Salah Abdelrahman, Claimant, v. The State of New York, Defendant. (2025)

In this claim, Salah Abdelrahman,¹ a formerly incarcerated individual, seeks damages for physical and emotional injuries that he suffered after being attacked by another incarcerated individual while they were housed at Franklin Correctional Facility in October 2022. Claimant alleges that state corrections officials knew about threats this other individual had made to claimant on prior occasions and, further, that claimant was wrongfully written up and disciplined as a result of the assault when he was not at fault and had done nothing wrong. In addition to his testimony, claimant offered several exhibits, all of which were received in evidence. Defendant proffered the testimony of a corrections officer and a facility nurse, as well as several exhibits which were also received in evidence.² After considering the testimony and documentary evidence presented at trial, as well as the applicable law, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Trial Evidence

The Court found claimant's consistent and emotional testimony to be articulate, compelling, and entirely credible. Claimant was formerly incarcerated in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and, in 2022, was housed at Franklin Correctional Facility. There, claimant worked in the mess hall on the food line, serving up meals to other incarcerated individuals during his various shifts at breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Claimant often worked seven days a week and was a model prisoner who stayed out of trouble. No disciplinary charges had ever been brought against him before the ticket resulting from the underlying incident.

During each shift, claimant was specifically instructed by corrections staff about how much of each food item to serve to each incarcerated individual and he was not allowed to give anyone extra portions. Other incarcerated individuals often complained to food service workers, including claimant, about the size of the portions being served. On several occasions in October 2022, including on October 10, 15, and 18, incarcerated individual Shane Brown complained about small portions to claimant. For example, claimant testified that Brown wanted five scoops of rice rather than just the three allowed, or six pieces of chicken rather than three. Claimant initially thought Brown was joking, but Brown would get angry. He would come through the line cursing and saying things like "there's nobody looking, give me extra food."³ Claimant consistently refused to serve Brown extra food and told Brown he could not give him more because claimant would be fired. Claimant initially testified that Brown regularly made these complaints in front of the facility's civilian kitchen staff, as well as the corrections officers observing the food service line, including Corrections Officer Christopher Ball. Upon hearing such statements, claimant testified that prison staff would direct Brown to move on or get out of the line if he did not like what was being served, but did not take any other action. Claimant stated that Brown also once said "If I catch you in the street, you're going to have a problem." When asked by the Court to clarify whether Brown made any specific threats against claimant that would have been heard by prison staff, claimant reiterated only that Brown would complain about the size of the food portions. And in contrast to his earlier testimony, claimant then noted that Brown would make these statements during the moments when officers were temporarily away from their posts and not present to overhear. On cross-examination, claimant testified that he reported Brown's repeated complaints to corrections staff, but acknowledged that he never expressed any concerns for his safety, nor requested protective custody as a result of his interactions with Brown in the mess hall.

In the early morning of October 22, 2022, around 7:00 a.m., claimant testified that he left his dormitory building to walk to the mess hall building to eat breakfast. It was still dark out when claimant exited the building onto the walkway. Suddenly, claimant was violently attacked by Brown, who came out of nowhere, cursing at claimant for not giving him enough food. Claimant fell to the ground, screaming for help and bleeding from Brown's punches, but no corrections officers were in either of the two nearby "bubbles" to see what happened and come to his aid. Claimant was 62 years old at the time of the attack; Brown was nearly 20 years younger, taller, stronger, and more fit than claimant. Two incarcerated individuals witnessed the attack. Officers eventually arrived and separated the two men, who were then handcuffed and separately transported to the infirmary. Claimant testified that he never punched Brown and that no officer witnessed the attack, but that the responding officers falsely accused claimant of starting trouble and fighting with Brown.⁴

Claimant suffered a broken ring finger on his right hand, lower back pain in the area where he had had prior back surgery in 2019, as well as the loss of his upper denture which had been knocked out during the attack and left him unable to eat normally for six months. He reported his injuries to facility medical staff a few days later on October 27, 2022 (see Exh C, at 1). At that time he reported pain and swelling of his right hand ring finger which he was unable to bend, as well as lower back pain. Although the report of the initial x-ray of claimant's finger taken a few weeks after the incident did not indicate any fracture (see Exh D, at 2), a subsequent x-ray revealed that claimant had in fact sustained a sliver avulsion fracture of the distal phalanx (see Exh E).

On cross-examination, claimant was asked about the "Inmate Injury Report" which had been prepared in connection with the incident and recorded that claimant had reported no injuries on the date of the incident (see Exh B, at 3). Claimant was first asked if that was his signature on the document, and he unequivocally denied that was his signature and explained how he signs his full name. Upon further cross-examination, claimant also vigorously denied that he would have stated that he suffered no injuries, which he reported to facility medical staff just a few days later after the pain began to manifest more significantly.

Ultimately, disciplinary charges were brought against both claimant and Brown for the incident. In a misbehavior report authored by a Corrections Officer Brassard, claimant was charged with violent conduct and fighting (see Exh A, at 3). In the report, Brassard stated that he observed claimant "exchanging closed fist blows" with Brown (id.). Despite receiving an offer from the hearing officer to plead guilty in exchange for a limited sanction of only 10 days, claimant elected to proceed with a Tier II hearing to clear his name because he did not do anything wrong, the attack by Brown was wholly unprovoked, and he believed that Brassard falsified the misbehavior report because neither he nor any other officer were there to witness the incident. Although claimant appeared to state at trial that the incarcerated individual witnesses he requested did not testify at the ensuing hearing, and further that he was not sure if the hearing officer actually spoke with Brassard during his telephonic testimony or was just pretending to do so, the hearing disposition packet indicates that the two incarcerated individuals requested by claimant and Brassard all testified in claimant's presence (see id. at 4). Following the hearing, claimant was found guilty and received a penalty of 60 days' loss of privileges, including loss of recreation, phone, tablet, packages, and commissary (see also id. at 5). In the disposition rendered, the hearing officer made no detailed factual findings, stating only that he credited Brassard's report and testimony that Brassard observed claimant "throwing closed fist blows" at Brown (id. at 6).

At trial, claimant was extremely emotional in describing how dehumanizing the entire ordeal—from the attack to the disciplinary proceedings—had felt for him. He also testified about how his family thought he had died in prison because he was unable to call them during the penalty period, and how much stress he was under by not being able to speak with them. He was also provided only cold meals during this period and was suspended from his prison job. Although claimant grieved and administratively appealed the determination, it was not reversed or expunged (see Exhs 6-7).

At the close of claimant's case, defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that claimant failed to establish a prima facie case. Defendant first argued that negligence cannot be inferred solely due to the attack on claimant by another incarcerated individual because the assault was not foreseeable. With respect to claimant's wrongful confinement cause of action, defendant argued that the penalty imposed on claimant did not include disciplinary confinement and, further, that this Court had no jurisdiction over the determination because claimant was afforded all the due process to which he was entitled in his disciplinary proceedings. Claimant opposed and the Court reserved decision.

Defendant called Nichole Gokey, whose signature appears on the "Inmate Injury Report" and other facility health records documenting claimant's medical treatment. Gokey is a registered nurse who has worked at Franklin Correctional Facility since 2013. She testified that if an incarcerated individual had been involved in an altercation, an "Inmate Injury Report" would be prepared simultaneously with the evaluation of the individual by facility medical staff. The report would document any injuries present or indicate that no injuries were noted. Gokey explained that she would typically fill out the report which would then be signed by the incarcerated individual and a sergeant. Gokey had no recollection of the underlying incident, but upon reviewing the "Inmate Injury Report" that she claimed to have prepared and filled out on October 22, 2022, she testified that claimant reported he had no injuries (see Exh B, at 3). Gokey further testified that she would have included any claim of injury reported by claimant or that she herself observed in the report. Upon cross-examination and reviewing the document again, Gokey noted that the "Inmate Injury Report" appears to contain two signatures for claimant, one in the section entitled "Inmate Signature" and another in the section designated for an "Inmate Statement" (Exh B, at 3). Gokey further testified on cross-examination that claimant would have signed the document in front of her and that no one forged his signature, but acknowledged that she did not know how claimant signs his name. Notably, the two signatures on the report that are purportedly claimant's do not match each other, nor do they remotely match claimant's signature as reflected in the pleadings and several other papers he has filed or submitted in this Court in connection with this claim. Although the Court is troubled by this, no explanation was provided at trial by either party for this discrepancy.

Officer Christopher Ball testified that he has been a corrections officer for nearly eight years and was assigned to Franklin Correctional Facility for most of that time. Ball was familiar with claimant as a former incarcerated individual who worked in the mess hall at that facility, but had no recollection of any specific interactions with him or with incarcerated individual Brown. In October 2022, Ball was assigned as a mess hall relief officer. In that capacity, Ball would stand at the food service line and observe the incarcerated individuals receiving their meals. Ball testified that he often saw incarcerated individuals gripe and complain about wanting more food and, if he heard anyone doing so, he would tell the person to move along. He further testified that complaints about the portions of food served would not have risen to the level of a safety or security concern at the facility, generally speaking. Ball also stated that he had no recollection of Brown or any other incarcerated individual making any threats to claimant. On cross-examination, Ball stated that he did not remember hearing any specific instances in which Brown made complaints about food portions to claimant while he was working the service line. In his redirect testimony, Ball stated that he did not recall claimant ever reporting to Ball that any incarcerated individual had threatened claimant in the mess hall.

Defendant renewed its motion to dismiss and the Court again reserved decision.

Analysis

As a threshold matter, only two causes of action are properly before this Court: (1) negligence based upon the State's failure to protect claimant from being assaulted by another incarcerated individual; and (2) wrongful confinement based upon alleged due process violations during the disciplinary proceedings that ensued after the attack on claimant. To the extent the claim asserts causes of action for alleged constitutional violations, federal constitutional claims cannot be brought in the Court of Claims, and a state constitutional tort action is unavailable where—as here—an adequate alternative remedy exists (see Cumberland v State of New York, 217 AD3d 1029, 1031 [3d Dept 2023]). And although claimant filed an amended claim that additionally raised a cause of action for medical malpractice, the amended claim is not properly before the Court because it was not timely filed as of right and claimant did not otherwise seek to amend his pleadings by stipulation or upon permission of the Court (see CPLR 3025 [a], [b]; 22 NYCRR 206.7 [b]; Answer to Amended Claim, ¶ 22). In any event, claimant offered nothing more than one conclusory statement at trial with respect to any medical malpractice claim and, thus, did not prove it by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

Turning first to the negligence claim, "[h]aving assumed physical custody of [incarcerated individuals], who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the State owes a duty of care to safeguard [incarcerated individuals], even from attacks by fellow [incarcerated individuals]" (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252 [2002]; see R.S. v State of New York, 231 AD3d 1376, 1376 [3d Dept 2024]). However, the State is not an "insurer of [incarcerated individual] safety and negligence cannot be inferred merely because an incident occurred" (Vasquez v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1275, 1276 [3d Dept 2009], citing Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253). Indeed, the State's duty is limited to protecting against "risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable," i.e., those that the State "knew or should have known" (id., citing Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253).

Initially, the Court finds that the incident unfolded exactly as claimant testified. But even crediting his testimony in full, the Court is constrained to hold that claimant failed to establish his claim of negligence because he did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant knew or should have known of a risk that claimant would be assaulted by Brown. Although corrections staff were aware that Brown complained about the food portions served by claimant, such complaints—even if angrily conveyed—would not reasonably have been perceived as threats and, thus, would not have rendered the attack foreseeable (see Silvera v State of New York, 306 AD2d 269 [2d Dept 2003]). Claimant attempted to describe a threat made by Brown but trailed off, and when asked by the Court whether there were any specific threats that could have been heard by staff, claimant did not say there were. And he almost immediately thereafter testified that Brown made his statements when officers were out of earshot. Moreover, claimant did not express fear for his safety to staff, did not request protective custody, and did not personally perceive any risk to his safety before the date of the assault. Indeed, claimant testified that he was completely blindsided by the unexpected attack. Nor did claimant proffer any evidence suggesting that Brown had any known proclivity for violence (see Vasquez, 68 AD3d at 1276).

Claimant also failed to establish a claim for wrongful confinement by a preponderance of the credible evidence. To prevail on a cause of action for wrongful confinement in the prison context, a claimant must establish that (1) defendant intended to confine the individual in a disciplinary housing unit or some other type of segregated or punitive confinement; (2) the individual was conscious of the confinement; (3) the individual did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not privileged (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 759 [2016]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; see also Miller v State of New York, 124 AD3d 997, 998 [3d Dept 2015]). Initially, as defendant argues, claimant does not have a valid cause of action for wrongful confinement because he was not subject to any type of punitive confinement as a result of his disciplinary hearing. Although a separate cause of action may lie in this Court for the wrongful loss of privileges (see Dorsette v State of New York, UID No. 2020-038-520 [Ct Cl, Feb. 25, 2020] [DeBow, J.] [collecting cases]), the State is absolutely immune from liability for harm caused by the discretionary, quasi-judicial actions of corrections employees in conducting disciplinary hearings (see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; see also id. at 219). Such immunity may be overcome only where employees exceed the scope of their authority or there is a violation of the constitutionally required "minimal due process safeguard[s]" to which incarcerated individuals are entitled (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 221 [citing 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 and 7 NYCRR Parts 252 through 254]; see Diaz v State of New York, 155 AD3d 1279, 1280 [3d Dept 2017]).

Here, defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for its disciplinary determination revoking claimant's privileges because the evidence adduced at trial shows that claimant received the due process protections to which he was entitled, including notice of the charges against him, the right to present witnesses, and a written hearing decision stating the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken (see Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 563-570 [1974]). Nor was the hearing officer acting outside the scope of the officer's authority. To the extent claimant asserts that the hearing officer improperly credited Brassard's account over claimant's and the other incarcerated individuals because the officer believed all incarcerated individuals are liars, such determination by the hearing officer is protected by absolute immunity even if it was rooted in malice, based on "egregious factual errors," or constituted an abuse of discretion (Mertens v State of New York, 73 AD3d 1376, 1377 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 706 [2010]; see Diaz, 155 AD3d at 1281; Torres v State of New York, UID No. 2022-061-227 [Ct Cl, Aug. 26, 2022] [R. Rivera, J.]).

Finally, although the Court is constrained to dismiss the claim because there is no rational process by which the State could be held liable, the Court nevertheless acknowledges the significant physical and emotional suffering that Mr. Abdelrahman experienced in a state correctional facility—through no fault of his own—at the hands of another incarcerated individual, and recognizes Mr. Abdelrahman's diligent pursuit of this matter to vindicate his painful and frustrating experience.

Any motions upon which the Court had previously reserved decision are hereby denied.

Let judgment be entered dismissing the claim in its entirety.

August 22, 2025

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

FOOTNOTES

1.   Claimant's first and last names were transposed in the claim filed with this Court, but at trial claimant confirmed that his first name is Salah and last name is Abdelrahman.

2.   Claimant's exhibits 1 through 5, part of exhibit 6, and exhibit 8 were admitted into evidence upon defendant's consent and stipulation; the remainder of exhibit 6, as well as exhibit 7, were admitted over defendant's objections. Claimant stipulated to the admission of defendant's exhibits A through E.

3.   Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the audio recording of the trial of this claim.

4.   Claimant testified that he believed there to be video evidence of the attack from cameras located in front of the mess hall as well as his dorm, but at a pre-trial conference held with the parties the Assistant Attorney General advised the Court that the State was not in possession of any such video evidence.

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.