Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Gail STRICKLER, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. Frederic MARSH, Defendant-Respondent-Appellant.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Sherry Klein Heitler, J., upon decision of Richard Andrias, J.), entered November 8, 1996, which, inter alia, awarded plaintiff a distribution of $30,000 as her equitable share of the increased value of defendant's cooperative apartment, directed plaintiff to pay $281,035 to defendant as reimbursement for the contribution of his separate assets toward the purchase of the marital home, and denied the parties' respective demands for attorneys fees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Defendant purchased Apartment 1701 with his separate funds prior to the marriage. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(d)(1) defines separate property narrowly as “property acquired before marriage”, and commands that “[s]eparate property shall remain such” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5] [b]; Zelnik v. Zelnik, 169 A.D.2d 317, 332, 573 N.Y.S.2d 261). Thus, apartment 1701 was properly found to be the separate property of defendant. However, the evidence also amply supported the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff contributed both directly and indirectly toward the increased value of the apartment and, accordingly, was entitled to equitable distribution of that increased value (Domestic Relation Law § 236[B][1][d][3]; Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 11, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219, 503 N.E.2d 684). With respect to the distribution of the apartment's increased value, we perceive no error in the trial court's determination of either the valuation date or the respective distributive percentages of the parties given their respective contributions. We also perceive no error in the court's calculation of the credit granted defendant by reason of the contribution of his separate funds toward the purchase of the Arrowhead Road property (see Heine v. Heine, 176 A.D.2d 77, 84, 580 N.Y.S.2d 231), reduced as the credit was by defendant's proportionate share of the obligation under the defaulted mortgage in accordance with the prior January 15, 1994 order of the IAS court. Finally, the documentary evidence indicates that the $150,000 donated by defendant's parents was made as a gift to defendant alone.
We have considered the parties' remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Thank you for your feedback!
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Decided: February 19, 1998
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)