PEOPLE v. BENNETT (2000)

 We reject the contention that defendant was denied a fair trial as the result of violations of the People's disclosure obligations under CPL 240.45 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.   Even if the failure to disclose the record of the disorderly conduct conviction of a prosecution witness constituted a violation of CPL 240.45(1)(b), defendant was not thereby denied a fair trial because he “was ‘given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the witness' ” (People v. Osborne, 91 N.Y.2d 827, 828, 666 N.Y.S.2d 556, 689 N.E.2d 526, quoting People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868, 870, 523 N.Y.S.2d 463, 517 N.E.2d 1349;  see also, People v. Clark, 228 A.D.2d 326, 644 N.Y.S.2d 236, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 863, 653 N.Y.S.2d 286, 675 N.E.2d 1239).   The prosecutor complied with his obligation to disclose “[t]he existence of any pending criminal action against a witness the people intend to call at trial” by identifying the charges pending against the witness (CPL 240.45[1][c] ).   The prosecutor had no obligation pursuant to CPL 240.45(1)(b) to disclose the juvenile delinquency adjudication of another witness because that adjudication is not a criminal conviction (see, People v. Gray, 84 N.Y.2d 709, 712, 622 N.Y.S.2d 223, 646 N.E.2d 444;  see also, People v. Fyffe, 249 A.D.2d 938, 672 N.Y.S.2d 552, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 897, 680 N.Y.S.2d 61, 702 N.E.2d 846).   Even assuming that the prosecutor had an obligation to disclose the adjudication prior to trial on the ground that it constitutes Brady material (see, Matter of Evan U., 244 A.D.2d 691, 693-694, 664 N.Y.S.2d 189), we note that the adjudication was disclosed while the witness was testifying and thus conclude that defendant had a meaningful opportunity to use it during his cross-examination of that witness (see, People v. Cortijo, supra, at 870, 523 N.Y.S.2d 463, 517 N.E.2d 1349;  People v. Pepe, 259 A.D.2d 949, 949-950, 689 N.Y.S.2d 310, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 1024, 697 N.Y.S.2d 583, 719 N.E.2d 944).   Thus, defendant was not denied a fair trial by the delayed disclosure (see, People v. Pepe, supra, at 949-50, 689 N.Y.S.2d 310).

The contention that the prosecutor bolstered the testimony of his key witness is not preserved for our review (see, CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Alston, 163 A.D.2d 398, 558 N.Y.S.2d 123, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 851, 560 N.Y.S.2d 991, 561 N.E.2d 891), and we decline to exercise our power to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15[6][a] ).   We reject defendant's contentions that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672) and that the sentence is unduly harsh or severe.

Judgment unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: