EWEN MASSA v. HEMMERLEIN (1997)

 Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred.   Plaintiff Alice Ewen-Massa returned to defendant's office seeking treatment “for a matter related to the initial treatment” (McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 406, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108) and was treated by defendant's physician's assistant.   We conclude that there is a sufficient relationship between the physician's assistant and defendant to warrant application of the continuous treatment doctrine and that the complaint was not untimely (see, CPLR 214-a;  Ganapolskaya v. V.I.P. Med. Assocs., 221 A.D.2d 59, 62-63, 644 N.Y.S.2d 735;  Pierre-Louis v. Ching-Yuan Hwa, 182 A.D.2d 55, 58, 587 N.Y.S.2d 17;  Watkins v. Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233, 237-239, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768).

 We reject defendant's contention that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to toll the Statute of Limitations with respect to plaintiff Paul T. Massa's derivative claim (see, Cappelluti v. Sckolnick, 207 A.D.2d 763, 616 N.Y.S.2d 398).

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: