MEGNA v. [And a Third-Party Action]. (2003)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered July 5, 2002, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, an elevator helper at a construction site, was injured when a temporary two-step wooden staircase leading to a temporary wooden landing collapsed under his weight and he fell to the ground.   As the temporary stairway was being used to facilitate plaintiff's access to a different elevation level, and therefore indisputably an elevation device within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) (see Hargobin v. K.A.F.C.I. Corp., 282 A.D.2d 31, 35, 724 N.Y.S.2d 155;  Wescott v. Shear, 161 A.D.2d 925, 557 N.Y.S.2d 493, appeal dismissed 76 N.Y.2d 846, 560 N.Y.S.2d 131, 559 N.E.2d 1290), the shortness of the distance of plaintiff's fall-at least two feet according to plaintiff, no more than 16 inches according to defendants-is irrelevant (see Siago v. Garbade Constr. Co., 262 A.D.2d 945, 701 N.Y.S.2d 538;  Binetti v. MK W. St. Co., 239 A.D.2d 214, 214-215, 657 N.Y.S.2d 648;  Norton v. Bell & Sons, 237 A.D.2d 928, 929, 654 N.Y.S.2d 512;  see also Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932).   Furthermore, plaintiff's proof that he fell when the staircase collapsed established a prima facie case of liability under Labor Law § 240(1) (see Greco v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 268 A.D.2d 300, 301, 702 N.Y.S.2d 29), and, there being no evidence that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the manner in which he fell or how he landed is also irrelevant (see Laquidara v. HRH Constr. Corp., 283 A.D.2d 169, 724 N.Y.S.2d 53;  Angeles v. Goldhirsch, 268 A.D.2d 217, 700 N.Y.S.2d 460).