucich v. City of New York, 111 A.D.2d 646, 648, 490 N.Y.S.2d 208;  see Mazurek v. Home Depot U.S.A., 303 A.D.2d 960, 961, 757 N.Y.S.2d 425).   Further, the majority's conclusion that the jury may have found that the sole proximate cause of the accident was plaintiff's conduct in stopping suddenly without signaling is based upon speculation.   We therefore would reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from, grant plaintiff's motion, set aside the verdict in part, reinstate the amended complaint and grant a new trial on the issue of proximate cause only.

MEMORANDUM: