Rahkeim Scarlett, Movant, v. The State of New York, Respondent. (2024)

Movant Rahkeim Scarlett, an incarcerated individual in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), seeks permission to file a late claim pursuant to section 10 (6) of the Court of Claims Act (CCA). The proposed claim alleges that movant was wrongfully held in segregated confinement as a result of DOCCS' failure to follow proper procedures for testing contraband, and that the confinement violated the requirements of the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (HALT Act). The State opposes the motion. The motion—brought within one year of movant's alleged release from confinement—appears timely, and the State does not argue otherwise (see CCA § 10 [6]; CPLR 215 [3]; Davis v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287, 1287 [3d Dept 2011]). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

The proposed claim alleges that on May 3, 2023, at Washington Correctional Facility, a piece of paper which was "oily in texture" was found on movant's person during a pat frisk (Proposed Claim, ¶ 4 [B]). The same day, a misbehavior report was issued charging movant with possessing contraband, smuggling, and refusing a search or frisk, and movant was transferred to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) pending a hearing on the misbehavior report. Movant was ultimately found guilty of possessing contraband and smuggling, and not guilty on the charge of refusing a search. The sanction imposed upon movant was 262 days in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) in addition to the 8 days of pre-hearing confinement he had already served, resulting in a total penalty of 270 days. Movant administratively appealed the disciplinary determination and, on July 19, 2023, he received a partially favorable appeal decision dismissing the smuggling charge—but not the possession charge—and reducing his total penalty to 98 days in SHU. There is a minor discrepancy in the record as to the actual date of movant's release; the affidavit in support of the motion states that movant was released on August 9, 2023, but the proposed claim states that he was released on August 11, 2023.

After being released from SHU, movant brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the hearing determination to the extent it found movant guilty of possessing contraband, arguing that the alleged contraband had not been properly tested. In response to the petition, the Attorney General's Office recommended that the determination be administratively reversed and expunged from movant's record. The charge was so expunged, and the article 78 petition was dismissed as moot upon the State's motion (see Claim, Exhs A-C; see also Matter of Scarlett v Rodriguez, Albany County Sup Ct, Index No. 11080-23, Dec & Judgment dated March 25, 2024).

CCA § 10 (6) enumerates six factors to be weighed by the Court in connection with a late claim motion: (1) whether the delay was excusable; (2) whether the State had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; (3) whether the State had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; (4) whether the claim appears to be meritorious; (5) whether the delay resulted in substantial prejudice to the State; and (6) whether the movant has another available remedy. This list is not exhaustive and the presence or absence of any one factor is not dispositive; rather, the Court in its discretion balances these factors in making its determination (see Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979, 981 [1982]).

Initially, as the State correctly argues, movant's proffered reasons for delay—ignorance of the filing deadlines and limited access to resources due to his incarceration—do not constitute reasonable excuses (see Matter of Robinson v State of New York, 35 AD3d 948, 950 [3d Dept 2006]; Innis v State of New York, 92 AD2d 606, 606 [2d Dept 1983], affd 60 NY2d 654 [1983]; see also Swart v State of New York, 211 AD3d 881, 882 [2d Dept 2022]). Thus, the first late claim factor weighs against movant.

However, the unreasonableness of the delay does not necessarily preclude late claim relief (see Bay Terrace, 55 NY2d at 981). The related factors of the State's notice of the essential facts, opportunity to investigate, and whether the State was prejudiced by the delay all weigh in movant's favor. As movant argues, the State had notice of the essential facts and opportunity to investigate the underlying circumstances through the disciplinary proceedings it conducted, including an appeal review which resulted in a reduction of the period of segregated confinement (see Bonie v State of New York, UID No. 2020-038-540 [Ct Cl, July 8, 2020] [DeBow, J.]; Adams v State of New York, UID No. 2006-044-509 [Ct Cl, Oct. 24, 2006] [Schaewe, J.]). The State's conclusory arguments to the contrary lack merit inasmuch as the State fails to identify any specific essential facts of which it did not have notice, or explain how it has been "impeded" in its ability to investigate the claim (Affirm in Opp to Mot, ¶ 10). In addition, the State's failure to identify any specific prejudice caused by the delay weighs in favor of movant (see Schnier v New York State Thruway Auth., 205 AD3d 958, 960-961 [2d Dept 2022] [holding that a finding of prejudice " 'cannot be based solely on speculation and inference,' " and State must "come forward with 'a particularized evidentiary showing' " of substantial prejudice], quoting Matter of Newcomb v Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 NY3d 455, 465, 467 [2016] [discussing prejudice to a defendant in the context of General Municipal Law § 50-e]).

The most important factor to consider is the potential merit of the claim because " 'it would be futile to permit the filing of a legally deficient claim which would be subject to immediate dismissal, even if the other factors tend to favor the granting of the request' " (Calverley v State of New York, 187 AD3d 1426, 1427 [3d Dept 2020], quoting Prusack v State of New York, 117 AD2d 729, 730 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Swart, 211 AD3d at 883). A claim has the appearance of merit if it is "not . . . patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective, and the record as a whole . . . give[s] reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists" (Calverley, 187 AD3d at 1427 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Swart, 211 AD3d at 883; Sands v State of New York, 49 AD3d 444, 444 [1st Dept 2008]).

To prevail on a cause of action for wrongful confinement, a claimant must ultimately establish that (1) defendant intended to confine the individual; (2) the individual was conscious of the confinement; (3) the individual did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not privileged (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 759 [2016]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; see also Miller v State of New York, 124 AD3d 997, 998 [3d Dept 2015]).¹ In the prison context, the actions of corrections employees in commencing and conducting formal disciplinary proceedings—including issuing misbehavior reports, conducting hearings, rendering dispositions, and placing incarcerated persons in punitive confinement—"constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" where such employees "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; see also id. at 219; Ramirez v State of New York, 175 AD3d 1635, 1636 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 902 [2020]). Significantly, not all rule violations will overcome the immunity typically afforded to the State in conducting disciplinary proceedings. Rather, the veil of absolute immunity may only be pierced where there has been a violation of the constitutionally required minimal "due process safeguard[s]" to which incarcerated individuals are entitled, such as written notice of the charges or the right to a timely hearing (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 221 [citing 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 and 7 NYCRR Parts 252 through 254]; see also Matter of Texeira v Fischer, 26 NY3d 230, 233-234 [2015], citing Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 556-558, 566 [1974]; Bottom v State of New York, 142 AD3d 1314, 1315 [4th Dept 2016] [citing Texeira], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 1177 [2017]). But even if absolute immunity is lost, recovery is not certain; the State is then only potentially liable. A claimant must still demonstrate that, but for the alleged due process violation, "the outcome of the hearing would have been different" (Encarnacion v State of New York, 203 AD3d 1416, 1418 [3d Dept 2022], citing Bottom, 142 AD3d at 1316).

Initially, the claim lacks the appearance of merit to the extent movant argues that the underlying disciplinary determination and resulting sentence of segregated confinement in a disciplinary housing unit was caused by DOCCS' failure to follow proper procedures for "the collection and testing of contraband" (Affid in Supp of Mot, ¶ 5 [A]). Notably, the proposed claim does not allege any specific regulations or directives that were violated during the course of the disciplinary hearing and, as the State correctly argues, alleged violations of the regulations governing drug testing procedures generally are not due process violations and, thus, "cannot serve as the basis for a wrongful confinement cause of action" (Moreland v State of New York, 200 AD3d 1362, 1364-1365 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 906 [2022]; see Ramirez v State of New York, 175 AD3d 1635, 1638 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 902 [2020]; Andrews v State of New York, UID No. 2021-053-534 [Ct Cl, July 9, 2021] [Sampson, J.]; Espiritu v State of New York, UID No. 2020-054-013 [Ct Cl, Jan. 27, 2021] [W. Rivera, J.]). Moreover, as the State further notes, the fact that the underlying disciplinary determination was later administratively reversed is not, by itself, sufficient to overcome the State's absolute immunity (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 214-215; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 819 [1999]).

However, the claim has the appearance of merit to the extent movant argues that the State exceeded the scope of its authority by imposing a period of segregated confinement longer than what is permissible under the HALT Act. The HALT Act, which became effective March 31, 2022, defines "segregated confinement" as "the confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than seventeen hours a day" (Correction Law § 2 [23], as amended by L 2021, ch 93, § 1). The statute provides that DOCCS may not hold a person in segregated confinement for longer than 3 consecutive days, or longer than 6 days in any 30-day period (see Correction Law § 137 [6] [k] [i]), unless the person has committed 1 of 7 offenses enumerated under section 137 (6) (k) (ii) (A) - (G), and DOCCS makes an individualized finding, "based on specific objective criteria," that "the acts were so heinous or destructive that placement of the individual in general population housing creates a significant risk of imminent serious physical injury to staff or other incarcerated persons, and creates an unreasonable risk to the security of the facility" (id. § 137 [6] [k] [ii]). Even where such findings are made, individuals generally may not be held in segregated confinement for longer than 15 consecutive days, or more than 20 days in a 60-day period (id. § 137 [6] [i] [i]). Beyond those limits, DOCCS must release individuals from segregated confinement or transfer them to a "residential rehabilitation unit" (id.). The statute also restricts DOCCS's authority to place a person in segregated confinement while a disciplinary hearing is pending: "[a]ll hearings to determine if a person may be placed in segregated confinement shall occur prior to placement in segregated confinement unless a security supervisor, with written approval of a facility superintendent or designee, reasonably believes the person fits the specified criteria for segregated confinement" set forth in Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) (id. § 137 [6] [l] [emphasis added]).

Here, movant established the appearance of merit with respect to the alleged violations of the HALT Act. The total alleged period of segregated confinement—at least 98 days—significantly exceeds the maximum permissible penalty under the statute. Moreover, the proposed claim has an appearance of merit to the extent movant may have been unlawfully confined during the pendency of the disciplinary hearing, because there is no indication that a security supervisor sought written approval from the superintendent and determined that movant's conduct met the criteria set forth in Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii) before placement in pre-hearing confinement (see id. § 137 [6] [l]).

The State argues that the penalty imposed was permissible because it was determined during the disciplinary hearing that movant was guilty of several rule violations including possession of contraband and smuggling. According to the State, this determination conclusively established that movant committed an enumerated offense under Correction Law § 137 (6) (k) (ii), specifically, "procuring a deadly weapon or other dangerous contraband that poses a serious threat to the security of the institution" (Correction Law § 137 [6] [k] [ii] [F]). Because this enumerated offense was committed, the State contends, movant qualified for an "extended stay" in segregated confinement (Affirm in Opp to Mot, ¶ 16).

The State's argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the State misreads the HALT Act to the extent it argues that the statute permits a period of segregated confinement longer than 20 days in a 60-day period where there is a finding that the criteria of section 137 (6) (k) (ii) have been satisfied. To the contrary, such a finding merely allows for a penalty longer than 3 consecutive days or 6 total days in a 30-day period (see Correction Law § 137 [6] [k] [i]). A penalty longer than 15 consecutive days or 20 days in a 60-day period is permitted only in limited circumstances not relevant here, specifically where an individual commits a "violent felony act" more than once within a 60-day period (Correction Law § 137 [6] [i] [ii]). Second, the State fails to show that the criteria of section 137 (6) (k) (ii) were satisfied in this case. To the extent the State argues that movant committed the enumerated offense of procuring "dangerous contraband" posing a "serious threat" to institutional safety pursuant to section 137 (6) (k) (ii) (F), the statute requires that DOCCS render a "written decision" that an enumerated offense was committed (id. § 137 [6] [k] [ii]) and, here, it does not appear that any such written decision was issued—and the State does not contend otherwise. The State does not argue that any of the other enumerated offenses are implicated by movant's conduct and, indeed, none appear to be (see id. §§ 137 [6] [k] [ii] [A] - [E], [G]). Furthermore, the statutory criteria are not satisfied solely by a finding that movant committed an enumerated offense. There must also be a specific written finding that movant's acts were so "heinous or destructive" that it would be dangerous to place movant in the general population (id. § 137 [6] [k] [ii]). The State does not argue that any such findings were made here, and the criteria cannot be presumed satisfied based on the nature of the disciplinary charges (see Fuquan Fields v Martuscello, Dec & Order [filed June 20, 2024], Albany County Sup Ct Index No. 902997-23, NYSCEF Doc No. 82, at 11-14 [holding that DOCCS may not adopt a policy inconsistent with requirement that individualized findings under section 137 (6) (k) (ii) be made in each case]).

Finally, even though movant availed himself of alternative remedies in the form of his administrative appeal and a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the balance of the factors nevertheless weigh in movant's favor.

In sum, after carefully considering and weighing the relevant statutory factors, late claim relief is warranted, in part, to the extent outlined above. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the application for late claim relief is GRANTED, IN PART, as limited to a cause of action for wrongful confinement and only to the extent that cause of action is based upon alleged violations of the HALT Act; and it is further

ORDERED that, within sixty (60) days of the date of filing of this Decision and Order, movant shall file with the office of the Clerk of the Court a claim limited to the cause of action for wrongful confinement solely to the extent permitted above; and within that same period, movant shall serve a copy of the claim upon the Office of the Attorney General personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested. In serving and filing the claim, movant is directed to follow all of the requirements of the Court of Claims Act, including section 11-a regarding the filing fee, and the Uniform Rules of the Court of Claims.

December 6, 2024

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

Papers Considered:

1. Notice of Motion and Affidavit in Support of Motion, with Exhibits, filed June 20, 2024; and

2. Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Krenrich in Opposition to Motion, with Exhibit A, filed August 12, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Placement in a special housing unit has generally been treated as confinement for purposes of a wrongful excessive confinement claim brought by persons already incarcerated (see Trammell v State of New York, 172 AD3d 1847 [3d Dept 2019]; Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]; Callender v State of New York, UID No. 2012-049-108 [Ct Cl, Aug. 3, 2012] [Weinstein, J.]).

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.