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The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Melvin JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Budd G. Goodman, J. on speedy trial motion; Rena K. Uviller, J. at jury trial and sentence), rendered June 19, 2002, convicting defendant of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of 5 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's speedy trial motion. Since each of the adjournments at issue on appeal occurred after the People declared their readiness, the periods of delay would be chargeable to the People only if solely attributable to them (see People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 210, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9, 604 N.E.2d 71 [1992]; People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 536, 498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231 [1985]; People v. Jackson, 267 A.D.2d 183, 184, 700 N.Y.S.2d 453 [1999], lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 949, 710 N.Y.S.2d 5, 731 N.E.2d 622 [2000] ). “The record sufficiently establishes that the [first] adjournment was a delay occasioned by the exceptional circumstances of the World Trade Center attacks and the resulting unavailability of police witnesses” (People v. Fuller, 8 A.D.3d 204, 780 N.Y.S.2d 320 [2004], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 706, 785 N.Y.S.2d 34, 818 N.E.2d 676 [2004] ) and that the second period at issue was necessitated by defense counsel's vacation (see People v. Brown, 207 A.D.2d 556, 557, 616 N.Y.S.2d 389 [1994] ). Although in each of these instances the assigned prosecutor was engaged in another matter, in neither case was the delay solely attributable to the People. Our determination that the first two periods were excludable renders the excludability of the third period academic.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing a reasonable limitation on defendant's cross-examination of a prosecution witness, and this limitation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or of his right to confront this witness (see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 [1986] ).
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Decided: April 12, 2005
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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