DOE v. MARZOLF (1999)

 Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's motion to vacate and set aside the parties' stipulation.  “Unless public policy is violated, the parties are free to chart their own procedural course, and ‘ “may fashion the basis upon which a particular controversy will be resolved” ’ (Mitchell v. New York Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 208, 214 [473 N.Y.S.2d 148, 461 N.E.2d 285], quoting Cullen v. Naples, 31 N.Y.2d 818, 820 [339 N.Y.S.2d 464, 291 N.E.2d 587])” (Loretto-Utica Props. Corp. v. Douglas Co., 226 A.D.2d 1058, 1059, 642 N.Y.S.2d 117).   We perceive no violation of public policy in the parties' agreement to resolve the issue of defendant's liability on the basis of polygraph test results (see, Zinn v. Bernic Constr., 99 Misc.2d 510, 515, 416 N.Y.S.2d 725).   Nor is there evidence of fraud, collusion, mistake or accident warranting the exercise of the court's discretionary power to relieve defendant of the consequences of his stipulation (see, Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178;  Przewlocki v. City of Lackawanna, 112 A.D.2d 757, 492 N.Y.S.2d 256).  Defendant entered into a stipulation setting forth the manner in which his liability would be determined, and his “subsequent change of heart provides an inadequate basis for vacating the stipulation” (Matter of Kennedy v. Friedlander, 99 A.D.2d 757, 471 N.Y.S.2d 673).

Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs, motion denied and stipulation reinstated.

MEMORANDUM: