PALMER v. NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (2008)

 Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that he was terminated from his employment with defendant in retaliation for his having advised defendant's employees and agents of alleged safety violations at his work site.   Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.   The first cause of action, alleging the violation of Civil Service Law § 75-b, “seeks only to vindicate [plaintiff's] individual interests,” and it therefore is precluded based on plaintiff's failure to file a notice of claim pursuant to Public Authorities Law § 1299-p(1) (Roens v. New York City Tr. Auth., 202 A.D.2d 274, 274, 609 N.Y.S.2d 6;  see Matter of Rigle v. County of Onondaga, 267 A.D.2d 1088, 701 N.Y.S.2d 222, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 764, 708 N.Y.S.2d 53, 729 N.E.2d 710).   That cause of action also is not viable because Civil Service Law § 75-b(2)(a)(i) prohibits a public employer from, inter alia, terminating a public employee based on the employee's disclosure of the “violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety” (see generally Peace v. KRNH, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 914, 785 N.Y.S.2d 547, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 705, 792 N.Y.S.2d 898, 825 N.E.2d 1093;  Gardner v. Continuing Dev. Servs., 292 A.D.2d 838, 739 N.Y.S.2d 302, lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 612, 749 N.Y.S.2d 475, 779 N.E.2d 186, cert. denied 537 U.S. 1201, 123 S.Ct. 1297, 154 L.Ed.2d 1042;  Vail-Ballou Press v. Tomasky, 266 A.D.2d 662, 663-664, 698 N.Y.S.2d 98;  Green v. Saratoga A.R.C., 233 A.D.2d 821, 822, 650 N.Y.S.2d 441).   Here, defendant established as a matter of law that the safety concerns raised by plaintiff did not present such a danger, and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718).   Moreover, defendant established that the supervisors who terminated plaintiff's employment were unaware of plaintiff's disclosure, and thus there is no causal connection on the record before us between the disclosure of plaintiff's safety concerns and plaintiff's termination (see Matter of Chamberlin v. Jacobson, 260 A.D.2d 317, 689 N.Y.S.2d 83). Plaintiff's “mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” to raise a triable issue of fact concerning the knowledge of plaintiff's supervisors (Zuckerman, 49 N.Y.2d at 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718).

We note that plaintiff on appeal has raised no issues concerning the dismissal of the remaining cause of action and thus is deemed to have abandoned any such issues (see Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora, 202 A.D.2d 984, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: