GOTTSTINE v. DUNLOP TIRE CORPORATION (2000)

Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim but properly denied that part of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing that claim.   William Gottstine (plaintiff) was injured at a worksite owned by defendant.   While constructing a foundation for the installation of a tire press, he was required to walk over a rebar mat approximately 18 inches above the bottom of a pit two feet deep, 14 feet wide and 16 feet long.   There was a second level of rebar mat four inches above the bottom of the pit.   The mats were constructed in a “checkerboard” design covering the pit.   Plaintiff was required to carry heavy metal leveling plates to the location where they would be installed.   While carrying a plate, his foot slipped and his leg went through a 12 inch by 12 inch opening in the mats.   The plate struck plaintiff's knee, causing injury.

 The hazards contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1) are those where safety devices are required because of a difference in elevation levels (see, Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 762, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104, 698 N.E.2d 933;  Lajeunesse v. Feinman, 218 A.D.2d 827, 828-829, 630 N.Y.S.2d 409;  see also, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82).   A worker who falls into a trench from the side is not covered by Labor Law § 240(1) because such an injury results from the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site (see, e.g., Bradshaw v. National Structures, 249 A.D.2d 921, 672 N.Y.S.2d 173;  Williams v. White Haven Mem. Park, 227 A.D.2d 923, 643 N.Y.S.2d 787;  see also, Mazzu v. Benderson Dev. Co., 224 A.D.2d 1009, 637 N.Y.S.2d 540).   Here, however, plaintiff was forced to walk on a mat suspended over the opening, and thus the mat is an elevated worksite within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) (see, Nichols v. Deer Run Investors, 204 A.D.2d 929, 931, 612 N.Y.S.2d 691).

 Plaintiffs submitted the deposition testimony of defendant's supervisor that planking could have been used on the area leading to the opening.   There was deposition testimony that planking could have prevented plaintiff's fall, and planking constitutes a safety device under Labor Law § 240(1) (see, Colern v. State of New York, 170 A.D.2d 1000, 1001, 566 N.Y.S.2d 154).   Defendant, however, submitted plaintiff's testimony that no safety devices were practical, none was customarily used for such work, and that plaintiff did not know what caused him to fall.   Issues of fact preclude summary judgment to either party with respect to the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

 The court properly denied that part of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it is based on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b).  Plaintiffs' submissions established that the 12 inch by 12 inch openings in the rebar mat were hazardous and could have been covered by planking.   The court erred, however, in failing to dismiss the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it is based on alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and (e) and 23-2.4(b) because those sections do not apply to the facts of this case.   Finally, the court erred in failing to dismiss the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it is based on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5(a) because that section does not set forth a specific safety standard (see, Williams v. White Haven Mem. Park, supra, at 923-924, 643 N.Y.S.2d 787;  see also, Adamczyk v. Hillview Estates Dev. Corp., 226 A.D.2d 1049, 1050, 641 N.Y.S.2d 925).

We modify the order, therefore, by denying plaintiffs' motion and by granting that part of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it is based on alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5(a), 23-1.7(d) and (e) and 23-2.4(b).

Order modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs.

I respectfully dissent in part.   In addition to those modifications ordered by the majority, I would further modify the order by granting that part of defendants' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.   The statute protects workers from those risks “inherent in the particular task because of the relative elevation at which the task must be performed * * *.   The contemplated hazards are those related to the effects of gravity where protective devices are called for * * * because of a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level” (Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932).   The risks addressed by the statute are “ ‘limited to such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height’ ” (Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 763, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104, 698 N.E.2d 933, quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82).   Here, plaintiff William Gottstine was injured while walking atop a grid of reinforcement bar, essentially laid at grade about 18 inches from the bottom of a shallow pit prepared for the pouring of a concrete slab.   His foot slipped through the grid, causing his knee to strike the rebar and to be struck by a metal plate that he was carrying.   In my view, the risk of misstepping on or through the rebar grid was one of the “usual and ordinary dangers at a construction site”, not “the type of extraordinary peril section 240(1) was designed to prevent” (Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrig. Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 914, 916, 690 N.Y.S.2d 852, 712 N.E.2d 1219;  see, Sousa v. American Ref-Fuel Co., 258 A.D.2d 514, 515, 685 N.Y.S.2d 279;  Duke v. Eastman Kodak Co., 248 A.D.2d 990, 990-991, 669 N.Y.S.2d 991).

MEMORANDUM:

All concur except KEHOE, J., who dissents in part in the following Memorandum: