Jeremy Zielinski, Claimant, v. The State of New York, Defendant. (2025)

In this claim, Jeremy Zielinski, an individual in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), seeks damages for his alleged wrongful confinement at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, in violation of the provisions of the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement (HALT) Act. Shortly after filing the claim, claimant filed two successive motions for partial summary judgment on liability (Mot Nos. M-99683 and M-100147). Defendant opposed the motions and cross-moved to dismiss the claim (Mot No. CM-100741), which claimant opposed. Before this Court could rule on those pending motions, claimant moved for an order directing the State to stop allegedly blocking claimant from accessing the Court of Claims decision database in correctional facility law libraries (Mot No. M-101617), asserting that he could not adequately respond to defendant's cross-motion to dismiss. That application was denied as it sought relief beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to grant (see Zielinski v State of New York, UID No. 2025-062-017 [Ct Cl, May 23, 2025] [Chaudhry, J.]); however, the Court provided claimant copies of each of the unpublished decisions cited in defendant's papers in support of its cross-motion and in opposition to summary judgment. Having adjourned the return dates of claimant's summary judgment motions and defendant's cross-motion to dismiss multiple times during the pendency of the application seeking law library access at claimant's request, the Court now turns to resolution of the remaining motions.

The Court begins with the State's cross-motion to dismiss, expressly made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendant first argues that the claim fails to state a cause of action over which this Court has jurisdiction because claimant is "essentially challenging the disposition of his [prison] disciplinary hearing," which was not overturned (Krenrich Aff in Supp of Cross-Mot and in Opp to M-100147, ¶ 15), as well as seeking review of DOCCS' administration of disciplinary procedures under the HALT Act, both of which defendant asserts implicate primarily equitable relief which should be sought in Supreme Court via proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see id. ¶ 18). Defendant further argues, in the alternative, that the claim fails to state a cause of action because, to the extent claimant seeks monetary damages, the State is immune from liability for the quasi-judicial actions of DOCCS officials under a theory of wrongful confinement (see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]). Defendant appears to misunderstand the claim and its allegations.

The claim alleges that claimant was unlawfully held in "segregated confinement" within the meaning of the HALT Act by DOCCS employees at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, "specifically [the facility] Superintendent" (Claim, ¶ 1). According to the claim, claimant arrived at Woodbourne on February 16, 2023, after being transferred out of Great Meadow Correctional Facility on February 11 immediately following a Tier II disciplinary hearing held on February 10 and which resulted in a sanction against claimant of 30 days' loss of recreation privileges.¹ The claim alleges that, because claimant was on "loss of rec" status upon arrival at Woodbourne, he was confined for up to 22 hours a day "[u]nder a policy made July 18, 2022 by [Woodbourne] Superintendent David Howard" to confine individuals serving " 'loss of rec' sanctions . . . for up to 22 hours a day" (Claim ¶¶ 5-6). Claimant grieved his confinement and the claim asserts that the Incarcerated Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC) agreed with claimant that the "Loss of Rec" policy results in "sanctions . . . more harsh than being placed in SHU" and that the IGRC felt that "the Loss of Rec policy needs to be looked at" (Claim ¶ 10; see also Krenrich Aff in Supp of Cross-Mot and in Opp to M-100147, Exh E, at 6). However, the grievance was ultimately denied upon the Superintendent's review. The claim alleges that the facility's policy was a violation of the HALT Act as well as DOCCS regulations, which do not permit segregated confinement for Tier II infractions and, thus, resulted in his wrongful confinement for 21 days.

When considering a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the Court must " 'accept the facts as alleged in the [claim] as true, accord [claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory' " (Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 175 [2021], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). With respect to a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) in particular, the Court's role is ordinarily limited to determining whether the claim states a cause of action (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). As further relevant here, in order to recover on a cause of action for wrongful confinement in the prison context, claimant must show that (1) defendant intended to confine claimant in segregated confinement; (2) claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not privileged (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 759 [2016]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; see also Miller v State of New York, 124 AD3d 997, 998 [3d Dept 2015]).

To be sure, as defendant contends, the loss of privileges is a sanction separate from confinement and a challenge to such a penalty does not sound in wrongful confinement (see Dorsette v State of New York, UID No. 2020-038-520 [Ct Cl, Feb. 25, 2020] [DeBow, J.], citing Stewart v State of New York, UID No. 2017-038-108 [Ct Cl, Aug. 22, 2017] [DeBow, J.], Lamage v State of New York, UID No. 2007-015-565 [Ct Cl, Nov. 5, 2007] [Collins, J.], Velasquez v State of New York, UID No. 2004-030-508 [Ct Cl, Feb. 19, 2004] [Scuccimarra, J.] and Rodriguez v State of New York, UID No. 2001-015-544 [Ct Cl, Nov. 15, 2001] [Collins, J.]). Claimant in fact readily concedes this point (see Cl's Affirm in Opp to Def's Cross-Mot, ¶ 11). However, contrary to defendant's characterization of the claim (see Krenrich Affirm in Supp of Cross-Mot and in Opp to Mot No. M-100147, ¶ 9), claimant is not seeking to challenge the disposition of his Tier II prison disciplinary hearing at Great Meadow or any loss-of-privileges sanction received as a result. Nor does claimant allege that he received a segregated confinement penalty in those Great Meadow proceedings. In addition, nothing in the claim seeks a broad review of DOCCS' administration of disciplinary procedures under the HALT Act, which like a challenge to the outcome of a prison disciplinary determination, would properly be the subject of a CPLR article 78 proceeding and/or declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court (see Fuquan F. v Annucci, 81 Misc 3d 517, 523 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2023]).

Rather, claimant alleges there is a specific policy in place at Woodbourne—the facility to which he was transferred immediately following the disciplinary disposition from Great Meadow—relating to individuals serving loss of recreation penalties that, when applied to claimant, effectively resulted in his segregated confinement for up to 22 hours per day for 21 days. The essence of the claim therefore is that defendant exceeded the scope of its authority by subjecting claimant to an unauthorized period of segregated confinement in violation of the HALT Act (see L 2021, ch 93). Defendant raises no argument that any such confinement would be entitled to the immunity afforded under Arteaga or was authorized under claimant's February 10, 2023, Great Meadow disciplinary disposition, or that such alleged confinement was otherwise privileged under the HALT Act or any other statutory authority.

Indeed, as claimant correctly points out, the HALT Act, which became effective March 31, 2022, defines "segregated confinement" as "the confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than [17] hours a day" (Correction Law § 2 [23], as amended by L 2021, ch 93, § 1 [emphasis added]; see Walker v Commissioner, 2025 NY Slip Op 02834, 235 NYS3d 486, 490 [3d Dept 2025]). Further, the HALT Act only permits the imposition of segregated confinement in limited circumstances, such as the "violat[ion of] department rules which permit a penalty of segregated confinement" (Correction Law § 137 [6] [k] [i]; see also Walker, 235 NYS3d at 489), which Tier II dispositions do not (see 7 NYCRR 253.7). And even when authorized, an incarcerated individual may not be held in segregated confinement for longer than 3 consecutive days, or longer than 6 days in any 30-day period (see Correction Law § 137 [6] [k] [i]), unless the individual has committed 1 of 7 offenses enumerated under section 137 (6) (k) (ii) (A) — (G) and DOCCS makes an individualized finding "based on specific objective criteria" that the individual's conduct poses significant and unreasonable risks to the security of the facility and the safety of staff and other incarcerated individuals (id. § 137 [6] [k] [ii]; see Booker v State of New York, 84 Misc 3d 590, 596-597 [Ct Cl 2024]; see also Matter of Peterkin v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2025 NY Slip Op 03617 [3d Dept 2025]). Additionally, even where such findings are made, individuals may not be held in segregated confinement for longer than 15 consecutive days, or more than 20 days in a 60-day period (see Correction Law § 137 [6] [i] [i]; Booker, 84 Misc 3d at 597; see also Peterkin, 2025 NY Slip Op 03617).

Thus, the arguments raised by defendant in support of its motion have no force here and, assuming the facts alleged in the claim to be true and affording claimant the benefit of every possible inference, he has sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful confinement (see Diaz v State of New York, Claim No. 139589, Motion No. M-101157 [Ct Cl, Feb. 14, 2025] [Sise, P.J.] [holding that Arteaga immunity doctrine does not apply to HALT Act violations]; cf. Booker, 84 Misc 3d at 597-598 [motion for late claim relief granted where proposed wrongful confinement claim had appearance of merit to extent it asserted violation of the HALT Act]; Delgado v State of New York, 82 Misc 3d 307, 312-313 [Ct Cl 2023] [same]).² To the extent, however, that claimant seeks to raise causes of action based upon violations of the New York State Constitution (see Claim ¶¶ 20-21), defendant is correct that such claims are not cognizable where the claimant has adequate alternative remedies—including, here, his wrongful confinement cause of action (see Cumberland v State of New York, 217 AD3d 1029, 1031 [3d Dept 2023]; see also Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83-84 [2001]).³ In addition, claimant's causes of action sounding in negligence must be dismissed because they are based on an alleged harm identical to that asserted in connection with the wrongful confinement claim (see Moreland v State of New York, 200 AD3d 1362, 1365 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 906 [2022]).

Although claimant's wrongful confinement cause of action survives defendant's cross-motion to dismiss, claimant is not entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Claimant's first motion for summary judgment (Mot. No. M-99683) was not accompanied by a copy of the pleadings, as required (see CPLR 3212 [b]; S.J. Capelin Assocs. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338, 341 [1974]) and, thus, may be dismissed on this ground alone (see Senor v State of New York, 23 AD3d 851, 852 [3d Dept 2005]). But even if such failure were excused by the Court or cured by claimant's submission of the pleadings with his reply papers (see Johnson v Collyer, 191 AD3d 1192, 1193 [3d Dept 2021]; Montalvo v Episcopal Health Servs., Inc., 172 AD3d 1357, 1359 [2d Dept 2019]; Pandian v New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 54 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2008]), the motion would nevertheless be denied because it is also not supported by any evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing the absence of material issues of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Matter of Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 33 NY3d 488, 496 [2019], citing Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; see also Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of NY v D'Agostino Supermarkets, Inc., 36 NY3d 69, 73-74 [2020]). Claimant's second motion for summary judgment (M-100147), although it contains copies of the pleadings, is similarly unsupported by admissible proof. Claimant's reliance in this second summary judgment motion on defendant's failure to respond to claimant's notice to admit under CPLR 3123 is unavailing. Initially, claimant appears correct that, in addition to service of the notice at any time after the service of the answer, the statute permits "the service of a notice to admit 20 days after the filing of the claim" (Peters v State of New York, 41 Misc 2d 980, 982 [Ct Cl 1964]), affd 22 AD2d 764 [2d Dept 1964]). However, the requests for admissions that claimant relies on in support of his motion—including the requests regarding the number of hours per day that claimant spent confined to his cell and the reasons why he was so confined—are improper because there is no "basis for a reasonable belief" (id. at 984) that these matters are not in "substantial dispute" (CPLR 3123 [a]). Thus, the purported admissions "do not constitute a basis for summary judgment" (Cancilla v O'Rourke, 232 AD3d 1175, 1178 [3d Dept 2024] [concluding that the plaintiff's notice to admit "improperly sought admissions of contested ultimate facts"]; see also American Bldrs. & Contrs. Supply Co. Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d 708, 709 [2d Dept 2023] ["A notice to admit is not to be employed . . . to compel admissions of fundamental and material issues or contested ultimate facts" or "concessions that go to the essence of the controversy" between the parties]). In any event, claimant's own submissions demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact surrounding the nature of, and reasons for, claimant's daily cell confinement, including whether he may have been refusing to choose or attend programs available to him. Inasmuch as summary judgment is not warranted under either of claimant's motions, claimant's request for consolidation of the two motions is also denied.

Finally, as to that part of Mot. No. 99683 that seeks an order dismissing each of defendant's affirmative defenses, the motion is granted in part.

Under CPLR 3211 (b), "[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit." The moving party "bears the burden of demonstrating that the affirmative defense is 'without merit as a matter of law' " (Bank of NY v Penalver, 125 AD3d 796, 797 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Vita v New York Waste Servs., LLC, 34 AD3d 559, 559 [2d Dept 2006]; see also Suarez v State of New York, 60 AD3d 1243, 1243 [3d Dept 2009]). In reviewing such a motion, "all of defendant's allegations must be deemed to be true and defendant is entitled to all reasonable inferences" (Capital Tel. Co. v Motorola Communications & Elecs., 208 AD2d 1150, 1150 [3d Dept 1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Penalver, 125 AD3d at 797). The motion may be granted only if the moving party "can demonstrate that the defenses are without merit as a matter of law because they either do not apply under the factual circumstances of [the] case, or fail to state a defense" (Bank of Am., N.A. v 414 Midland Ave. Assoc., LLC, 78 AD3d 746, 748 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original]). But if there is "any doubt" with respect to the availability of the challenged defense, the defense should not be dismissed and the motion denied (Thy Tran v Avis Rent A Car, 289 AD2d 731, 732 [3d Dept 2001]; see also Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738, 739 [2d Dept 2010]; Stopani v Allegany Co-op Ins. Co., 83 AD3d 1446, 1447 [4th Dept 2011]).

As an initial matter, defendant correctly notes that claimant has failed to include a copy of the answer with his submissions in Mot. No. M-99683. However, CPLR 3211 (b) contains no express requirement that a motion to dismiss affirmative defenses be supported by a copy of the answer (compare CPLR 3212 [b]). And in any event, the answer has been filed with the Court, claimant included it as part of his reply papers, and it is a part of the parties' submissions in the other related motions under consideration. Thus, even assuming claimant was required to attach a copy of the answer to his motion papers, the record is sufficiently complete for the Court to assess the merits of claimant's motion to dismiss affirmative defenses notwithstanding the omission and there is no substantial prejudice to defendant (see Welch v Hauck, 18 AD3d 1096, 1098 [3d Dept 2005]; Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v County of Suffolk, 122 AD3d 688, 691 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 914 [2015]; see also CPLR 2001).

The defenses in the answer appear to include boilerplate recitations of nearly every affirmative defense that may possibly be pled in a claim brought against the State in the Court of Claims. Several of the asserted affirmative defenses relate to the Court's jurisdiction over the claim and, as to most of those, claimant has met his burden to establish they are without merit as a matter of law. The claim alleges that the claim arose on February 16, 2023, when he arrived at Woodbourne, and accrued when he was released from the alleged wrongful confinement 21 days later (see Davis v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287, 1287 [3d Dept 2011]). Claimant submitted proof that the claim was filed on May 19, 2023, and served on May 22, 2023 (see Cl's Affid in Supp of Mot No. M-99683, Attached Exhibits, at 1-2), well within the applicable 90-day limitations period (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [3-b]), and obviating the necessity for any service of a notice of intention to file a claim (see id. § 11 [a] [i]). In addition, as explained above, the claim is not properly characterized as one that must be brought via a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Thus, the first, second, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth affirmative defenses are without merit as a matter of law and are dismissed. The eighth affirmative defense regarding the asserted negligence of unnamed third parties is dismissed inasmuch as it does "not apply under the factual circumstances" of the claim (414 Midland Ave. Assoc., LLC, 78 AD3d at 748 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendant's thirteenth affirmative defense, however, was successfully deployed in its cross-motion to dismiss insofar as claimant's state constitutional causes of action were determined not to be cognizable. As to the remaining affirmative defenses, claimant's conclusory submissions, unsupported by any proof, do not establish the unavailability of the challenged defenses as a matter of law. Indeed, as discussed above in connection with the denial of claimant's motions for summary judgment, it would be "error for a court to strike a defense in situations where material issues of fact remain unresolved" (Colwell v State of New York, UID No. 2007-009-007 [Ct Cl, Mar. 20, 2007] [Midey Jr., J.]; see Matter of Harrison v State of New York, 262 AD2d 833, 834 [3d Dept 1999], citing Connelly v Warner, 248 AD2d 941, 943 [4th Dept 1998]). However, it remains defendant's burden of proof at trial to establish any surviving defenses (see Colwell, supra).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's cross-motion to dismiss (Mot No. CM-100741) is GRANTED, in part, to the extent that the state constitutional causes of action and negligence causes of action in Claim No. 139210 are dismissed, and the cross-motion is otherwise DENIED; it is further

ORDERED that claimant's motions for summary judgment (Mot Nos. M-99683 and M-100147) are DENIED; it is further

ORDERED that claimant's motion to dismiss defendant's affirmative defenses (Mot No. M-99683) is GRANTED, in part, and the first, second, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth affirmative defenses are dismissed, and the motion is otherwise DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that, the claim having been determined as accruing at Woodbourne Correctional Facility and not Great Meadow Correctional Facility, the Clerk's Office is directed to transfer the claim from the Incarcerated Pro Se Great Meadow calendar to the Incarcerated Pro Se calendar for Woodbourne for trial.

September 26, 2025

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

Papers Considered:

1. Claim, filed May 19, 2023;

2. Answer, filed June 30, 2023;

3. Notice of Motion to Dismiss Defenses and for Partial Summary Judgment (M-99683), and Affidavit of Claimant, with Exhibits and Memorandum of Law, filed July 13, 2023;

4. Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Krenrich in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (M-99683), with Exhibit A, filed November 14, 2023;

5. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability (M-100147), and Affidavit of Claimant, with Exhibits and Memorandum of Law, filed November 16, 2023;

6. Letter from Claimant, dated November 8, 2023, and received November 16, 2023, requesting consolidation of his motions for summary judgment;

7. Reply Affidavit of Claimant (M-99683), with Attached Pleadings, filed November 27, 2023;

8. Letter from Claimant, dated December 26, 2023, and received December 29, 2023;

9. Notice of Cross-Motion to Dismiss (CM-100741), and Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Krenrich in Support of Cross-Motion and in Opposition to Summary Judgment, with Exhibits A — G, filed April 10, 2024; and

10. Claimant's Affirmation in Opposition to Cross-Motion (CM-100741), filed July 7, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Claimant was also subjected to 30 days' loss of packages, commissary, and phone privileges after being found guilty of disciplinary charges related to smuggling, contraband, and unauthorized legal assistance (see Krenrich Aff in Supp of Cross-Mot and in Opp to M-100147, Exh C).

2.   Although defendant's motion papers contain a confusing reference to its cross-motion being one for summary judgment (see Krenrich Aff in Supp of Cross-Mot and in Opp to M-100147, ¶ 5), the notice of motion and the remainder of the submission make clear that the cross-motion is seeking dismissal of the claim under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

3.   Claimant himself also notes that he is challenging the underlying misbehavior report in a federal action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Cl's Affirm in Opp to Def's Cross-Mot, ¶ 13).

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.