Raymond Mayrant, Claimant, v. The State of New York, Defendant. (2026)

In this claim, Raymond Mayrant seeks damages for physical and emotional injuries that he suffered after allegedly being slammed into a wall by a corrections officer during a pat frisk and strip search that took place at Great Meadow Correctional Facility in June 2017. Claimant was the only witness to testify on his behalf and offered no exhibits. Defendant did not call any witnesses to testify regarding the alleged use of force because all of the corrections officers with knowledge of the incident were no longer in the employ of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS).¹ However, over claimant's objection and following the testimony of a defense witness called for the limited purpose of establishing the authenticity of certain DOCCS records,² the Court received into evidence the unusual incident packet proffered by defendant (see Exh A). After considering the evidence presented at trial, as well as the applicable law, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Trial Evidence

The Court found claimant's testimony to be forthright and generally credible. According to claimant, on June 8, 2017, around 3:00 p.m., he was in the "big yard" at Great Meadow when incarcerated individuals were given orders to line up to re-enter the facility at the end of the recreation period.³ Claimant testified that he suddenly felt dizzy and disoriented, and "fell out," meaning that he passed out. Claimant explained that he fell backwards and landed on his back on the ground. He awoke to a corrections officer tapping him with his foot. Claimant had difficulty walking and his vision was blurry, and he was taken to the infirmary to be examined. In the exam room, officers began a search of claimant's person. He was directed to assume the search position, with his hands placed high and flat against the wall, and his legs spread out and angled back three to four feet from the wall. Claimant began to take off each item of clothing he was wearing and pass it back to the officer conducting the search. Shortly thereafter, claimant again felt dizzy and told the officer that he "was about to fall out" and kept repeating that he would not be able to keep standing in the search position. According to claimant, the officer shouted profanities and told claimant to keep standing as he was directed. Claimant testified that—as he began to fall down toward the ground—the officer standing behind him grabbed claimant's wrists, rear handcuffed him, and then pulled him up by his wrists and slammed his face into the wall. A large piece from one of claimant's front teeth broke off when he hit the wall, as depicted in photographs taken on the day of the injury (see Exh A, at 13-14). Claimant testified that he did nothing to provoke the assault, and that feeling sick did not justify the officer's actions. Claimant stated he was then dragged to another room and placed on a gurney. He remained in the infirmary for an additional day for observation before being sent back to his cell. Claimant testified that he never received any treatment or medication for his tooth pain, nor any diagnostic testing to see why he was "passing out" or "blacking out."

As to his injuries, claimant testified that he was in "excruciating" pain for a long time after the incident and that "it never stopped" until his broken front tooth was finally fixed six years later in May or June 2023. Claimant stated that most of the back of his tooth broke off "where the nerve was at," and that it was his understanding that the significant pain was due to the nerve being "exposed." Claimant explained that he was also unable to eat or drink normally during that time and that it was uncomfortable to do so. For example, he had to eat using the side of his mouth and could not drink liquids that were hot or too cold. Claimant stated that he put in "numerous" dental call slips to be seen for his tooth, but stopped doing so "after a while" because he "felt like it wasn't going to happen" and so then "just left it alone." Claimant did not have any documentation of those requests to be seen, which he testified had been lost when he was moved to other facilities. Claimant further testified that he felt "emotionally unstable" and "distressed," and withdrew from social interactions due to his discomfort with his physical appearance.

Contrary to claimant's testimony, the unusual incident report admitted into evidence on defendant's case in chief indicated that, after first falling in Great Meadow's big yard, claimant again "became dizzy and fell forward face first into the wall, chipping his front tooth" while being evaluated in the infirmary (Exh A, at 1). A memorandum from Sergeant Woodruff to the facility superintendent similarly indicated that "[w]hile [claimant] was being examined by [a facility nurse], his legs buckled and he hit his mouth on the wall chipping his right front tooth" (id. at 11). The DOCCS records also contain an Inmate Injury Report filled out by facility medical personnel in which claimant purportedly stated that he "fell and chipped [his] tooth" when he "fell out" in the "big yard" (id. at 9). However, not only did claimant emphatically deny on cross-examination that he made such a statement about how his injury occurred, the Court does not credit the report attributing this statement to claimant. Significantly, the Inmate Injury Report it is not signed by claimant; rather, the report notes that claimant was "unable" to sign due to "cuffs on" (id.). Moreover, the medical examiner's statement in the Inmate Injury Report about how claimant broke his tooth is inconsistent with both the unusual incident report and the Sergeant's memorandum, each of which stated that claimant broke his tooth while falling and hitting a wall during the subsequent medical evaluation.

At the close of claimant's case, and then again after it rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict under CPLR 4401, arguing that claimant failed to meet his burden of proof on the assault cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence because of the contradictory trial evidence about how his injury occurred. Defendant further argued that claimant failed sufficiently to plead a medical or dental malpractice cause of action under Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), and did not present any expert testimony with respect to such a claim. Lastly, to the extent claimant sought to press a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendant argued such a cause of action was not pled in the claim and is not viable in this Court in any event. Claimant opposed the motions, asserting that all of his injuries stemmed from the assault, which he characterized as "willful," and that he was seeking damages for the pain and suffering he went through for the years before his tooth was fixed. The Court reserved decision on the motions.

Analysis

It is well settled that the State may be held vicariously liable for intentional torts "committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment" (Rivera v State of New York, 34 NY3d 383, 389 [2019]). "Battery is the unjustified touching of another person, without that person's consent, with the intent to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive; assault involves putting a person in fear of a battery" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). In state correctional facilities, DOCCS employees are generally authorized to use force in self-defense, to prevent injury to another person or property, maintain order, and enforce discipline, among other circumstances (see Correction Law § 137 [5]; 7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [d]; Rivera, 34 NY3d at 391). When it is necessary for corrections officers to use force, they may use "only such degree of force as is reasonably required" (7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [b]; see also McFadden v State of New York, 200 AD3d 1357, 1357 [3d Dept 2021]). Thus, to recover for assault and battery under these circumstances, a claimant must demonstrate that an officer's use of force was "unreasonable or excessive under the circumstances or in violation of [a] policy or procedure of defendant" (McFadden, 200 AD3d at 1359 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Bush v State of New York, 57 AD3d 1066, 1067 [3d Dept 2008]; Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]).

Claimant has the burden of proving his case by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence (see Rinaldi & Sons v Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 39 NY2d 191, 196 [1976]; Weinberger v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 133 AD3d 1006, 1007 [3d Dept 2015]). Thus, the Court, as trier of fact, must assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any factual disputes to determine whether claimant met his burden to establish his claim (see Shirvanion v State of New York, 64 AD3d 1113, 1114-1115 [3d Dept 2009]; Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468, 468 [2d Dept 1998]; see also Janczylik v State of New York, 126 AD3d 1485, 1485 [4th Dept 2015]). Here, after evaluating the testimony and other evidence presented at trial, and the credibility of same, the Court finds that claimant has established his claim for the use of excessive force by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

On this record, including the testimony of claimant and observing his demeanor as he testified, as well as the photographs of his injuries, the Court finds that the incident in the infirmary on June 8, 2017, occurred as claimant testified. Although claimant did not present any other documentary or testimonial evidence to corroborate his account of the use of force, his testimony was direct, consistent, and without embellishment as to the incident itself or his resulting injuries, which enhanced its credibility. The defense did not adduce the testimony of any of the corrections officers who were involved who might have rebutted claimant's version of events. And the Court does not credit the contradictory documentary evidence presented by defendant. The various DOCCS reports and memoranda were internally inconsistent with respect to key facts, undermining their credibility. First, the statement written by the medical examiner in the Inmate Injury Report that claimant broke his tooth when he initially lost consciousness out in the yard, is inconsistent with the account of the injury in both the unusual incident report and the Sergeant's memorandum, each of which stated that claimant broke his tooth while falling and hitting a wall during his subsequent medical evaluation in the infirmary. In addition, a further contradiction exists among the documents: while the Inmate Injury Report indicates that claimant was handcuffed in the infirmary (and, thus, unable to sign the document himself), the unusual incident report regarding the events that took place at the infirmary states that no use of force was used (see Exh A). Furthermore, the extent of claimant's injury to his front tooth appears more consistent with forcefully being slammed face first into a wall by someone, rather than with an individual in the search position with most of his body spread out away from the wall simply beginning to fall down toward the ground.

Thus, given the lack of credible evidence to counter claimant's testimony that his injury occurred when a corrections officer handcuffed him and slammed him into the wall after claimant was unable to maintain the search position due to feeling like he was about to faint—as had just occurred a short while earlier during claimant's apparent medical episode in the yard—the officer's use of force was "unreasonable" and "excessive under the circumstances" (McFadden, 200 AD3d at 1359 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bazil v State of New York, 63 Misc 3d 1216 [A] [Ct Ct 2019]; Manley v State of New York, UID No. 2009-030-008 [Ct Cl, March 30, 2009] [Scuccimarra, J.]). Accordingly, the Court finds defendant 100% liable to claimant on the excessive force cause of action.

Having established that defendant is liable, the Court turns to the question of damages. "An award for pain and suffering is inherently a subjective inquiry, not subject to precise quantification, and generally presents a question of fact" (Petrilli v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 40 AD3d 1339, 1343 [3d Dept 2007]; see also McDougald v Garber, 73 NY2d 246, 257 [1989] [recognizing that "[t]ranslating" an individual's pain and suffering "into dollars and cents involves no mathematical formula"]; DeMarco v DeMarco, 154 AD3d 1226, 1228-1229 [3d Dept 2017]). The starting point in determining the appropriate damages award is examination of awards in "comparable cases" (Ciuffo v Mowery Constr., Inc., 107 AD3d 1195, 1197 [3d Dept 2013]; see Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 AD3d 656, 658 [2d Dept 2018]). Although compensation awarded in prior cases involving similar injuries is instrumental in "guid[ing] and enlighten[ing]" a court in its consideration of the proper damages in a particular case, such prior awards "are not binding" (Garcia, 164 AD3d at 658 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Factors to be considered in establishing an award for pain and suffering include "the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries, the extent of past, present and future pain and the long-term effects of the injury" (Nolan v Union Coll. Trust of Schenectady, NY, 51 AD3d 1253, 1256 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 705 [2008]; see Fabiano v State of New York, 170 AD3d 1301, 1303 [3d Dept 2019]). In addition, "mental suffering is an element of the pain and suffering experienced by" an injured party (Lamot v Gondek, 163 AD2d 678, 679 (3d Dept 1990), citing McDougald v Garber, 73 NY2d 246, 257 [1989]; see also Clarke v State of New York, UID No. 2015-038-118 [Ct Cl, Nov. 30, 2015] [DeBow, J.] ["An award for pain and suffering should compensate the claimant for the physical and emotional effects of the injury for which defendant is liable"]).

Claimant's testimony credibly established that he was in excruciating pain immediately after the incident, and that he was not given any pain relief medication or other treatment at that time. Until it was repaired, the broken tooth made it uncomfortable for claimant to eat and drink normally, and also caused him to feel emotionally distressed about his appearance resulting in his social withdrawal. However, claimant's testimony that he believed his tooth pain was due to an exposed nerve that continued to cause him great pain for six years until his tooth was fixed was unsupported by any expert testimony; such testimony would have been necessary to establish the nature of any alleged nerve injury or the extent to which claimant's pain was enhanced by it (see Manley, UID No. 2009-030-008; see also Brown v County of Albany, 271 AD2d 819, 821 [3d Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 767 [2000]; Morgan v State of New York, UID No. 2018-038-103 [Ct Cl, Jan. 17, 2018] [DeBow, J.]). In addition, although the Court credits claimant's testimony that he put in numerous sick call requests to be seen for his pain—at least for some time after the incident occurred—he did not have any medical documentation to corroborate that he made those requests continuously for six years without any response. Nor did his own testimony support an inference that the pain lasted all that time since he candidly stated that he stopped seeking medical care "after a while." Thus, the Court finds claimant's testimony about the duration of his pain to be "exaggerated, especially in the absence of medical records or other documentary evidence that would support his testimony that he was in pain for that" long (Clarke, UID No. 2015-038-118). Accordingly, the Court finds that claimant is entitled to compensation for past pain and suffering in the amount of $2,000.00 (see Manley, UID No. 2009-030-008; see also Bonilla v State of New York, UID No. 2002-011-107 [Ct Cl, June 17, 2002] [McNamara, J.]; Hammer v State of New York, UID No. 2008-044-016 [Ct Cl, Oct. 28, 2008] [Schaewe, J.]).

Finally, to the extent the claim asserted a cause of action for medical malpractice, it was not established by a preponderance of the credible evidence at trial in the absence of any expert medial opinion testimony (see DeMaille v State of New York, 166 AD3d 1405, 1406-1407 [3d Dept 2018]; see also Fiore v Galang, 64 NY2d 999, 1001 [1985]; Knight v State of New York, 127 AD3d 1435, 1435 [3d Dept 2015], appeal dismissed 25 NY3d 1212 [2015]). And no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can lie against the State in the Court of Claims (see Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997], citing Brown v State of New York, 125 AD2d 750, 752 [3d Dept 1986]; see also Wheeler v State of New York, 104 AD2d 496, 498 [2d Dept 1984]).

In sum, defendant is 100% liable to claimant and claimant is entitled to recover for past pain and suffering for the injury he sustained as the result of a corrections officer's use of excessive force. After considering awards in similar cases, and having credited claimant's trial testimony regarding the severity of his pain immediately after the incident and for some period of time thereafter, as well as his mental and emotional distress, the Court awards claimant $2,000.00, together with the appropriate statutory interest pursuant to CPLR 5001 and 5002. To the extent claimant has paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11-a (2).

All motions not ruled upon at trial are hereby denied.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

January 23, 2026

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

FOOTNOTES

1.   On the eve of trial, defendant requested an adjournment of the trial to try and locate those individuals and attempt to secure their testimony. Given claimant's objection, the prejudice to him, and the last-minute nature of the application, all of which defendant candidly acknowledged—as well as defendant's representation that it could not guarantee that the witnesses could be found even if the matter were to be adjourned—the Court denied defendant's application. The Court notes that the Assistant Attorney General making the request had only recently been assigned the matter shortly before trial; however, the Office of the Attorney General had been made aware of the December 12, 2025, trial date for this claim approximately two and a half months earlier, on September 30, 2025.

2.   Defendant called Taryn Thomas, Inmate Record Coordinator (IRC) 2 at Washington Correctional Facility. With the Court's permission, IRC Thomas appeared by audio because the video equipment at the facility was unavailable. IRC Thomas received and processed the request by defendant for the records related to this claim because Great Meadow is not currently operational and any requests for records relating to claims that accrued at that facility are processed by IRC staff at Washington.

3.   Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the audio recording of the trial of this claim.

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.