Mamie W.-K., Respondent-Appellant.  (Appeal No. 1.) v. << (2006)

 Respondent contends in each appeal that Family Court erred in terminating her parental rights with respect to her two children because petitioner failed to establish that she is presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness, to provide proper and adequate care for the children (see Social Services Law § 384-b[4][c] ).  We reject that contention.   Petitioner presented the requisite clear and convincing evidence establishing that respondent is suffering from mental illness “to such an extent that if [the children] were placed in or returned to the custody of [respondent], [they] would be in danger of becoming ․ neglected child[ren]” (§ 384-b[6][a];  see Matter of Stephen B., 176 A.D.2d 1204, 1205, 576 N.Y.S.2d 701, lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 752, 580 N.Y.S.2d 198, 588 N.E.2d 96, appeal dismissed 79 N.Y.2d 914, 581 N.Y.S.2d 666, 590 N.E.2d 251).   Contrary to respondent's further contention, the court was not required to conduct a separate dispositional hearing (see generally Matter of Joyce T., 65 N.Y.2d 39, 41-42, 489 N.Y.S.2d 705, 478 N.E.2d 1306).

 We recognize, however, that the termination of the parental rights of a biological parent results in an abrupt and complete cessation of contact between a child and the parent, and that “psychological harm ․ may possibly result from severing the bonds between a child and his or her biological parent, particularly where the child is older and has strong emotional attachments to the birth family” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 90, 544 N.Y.S.2d 535, 542 N.E.2d 1052).   We conclude that, in the event that parental rights are terminated after a finding that the parent is unable by reason of mental illness or mental retardation to provide proper and adequate care for his or her child or after a finding of permanent neglect (see Social Services Law § 384-b [4][c], [d] ), Family Court may, in those cases in which the court deems it appropriate, exercise its discretion in determining whether some form of posttermination contact with the biological parent is in the best interests of the child (cf. Matter of Labron P., 23 A.D.3d 943, 945, 804 N.Y.S.2d 453;  Matter of April S., 307 A.D.2d 204, 204-205, 762 N.Y.S.2d 380, lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 504, 775 N.Y.S.2d 781, 807 N.E.2d 894;  see generally Family Ct. Act § 634;  Matter of Jessica Marie Q., 303 A.D.2d 512, 514, 757 N.Y.S.2d 304, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 507, 764 N.Y.S.2d 235, 795 N.E.2d 1244).   To the extent that our decisions in Matter of Kenneth D., 32 A.D.3d 1237, 821 N.Y.S.2d 698 and Matter of Livingston County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Tracy T., 16 A.D.3d 1133, 792 N.Y.S.2d 273 hold otherwise, they are no longer to be followed.   We therefore modify the orders by remitting these matters to Family Court for a hearing to determine whether posttermination contact between respondent and her children is in the best interests of the children (cf. Joyce T., 65 N.Y.2d at 46 n. 2, 489 N.Y.S.2d 705, 478 N.E.2d 1306;  Stephen B., 176 A.D.2d at 1205, 576 N.Y.S.2d 701;  see generally Matter of Corinthian Marie S., 297 A.D.2d 382, 746 N.Y.S.2d 606).   We note that, in determining the best interests of the children, the court may consider, inter alia, the ages of the children, the bond between respondent and the children, and the likelihood that the children will be adopted.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is modified on the law by remitting the matter to Family Court, Erie County, for a hearing in accordance with the Memorandum and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM:

All concur, KEHOE, J., not participating.