Thomas Cappetta, Claimant, v. The State of New York,1 Defendant. (2023)

Claimant, appearing pro se,² filed this claim alleging that his due process and other constitutional rights were violated in connection with the issuance of, and his requests to vacate, multiple Family Court orders from 2006-2021 relating to custody of his children, child support payments, and the termination of his parental rights, among other proceedings. He names as defendants various individually named persons, multiple Oswego County agencies, Le Moyne College, the New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance, and the New York State Office of Court Administration. In lieu of answering, defendant moves to dismiss the claim based upon a lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction; improper service; judicial immunity; and failure to state a cause of action. Claimant opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted and the claim is dismissed in its entirety.

To begin, the Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, with power to hear claims only against the State and certain public authorities for, among other things, "the torts of [their] officers or employees while acting as such officers or employees" (Court of Claims Act § 9 [2]; see also NY Const, Art VI, § 9). The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against individual persons, even those employed by the State of New York (see Court of Claims Act § 9; Smith v State of New York, 72 AD2d 937, 938 [4th Dept 1979]; see also Morell v Balasubramanian, 70 NY2d 297, 300 [1987]). Nor does the Court have jurisdiction over claims against a county, its agencies, or its individual employees (see Fisher v State of New York, 10 NY2d 60, 61-62 [1961]; Whitmore v State of New York, 55 AD2d 745, 746 [3d Dept 1976], lv denied 42 NY2d 810 [1977]; see also Public Officers Law § 2; Fishbein v State of New York, 282 AD 600, 602-603 [3d Dept 1953], citing Paige v State of New York, 269 NY 352 [1936]; Mooraty v State of New York, 73 Misc 3d 1238[A] [Ct Cl 2021]). Claimant himself appears to recognize that jurisdiction does not exist over specific individuals in the Court of Claims (see Claimant's Response in Opp. to Mot., ¶ 22 [a] [iv], at pp. 8-9).

Similarly, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over private entities or colleges which are not state universities (see Education Law § 352; Amato v State of New York, 170 Misc 136, 137 [Ct Cl 1939] [noting "[t]here is no provision of the Court of Claims Act which permits this [C]ourt to determine a controversy between private parties"]; Brown v North Country Community College, 63 Misc 2d 442, 444 [Sup Ct Essex Co 1970] [holding that Supreme Court properly had jurisdiction over the community college defendant inasmuch as it was not part of the SUNY corporation]; see also State Univ. of NY v Syracuse Univ., 285 AD 59, 59-62 [3d Dept 1954] [holding in action against private college properly brought in Supreme Court, that the court had no jurisdiction of private university's counterclaim against SUNY]; Planck v SUNY Bd. of Trustees, 18 AD3d 988, 990-991 [3d Dept 2005] [involving community college defendant which was "not part of the SUNY corporation," and noting that defendant SUNY Board had conceded Supreme Court's subject matter jurisdiction in that case]; cf. Nemani v United Health Servs., 170 AD2d 782 [3d Dept 1991] [holding joinder of state psychiatric facility in action in Supreme Court by state employee against two private hospitals operated by not-for-profit corporation, at which employee also worked, was improper because Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of claims against the State]).

Accordingly, insofar as the claim is asserted against the individual persons named herein—Eben Norfleet, Gregory Oakes, Jeffery Domachowski, Richard Mitchell, Allison O'Neill; Mary Mauder, Stacy Alvord, Eileen Stack, Lawrence K. Marks, Jasmine Maldonado, Jean Brown, and Maximo Flint-Morgan; the Oswego County Department of Social Services; the Oswego County Treasurer; the Oswego County District Attorney; the Oswego County Attorney; the Oswego County Human Resources; and Le Moyne College, the claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over these purported defendants.

Turning next to the argument that the claim was improperly served, defendant contends that the claim should be dismissed in its entirety because claimant failed to serve it by personal service or certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) (i) (see Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992] [recognizing that section 11 [a] establishes a notice requirement under which a claim or notice of intention to file a claim must be served in one of these two ways]).³ Compliance with the filing and service requirements contained in the Court of Claims Act is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing and maintaining an action in the Court of Claims; and the failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements "divests the [C]ourt of subject matter jurisdiction," necessitating dismissal of the claim (Miranda v State of New York, 113 AD3d 943, 943-944 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Dreger, 81 NY2d at 724; Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 722-723 [1989]).

In support of its argument, defendant annexes a copy of the envelope in which the claim was served upon defendant. The envelope bears indicia of the use of certified mail. However, it does not contain any indication that a return receipt was requested. In opposition to the motion, claimant fails to offer any proof to counter defendant's argument. Indeed, in the affidavit of service included with the filed copy of the claim, claimant declared under penalty of perjury only that he mailed a copy of the claim to the Attorney General "in a postpaid certified mail envelope." No reference is made in the affidavit of service to any request for a return receipt, and the certified mail tracking number on defendant's envelope matches that listed in claimant's affidavit of service for the mailing to the Attorney General. Claimant now argues only that his notice of intention to file a claim was properly served upon defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, in March 2022, and that the appearance of the Assistant Attorney General in this matter establishes evidence of successful service. But a claimant who properly serves a notice of intention to file a claim is not then permitted to serve a claim by an alternative method of service not specifically authorized by Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) (see Hodge v State of New York, 213 AD2d 766, 767 [3d Dept 1995]). In addition, "[c]laimant's contention that the State received actual notice of the claim and, therefore, was not prejudiced by his use of [a different method] is unavailing, for 'notice received by means other than those authorized by statute cannot serve to bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of the [C]ourt' " (Turley v State of New York, 279 AD2d 819, 819 [3d Dept 2001], quoting Feinstein v Bergner, 48 NY2d 234, 241 [1979]). Defendant's motion to dismiss the claim as to the remaining defendants thus must be granted.

In light of the Court's holding, it is not necessary to address defendant's alternative arguments in support of dismissal. However, defendant is correct that, to the extent the claim alleges wrongdoing by the New York State Office of Court Administration and/or the Unified Court System—and those entities' employees—in the exercise of their judicial functions, such conduct is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and cannot form the basis of a claim for damages against the State (see Mosher-Simons v County of Allegany, 99 NY2d 214, 219-221 [2002] [recognizing that "it is imperative to the nature of the judicial function that [j]udges be free to make decisions without fear of retribution"] [internal quotation marks omitted]; Murray v Brancato, 290 NY 52, 55 [1943] [absolute immunity applies even where conduct is malicious, with intent to injure the plaintiff, or in excess of jurisdiction]; Morrison-Allen v State of New York, 152 AD3d 509, 510 [2d Dept 2017] [holding that Court of Claims did not have authority to review the merits of Family Court's termination of the claimant's parental rights or related acts of court personnel], appeal dismissed 30 NY3d 1002 [2017]; Rosenstein v State of New York, 37 AD3d 208, 208-209 [1st Dept 2007]; Harley v Perkinson, 187 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 1992] [holding that absolute immunity extends to allegations of intentional or negligent conduct by Office of Court Administration]; see also Matter of World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 17 NY3d 428, 442 [2011] [holding that a State's waiver of sovereign immunity, such as under Court of Claims Act § 8, does not preclude State from asserting immunity-based defenses such as governmental or judicial immunity where appropriate]). Thus, dismissal of the claim insofar as it alleges wrongdoing in relation to the exercise of judicial functions is also warranted.

Defendant is also correct that the claim fails to comply with the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) inasmuch as it fails to contain any particularized allegation of wrongdoing by the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003] [holding that failure to comply with the substantive conditions upon the State's waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 11 (b) renders a claim jurisdictionally defective]; see also Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007]). The claim here fails to set forth any clear or discernible allegations regarding the nature of the claim or the specific actions of the State upon which liability is premised. It further fails to set forth the specific dates when, and the places where, the alleged wrongdoing by the State occurred, or any particularized factual basis for the broad allegations of constitutional violations. But conclusory or general allegations of negligence that fail to state the manner in which the claimant was injured and how the State was negligent prevent defendant from "investigat[ing] and promptly ascertain[ing] the existence and extent of its liability" and, thus, do not meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) (Clark v State of New York, 165 AD3d 1371, 1372 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 905 [2019], rearg denied 34 NY3d 973 [2019]; see Patterson v State of New York, 54 AD2d 147, 150 [4th Dept 1976], affd on opn below 45 NY2d 885 [1978]; see also Langner v State of New York, 65 AD3d 780, 782-783 [3d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, had the claim been served properly, dismissal of the claim would nevertheless be warranted on this basis.

Finally, claimant's request to appear in person to present argument on the motion to dismiss is denied. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 206.9(c), such applications rest within the discretion of the Court. Inasmuch as the motion to dismiss presented only questions of law that could readily be determined from the papers filed with the Court, oral argument would not have assisted the Court in making its determination.

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Claim No. 138164 is DISMISSED in its entirety.

July 14, 2023

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

Papers Considered:

1. Notice of Motion to Dismiss;

2. Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General Glenn C. King, in Support of Motion to Dismiss, with attached exhibit;

3. Claimant's Response in Opposition to Motion, with exhibits;

4. Claim, filed September 1, 2022, with Affidavit of Service, dated August 31, 2022.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Pursuant to CPLR 321 (a), a party may prosecute a civil action in person or by an attorney. Claimant cannot appear by Automated Cyber Solutions, LLC, as alleged in paragraph two of his claim.

3.   Defendant's objection is properly raised under Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) (ii), which provides that any defense based upon the failure to comply with the manner of service requirements must be raised with particularity either in a motion to dismiss made before service of the responsive pleading is required, or in the responsive pleading, in order to avoid a waiver of the defense (see Court of Claims Act § 11 [c] [ii]).

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.