PEOPLE v. MULLINS (1998)

 Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of two counts each of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03) stemming from two separate incidents.   He was charged as a principal in one of the incidents and as an accomplice in the other.   Because the evidence with respect to the assault in which defendant was charged as a principal was admissible to establish identity and intent with respect to the assault in which he was charged as an accomplice (see, People v. Read, 175 A.D.2d 602, 572 N.Y.S.2d 259, lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 863, 580 N.Y.S.2d 734, 588 N.E.2d 769), the criminal transactions were properly joined under section 200.20(2)(b).   Once the offenses were properly joined, Supreme Court “lacked statutory authority to sever” (People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892, 895, 515 N.Y.S.2d 227, 507 N.E.2d 1083;  see, People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 451 N.Y.S.2d 6, 436 N.E.2d 456;  People v. Christopher, 101 A.D.2d 504, 533, 476 N.Y.S.2d 640, revd. on other grounds 65 N.Y.2d 417, 492 N.Y.S.2d 566, 482 N.E.2d 45, rearg. denied 65 N.Y.2d 1054, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 484 N.E.2d 1055).  We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.

Judgment unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: