PEOPLE v. SOE (2005)

Decision on Motion

In a case of first impression, the Court has been requested to rule on the standard of proof for both the level of intent and voluntary acts needed for legal sufficiency of a simplified infraction under the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York State.   Accordingly, the motion of the defendant to dismiss the simplified traffic information, is determined as hereby provided.

FACTS

The defendant, Robert Soe, is charged with failure to stop at a stop sign, a traffic infraction under Section 1172 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The facts of the case are essentially without dispute.   The defendant was visiting a friend in Valley Stream, New York, Nassau County, where he was staying after surgery.   On April 26, 2005, he drove a few miles away to Franklin Square to visit his daughter.   On his way back to his friend's house in Valley Stream, he began to feel uncomfortable and pulled over to the side of the road.   Three days earlier, the defendant had been given a prescription for four different medications, including Welbutrin XL, a medicine known for blackouts and seizures.   After the defendant had rested for 20 minutes, he continued on his trip back to his friend's house.   At approximately 8:57 p.m., the defendant's vehicle was observed by the police patrolman as traveling through a stop sign at the corner of Hendrickson and East Avenue in the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, Nassau County, New York. The defendant is issued a simplified traffic infraction for failure to stop at a stop sign under VTL 1172.

The defendant claims that he was unaware that he had gone through the stop sign.   He also claims that he experienced a “black-out” or “seizure” that resulted in his momentary lack of consciousness.   The defendant was also unfamiliar with the area as he was a temporary visitor.

After the incident, the defendant revisited his doctor who informed him that the use of Welbutrin XL plus the other prescription drugs he consumed, could have resulted in both blackouts and/or seizures.   Therefore, the doctor readjusted the medicine, and no further complications occurred.

Lastly, the defendant notes that in 26 years of driving, this is the first occurrence where a ticket has been issued.

THE LAW

 In order for this vehicle and traffic infraction to be dismissed, we must examine as we do in all criminal actions, if the elements have or have not been satisfied.  People v. Zapletova, 191 Misc.2d 48, 742 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Greene Co. Ct.2002).   This includes the most elementary of aspects of criminal law, and include what, if any, mental intent is necessary (“mens rea”) and if the voluntary acts of the defendant were sufficient (“actus reas”).

 As a general rule, mental intent is usually determined by the language of the statute such as “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly” and “criminal negligence.”  Penal Law 15.05;  People v. Chessman, 75 A.D.2d 187, 429 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2nd Dept.1980).   If the statute is silent, then proof of a mental state can be presented if logically the offense would require a mental state.  People v. Patterson, 185 Misc.2d 519, 708 N.Y.S.2d 815 (New York Crim. Ct.2000).   However, a court should interpret the statute in a reasonable manner.  Statewide Roofing, Inc. v. Eastern Suffolk Bd., 173 Misc.2d 514, 661 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Suffolk Co. Sup.Ct.1997).   Also, a court should not read into a statute that which could not reasonably be found.  New York Life Insurance v. State Tax Commission, 80 A.D.2d 675, 436 N.Y.S.2d 380 (3rd Dept.1981) aff'd 55 N.Y.2d 758, 447 N.Y.S.2d 245, 431 N.E.2d 970 (1981).

 The statute under which the defendant is charged, reads in relevant part “Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line ․” VTL 1172(a).   For over 75 years, this statute has remained unchanged and continuous under each generation of motor vehicle laws.

Interestingly, these are no cases of record that define the mental intent of a traffic infraction where a moving violation is charged, at least not since the New York State Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law was restructured and put in effect on October 1, 1960 (Laws 1959, Chapter 775) thus superceding the previous law originally enacted in 1929.   However, several cases decided under the original 1929 motor vehicle law could shed some light for interpretation.

In People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Utica City Ct., 1941):  aff'd 178 Misc. 625, 36 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Oneida County Ct.1942), a city court judge held in a parking violation case, that “intent, while often an essential element of a crime, is not an element of the offense here charged.   This is a traffic infraction rather than a crime.”  Baxter, supra at 323.   In People v. Janoske, 206 Misc. 155, 132 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Broome County Ct.1954) the county court held in a case charging improperly passing a stopped school bus, the People are not required to establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant, so long as the prosecution satisfactorily proves that it was a bona fide school bus displaying its flashing red lights and did not permit the defendant's vehicle to proceed.

While Baxter and Janoske provide us with some guidance, both cases concern the 1929 Vehicle and Traffic Law, and there are no cases concerning the current 1960 law.   However, such cases may have continued authority if, as in the case at bar, the new Vehicle and Traffic Law essentially mirrors its pre-1960 counter part.   There, the 1960 law would be viewed as a an uninterrupted continuation of the 1929 law.   General Constitution Law Section 95 supports this interpretation and reads as follows:

Effect of the repeal of a statute by another statute substantially re-enacting the former

The provisions of a law repealing a prior law, which are substantial re-enactments of provisions of the prior law, shall be construed as a continuation of such provisions of such prior law, modified or amended according to the language employed, and not as new enactments.

In a case similar to the case at bar, a trial judge held that due to the fact the Environmental Conservation Law was substantially a re-enactment of the old Conservation Law, it is to be construed as simply a continuation of prior law and not a new enactment and should be interpreted accordingly.   People v. Heath, 77 Misc.2d 215, 352 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Schuyler Co. Ct.1974).

Therefore, due to the identical nature of both the 1929 and 1960 village and traffic statutes, it is clear no intent required for the traffic infraction of failure to stop at a stop sign under VTL 1172.

As intent is not at issue here, the next question to be addressed is did the physical actions (“actus reas”) of the defendant satisfy the requirements for a sufficient traffic infraction.

 For these to be criminal liability, there must be, at minimum, a voluntary act.  People v. Carlo, 46 A.D.2d 764, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dept.1974).   As a general rule, a “voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, Penal Law 15.00(2).

 The definition of a “voluntary act” excludes reflex actions or bodily movements performed during unconsciousness, hypnosis, amnesia or similar mental states.  People v. Hager, 124 Misc.2d 123, 476 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Nassau Co. Ct.1984) see also National Elevator Industry v. NYS Tax Commission, 49 N.Y.2d 538, 427 N.Y.S.2d 586, 404 N.E.2d 709 (1980).

 While an act may be criminal without intent or knowledge, an involuntary act is not criminal.  Penal Law 15.10;  People v. Marzulli, 76 Misc.2d 971, 351 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup.Ct. App. Term 2nd Dept.1973).   To Sustain a crime or violation, it is an absolute necessity that there at least be some form of voluntary act or omission:  People v. Shaughnessy, 66 Misc.2d 19, 319 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.1971).

 In the instant case, it is clear the defendant suffered from unforeseen seizures and blackouts, resulting in his failure to stop at the stop sign.   There is sufficient medical evidence and testimony to establish that the defendant was unconscious and his action of passing through the stop sign was an involuntary act.   Thus, as a result of the involuntariness of the defendant's actions the People have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for the charges in the instant case.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the simplified traffic infraction is granted in its entirety.   This determination shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERT G. BOGLE, J.