DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CITY OF NEW YORK v. Steven Green, Respondent-Respondent. (2005)

Order dated April 2, 2004 (Kevin C. McClanahan, J.) reversed, with $10 costs, motion denied and default judgment reinstated.

For reasons stated in DHPD v. 532-536 West 143rd St. Realty Corp. (appeal numbered 04-283, decided herewith), we find no basis to vacate the April 2000 default judgment issued against respondent Green in this Housing Part enforcement proceeding.   We additionally note that any irregularity as may have existed in the affidavit of nonmilitary service accompanying petitioner's application for a default judgment (see Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 [50 USC Appendix § 501 et seq.] ) did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect or provide a legal basis to vacate the default judgment otherwise properly issued, at least in these circumstances where the defaulting party “has made no pretense of being on active military duty or being a military dependent at the time of his default.”  (Citibank, N.A. v. McGarvey, 196 Misc.2d 292, 301, 765 N.Y.S.2d 163 [2003].)

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

I concur.   In granting vacatur of the default judgment entered in this heat and hot water proceeding, Civil Court held that the failure to file a non-military affidavit, pursuant to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 520, prior to the entry of the default judgment “deprives the court of jurisdiction to enter the judgment” and “renders the judgment void ab initio.”   Although the issue has apparently not been directly addressed by published state appellate authority in New York, it has been consistently held that the filing of the required affidavit is not jurisdictional, and that a default judgment is not void but merely voidable upon application of the serviceman, contrary to Civil Court's determination herein.   See PNC Bank, N.A. v. Kemenash, 335 N.J.Super. 124, 761 A.2d 118 (2000);  United States v. Hampshire, 892 F.Supp. 1327, 1332 (D.Kan.1995);   Desjarlais v. Gilman, 143 Vt. 154, 463 A.2d 234 (1983);  Sarfaty v. Sarfaty, 534 F.Supp. 701, 704 (E.D.Pa., 1982);  Rish Equipment Co. v. Reasonover, 1979 WL 207085 (Ohio App.);  Courtney v. Warner, 290 So.2d 101 (Fl.App.1974);  Davidson v. General Fin. Corp., 295 F.Supp. 878, 881 (N.D.Ga., 1968);  Haller v. Walczak, 347 Mich. 292, 79 N.W.2d 622 (1956);   Sanchez v. Sobieski, 3 Ill.App.2d 479, 122 N.E.2d 602 (Ill.App.1954);   Hudson v. Hightower, 307 Ky. 295, 210 S.W.2d 933 (1948);  Allen v. Allen, 30 Cal.2d 433, 182 P.2d 551 (1947);  Bristow v. Pagano, 238 Iowa 1075, 29 N.W.2d 423 (1947);  Snapp v. Scott, 196 Okla. 658, 167 P.2d 870 (1946);   Lyle v. Haskins, 24 Wash.2d 883, 168 P.2d 797 (1946);  Mims Bros. v. N.A. James, 174 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.1943);  Alzugaray v. Onzurez, 25 N.M. 662, 187 P. 549 (1920);  Howie Min. Co. v. McGary, 256 F. 38 (N.Dist.W.Va.1919);  State v. District Court, 55 Mont. 602, 179 P. 831 (1919);  Eureka Homestead Soc. v. Clark, 145 La. 917, 918, 83 So. 190 (1919);  see generally Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 63 S.Ct. 1223, 87 L.Ed. 1587 (1943);  American Law of Veterans, p. 706, § 894.

PER CURIAM.