Caprice Pack, Claimant, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2025)

In these claims,¹ Caprice and Brian Pack each seek to recover damages for personal injuries they sustained in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a New York State Trooper's reckless operation of an emergency vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1104 [e]). Claimants allege that the trooper struck claimants' car with his police vehicle in the middle of a major highway intersection when he sped through a red light at approximately 60 miles per hour on a dark and rainy night. After considering the testimony and documentary evidence received at the joint liability trial, the parties' arguments at trial and in their post-trial submissions, as well as the applicable law, the Court finds that defendant is 100% at fault with respect to both claims.

Trial Testimony

The parties stipulated to the fact that the accident occurred at approximately 10:35 p.m. on March 31, 2017. Several exhibits were also received into evidence upon the stipulation and consent of counsel.²

Claimants each provided detailed and largely consistent testimony about the accident and the events leading up to it, which the Court found credible. Brian Pack testified that the accident occurred at the intersection of State Route 300, which runs north and south, and the westboundI-84 exit ramp in Newburgh, New York. As Mr. Pack explained, and as photographs of the intersection admitted into evidence show, the I-84 exit ramp has two left turn lanes to access Route 300 southbound, and one right turn lane that allows motorists to turn onto Route 300 northbound; there is no option to proceed straight (see Exhs C, E). Route 300 northbound has two travel lanes and one left turn lane at the intersection (see Exhs C, D). Mr. Pack testified that he was familiar with the intersection because he regularly drives through it, including on his commute home from work. There is a traffic light at the intersection, which he agreed could be characterized as a "major highway interchange," and he noted that the traffic in the area is always "moderate to heavy" (Transcript, Vol. 1 [T.1], at 65).

Mr. Pack testified that on the evening of the incident, he and his wife Caprice, along with their young nephew, a nonparty to this action, were traveling home from the nephew's basketball game, which ended at around 9:30 p.m. Mr. Pack was driving, Mrs. Pack was in the passenger seat, and the child was in the back seat. Mr. Pack testified that the weather conditions that night were "[r]ainy and misty" (id. at 18), but he could not recall how long it had been raining or whether it was raining when the accident occurred. He had been using his windshield wipers intermittently while driving. About 45 minutes after leaving the basketball game, after exiting I-84, the Packs' vehicle approached the intersection where the accident occurred. Mr. Pack testified that he traveled down the exit ramp and intended to turn left onto Route 300 southbound. Mr. Pack observed that the traffic light at the intersection was red, so he slowed to a stop in the rightmost of the two left turning lanes on the exit ramp and engaged his left turn signal. The Packs' vehicle was the first car waiting at light in that lane.

Mr. Pack testified that he did not do anything while waiting for the light to change besides observe traffic, monitor the traffic light, and glance over at Mrs. Pack. He did not have the radio turned on while waiting at the intersection. Mr. Pack observed a white vehicle pulled up next to him in the turn lane to his left while he was waiting. Eventually, Mr. Pack saw the northbound traffic on Route 300 come to a stop. He saw three or four cars lined up in the right-hand northbound lane, and at least one car in the left lane, but could not recall how many cars were behind it. Mr. Pack testified that the number of cars lined up in the northbound lanes was "about the same" as depicted in Exhibit E (id. at 55). Mr. Pack testified that he looked over at Mrs. Pack and noticed the glow of her cellphone and, once he looked back at the traffic light, it changed to green. Mr. Pack estimated that 10-12 seconds passed from the time he stopped at the intersection until the light changed. Mr. Pack testified that, before he moved his vehicle, he looked to his left to make sure that cars in the northbound lanes on Route 300 remained stopped. Then he looked to the right, lifted his foot from the brake, and began to accelerate into the intersection. He testified that the vehicle in the lane next to him next to him began to roll forward at the same time. Mr. Pack began to look left again but, before he could do that, his vehicle was struck near the driver's side door by another vehicle, now known to be a state police vehicle being driven by Trooper Owen Healy.

Mr. Pack testified that fewer than five seconds passed between the time he began to move forward into the intersection and the time of impact, and he had only just begun to cross into the northbound lane of traffic. He described his vehicle's speed as "creeping" when the impact occurred (id. at 33). Significantly, Mr. Pack testified that he did not see Trooper Healy's vehicle before the impact, and he did not see any flashing lights or hear any emergency sirens at any time before the collision. Mr. Pack testified that the impact from Healy's vehicle caused his car to spin around three times. Eventually, after he was able to unbuckle himself and get out of the vehicle, another trooper approached him to ask if everyone was all right, but they did not discuss the cause of the accident.

On cross-examination, Mr. Pack acknowledged that although the weather was misty, it did not interfere with his ability to see the road ahead of him. In addition, Mr. Pack testified as to how far south he could see down Route 300 from his vantage point at the intersection. He testified that he could not see past the part of Route 300 southbound that curved to the right, but agreed that nothing obstructed his view as far south as the road signs hanging over Route 300 as depicted in Exhibit F, which he estimated were about 150 yards south of the intersection. He explained, however, that his visibility was more limited than what was shown in the photographs of the intersection taken during the day that were admitted into evidence because the accident occurred at night. Mr. Pack nevertheless acknowledged that a vehicle with headlights or emergency lights would have been visible to him from at least 450 feet from the intersection. Mr. Pack also generally acknowledged that if an emergency vehicle approaches an intersection, motorists should stop and not proceed forward. In addition, Mr. Pack testified that, on the night of the accident after the light changed green and he looked to his left, he did not look further south beyond the vehicles that were sitting at the intersection. He explained that he was focused on the cars stopped at the intersection in the northbound lanes because those vehicles would be the first ones that would potentially cross into his path. Mr. Pack further stated that he might not have been able to see the police car that approached the intersection and hit him in any event, if it was behind the cars that were lined up at the intersection in the northbound lanes.

On re-direct, Mr. Pack testified that his car door window was closed at the time of the incident, and it probably would have had rain drops on it, thus creating a "slight" obstruction (id. at 58). He also testified that he had never previously seen vehicles traveling in the shoulder of the road on Route 300, and he would not have been looking for vehicles in the shoulder before entering the intersection at the time of the accident. Finally, on re-cross, when asked whether there were any obstructions on the night of the accident that would have prevented him from seeing the shoulder of the road, Mr. Pack indicated that his view of the shoulder may have been blocked by the vehicle in the lane next to him, even though that vehicle was smaller and he could see over "[p]ortions" of it (id. at 66).

Mrs. Pack similarly described the weather conditions on the evening of the accident as "a misty, kind of yucky rain" (id. at 68). She testified that Mr. Pack used the windshield wipers intermittently during the drive from the basketball game to the scene of the accident. Mrs. Pack stated that it was "[u]nusually quiet" inside the car during the few minutes before the accident because their nephew was sleeping (id. at 70). As the Packs' vehicle approached the intersection, Mrs. Pack began to text her sister. When the car stopped at the red light, it was the first car in the right-hand left turn lane. Mrs. Pack looked up from her phone, briefly looked at the traffic, and looked back down to finish her text. Mrs. Pack testified that the light then changed to green, and she could sense that the car was starting to move. Before Mr. Pack proceeded into the intersection, Mrs. Pack instinctually "did a quick glance to the left" to make sure that all northbound traffic had stopped (id. at 73). Then, the car rolled forward into the intersection and "boom"—the Packs' vehicle was struck (id.). Mrs. Pack described the impact as "a hard hit" and "[h]eavy," causing the Packs' vehicle to spin around three or four times (id.). Mrs. Pack testified that she did not see any flashing lights before the accident occurred. She also noted that the intersection generally is not the "brightest lit area" (id. at 72).

On cross-examination, Mrs. Pack acknowledged that during the time the Packs' vehicle was stopped at the intersection, she was using her phone and generally not paying attention to what Mr. Pack was doing. She further stated that when she looked to the left after the light changed to green, she did not look further south beyond the vehicles stopped in the northbound lanes to see if any other vehicle was approaching. Mrs. Pack also reaffirmed that she did not see any flashing lights, and further stated that she did not hear any sirens before the accident occurred.

Claimants called Trooper Healy. The Court found his testimony to be forthright and sincere. Healy testified that he became a State Trooper in 2014, three years before the accident occurred. His training included a six-month course at the academy and supervision by a senior trooper. During his training, he received instruction on several subjects, including as relevant here, the Vehicle and Traffic Law, driving, and how to respond to calls over the radio. On the date of the accident, Healy was working a night shift from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. His duties included enforcement of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, ensuring safety on the roadways within his patrol area, and responding to calls. Healy could not remember the exact time that the accident occurred, but he agreed that it would have been around 10:30 p.m. or 11:30 p.m. Healy testified that the weather conditions that night were "very wet" and "[d]ark," but he could not remember if it was raining at the time the accident occurred (id. at 122). He confirmed that the roadways had a "sheen" on them from the rain, as depicted in photographs admitted into evidence (id. at 152; see Exh 7).

At some point on the night of the accident, Healy heard a call come over the radio about a domestic dispute involving a 13-year-old girl. Healy testified that he was not directly asked by State Police headquarters to respond to this call; rather, the call was placed by the Town of Newburgh, which was seeking a backup unit to assist the town police. Healy explained that the State Police often work with local police departments if they need assistance responding to calls. After some time, when Healy realized that the town was having difficulty locating a backup unit, he decided to respond. Healy testified that an officer generally does not know the exact nature of a domestic dispute before walking into it—it could be anything from "an argument" to "blood[ ] flying everywhere"—which is why police departments require two units to respond to the call (T.1, at 126). He acknowledged that there was no indication on this specific call that anyone's life was in danger.

Healy testified that he did not use the radio to confirm with headquarters that he was responding to the scene. Healy acknowledged that he was trained on "radioing in" when responding to calls (id. at 129). But he explained that he felt it would not have been safe to do so at that time because he had to focus on driving, navigating busy intersections, and using the lights and sirens. He decided he would just wait until he arrived at the location to call in and notify headquarters where he was. However, Healy then recalled that at the time this particular call came in, a "radio silence" was in place, meaning that officers were prohibited from using the radio unless they were involved in the specific incident for which the silence was put in place (id.). Healy acknowledged that he did not previously testify about the radio silence at his deposition. A State Police radio log offered into evidence by claimants shows that a radio silence was lifted at 10:48 p.m., about 10 minutes after the accident (see Exh 9). Healy acknowledged that the radio log does not show when the radio silence went into effect, nor does it show when the call about the domestic situation came in. Healy explained that that call would instead be reflected on county or town records.

Healy testified that at the time he received the radio call, he was near Route 300. The location of the domestic incident was further north on Route 300; thus, the drive would be a "straight shot" down northbound Route 300 that he anticipated would take about 15 minutes (T.1, at 125). Healy initially testified that he activated his lights and sirens and started traveling toward his destination. With respect to the emergency lights, Healy explained that his vehicle had a "three mode switch," with the brightest lights activating when the switch is all the way to the right (id. at 127). At the brightest setting, the switch activated flashing lights on the top of the car, the back deck lights, and flashing headlights. Healy could not recall if his car also had flashing lights in the grille. The middle setting on the switch activated the same lights but dimmer, and the lowest setting activated only the back deck lights. Healy did not expressly state which setting he used on the night of the accident.

Healy described the traffic on Route 300 as "light" on the evening of the accident, although he acknowledged that there were vehicles stopped on Route 300 and the I-84 exit ramp (id. at 132). Healy stated that while he was driving to the call location, he passed through one other major intersection before the intersection with I-84. At the first intersection, he did not do anything unusual—it was "standard lights and sirens and slow down" (id. at 132-133). However, when asked whether it was his standard practice to activate the sirens immediately along with the lights, Healy clarified that he did not have the sirens constantly blaring. Rather, he explained that the siren was turned off unless he was manually depressing the car's horn to activate it. He testified that he only activated the siren when he was actually approaching an intersection and would deactivate the siren after clearing the intersection. Thus, when approaching an intersection, he would be steering with one hand while the other hand was pressing down the horn to activate the siren. Healy candidly acknowledged that this practice was contrary to the instructions he received during his training to activate the siren "simultaneously" with the lights and to do so "constantly" (id. at 135). He explained that he operated the siren in a manner contrary to his training—i.e., by "deactivat[ing it] in between intersections"—to avoid disturbing the locals with constant loud noise (id.). Healy also acknowledged that the siren sound "doesn't go too far," noting that "some people don't hear it until you get right up to them" (id. at 137). He stated it was possible that someone could see his vehicle's lights but not hear the siren. Nevertheless, he maintained on cross-examination  ³ that he intended to do everything in his power to alert other motorists of his presence.

Healy then testified about his approach to the intersection where the accident occurred, which he estimated was half a mile from the first intersection that he had passed through. Healy recalled that Route 300 northbound had two travel lanes, a left turn lane at the intersection, and a shoulder to the right of the travel lanes. He stated that he could not remember whether any vehicles were in the left turning lane, although he had previously testified at his deposition that there were no cars in the left turn lane. Healy testified that when he first noticed cars lined up at the intersection in the travel lanes, he was still "pretty far" from the traffic light (id. at 141). At some point, Healy decided to maneuver around the northbound cars that were stopped at the light by entering the shoulder of the road. He explained that his intention was to enter from the shoulder and then "cut into the middle" after passing the cars stopped in the northbound lanes (id. at 149). He considered entering the intersection from the left turn lane, but decided against it to avoid oncoming traffic from the southbound lanes. Healy frankly acknowledged that entering from the shoulder "might not have been the smartest thing to do" (id. at 142).

Healy could not remember how fast he was going when he entered the intersection, but he testified that he started slowing down before moving into the shoulder. He stated that he placed his foot on the brake as soon as he saw the intersection. Healy testified that he felt he was going slow enough such that he had "full control of the situation within the intersection" (id. at 158). When asked whether he could have been going as fast as 60 miles per hour at the time of the accident, he said he did not know. Healy testified that he understood that entering an intersection at a high rate of speed, without slowing down, was dangerous and likely to produce harm.

Once Healy was in the intersection, he stated that he began to accelerate again because he saw that all the other vehicles had stopped and assumed that the other drivers must have seen him. Healy agreed on cross-examination that this assumption was wrong. Healy testified that, as he began to go from the shoulder into the travel lanes, he only saw the "tip of the nose" of claimants' vehicle before colliding with it (id. at 144). He also stated that he saw the "flash of a rim of a vehicle" before the collision, and after that, he was "knocked out" (id. at 144). He testified that he must have seen claimants' vehicle before entering the shoulder, but he did not see it move. Healy stated that the only vehicles he saw moving were those traveling southbound on Route 300, which he assumed had all braked because they saw him coming. However, Healy did not know whether the southbound vehicles were instead stopping because they had a red light like the northbound vehicles. He stated that it was a "complicated intersection," and he did not know whether the northbound and southbound traffic signals operated in sync with each other (id. at 148).

As noted above, Healy testified that he did not see claimants' vehicle moving into his lane of travel before the impact, and he further testified that he did not see the vehicle in the leftmost lane on the I-84 exit ramp moving into the intersection. However, in a memorandum written by Healy the day after the accident on April 1, 2017, Healy had stated that he "observed from the far right corner of the windshield two vehicles entering in[to] [his] lane of travel," "[o]ne . . . in the right most left turning lane" on the I-84 exit ramp and one "in the left most left turning lane" (Exh B, at 8). Thus, Healy ultimately acknowledged in his trial testimony that he thought he saw cars in both of the left turn lanes on the I-84 exit ramp move forward into the intersection before the accident occurred (see T.1, at 156).

Claimants' final witness was an expert witness, attorney Dawn Flower. Ms. Flower became familiar with the field of accident reconstruction during her time as a local prosecutor, and later attended accident reconstruction classes at the Traffic Safety Institute at Northwestern University. She passed an examination administered by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction (ACTAR) to become an ACTAR-certified accident reconstructionist. ACTAR is a private body that was formed upon the recommendation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to establish credentials for accident reconstructionists, and continuing education credits are required to maintain the certification. Ms. Flower testified that accident reconstruction requires the application of physics, biomechanics, perception reaction, and psychological evaluation to the facts of an accident. Ms. Flower also explained that she is certified to download, interpret, and analyze Crash Data Recorder (CDR) reports. A CDR is a device, typically connected to a vehicle's seatbelt module, that records data about a vehicle's operation when the seatbelts tighten or the airbags deploy. Such data includes information about the vehicle's speed, the steering input, and whether the brake was being applied. After a brief voir dire, defendant did not object to Ms. Flower testifying as an accident reconstructionist.

Ms. Flower testified that she was called to provide an opinion "as to the behavior of the police vehicle as it entered the intersection and as to how the collision happened" (Transcript, Vol. 2 [T.2] at 6). In preparation for her testimony, Ms. Flower reviewed witness depositions (including Healy's), photographs of the accident site and the vehicles involved in the collision, Google Earth aerial photographs of the intersection, police records, medical records, and the CDR report from Healy's trooper vehicle which was admitted into evidence (see Exh 10). In addition, Ms. Flower visited the accident site.

Ms. Flower explained that the CDR report contained data pertaining to Healy's operation of his vehicle during the five-second period before the accident occurred (T.2, at 13; Exh 10, at 15). The report has data inputs for each tenth of a second during those five seconds. The data recorded includes the speed of the vehicle, whether any weight was placed on the accelerator pedal (shown as a percentage from 0 to 100), whether the brake was activated (recorded as "on" or "off"), and the steering wheel input, i.e., whether the wheel was turned or held straight. The CDR report does not show if or when Healy activated his siren or flashing lights.

Based on the CDR report, Ms. Flower testified that the speed of Healy's vehicle at the time the accident occurred was 60 miles per hour. She testified that five seconds before the collision, Healy's speed was 67 miles per hour, the front of his vehicle was 450 feet from the point of impact, and he did not have his foot on the accelerator or the brake. At 4.6 seconds before impact, Healy put his foot on the brake and the vehicle began to slow down. He lifted his foot off the brake at 2.9 seconds before impact, at which point the vehicle's speed was 58 miles per hour and he was 241 feet from impact. At that same time, Healy pressed down on the accelerator. Because a vehicle takes some time to respond to pressure on the pedals, the vehicle continued to slow until 2.0 seconds before impact—about 175 feet from the point of collision—reaching its lowest recorded speed of 57 miles per hour. The vehicle then accelerated, climbing back to a speed of 61 miles per hour at 0.2 seconds before impact (see Exh 10, at 16). Healy's foot remained on the accelerator until 0.3 seconds before impact, and the pressure on the accelerator reached as high as 60%. Healy pressed on the brake again at 0.2 seconds before impact, causing the car to slow to 60 miles per hour at 0.1 seconds before impact.

Ms. Flower opined that Healy's testimony that he slowed his vehicle when entering the intersection was inconsistent with the CDR data (see T.2, at 27, 36). Indeed, according to Ms. Flower, the CDR data shows that Healy accelerated into the intersection. Moreover, during her investigation, Ms. Flower measured the distance from the point of impact to the "stop line" on Route 300 northbound to be 80 feet (id. at 34). The point of impact was determined by reviewing photographs of the location of the cars and the testimony of the parties, and Ms. Flower asserted that the calculation was accurate within a radius of a couple of feet. She testified that there was no indication that Healy applied the brakes during that 80-foot stretch until 0.2 seconds before impact (see id. at 34).

Ms. Flower further opined that the accident would not have occurred had Healy approached the intersection at slower rate of speed. She testified that, if Healy had been going even 50 miles per hour, the Packs' vehicle "would have had time to clear [Healy's] path and the collision wouldn't have happened" (id. at 37). Ms. Flower also discussed "perception reaction time," which is "the time that it takes someone to perceive something that is happening, for their mind to decide what to do about it and to institute that reaction" (id. at 37-38). She explained that the average perception reaction time is 1.5 seconds for an unexpected event, such as a collision, although it would be less for an expected event like a traffic light changing.

On cross-examination, Ms. Flower acknowledged that the CDR data shows Healy was not pressing the accelerator from 5.0 seconds before impact until 2.9 seconds before impact, and he was applying the brake between minus 4.6 seconds and minus 2.9 seconds. She further testified that there is no data regarding Healy's speed before the five seconds analyzed in the CDR report. In addition, Ms. Flower agreed that when a motorist stopped at an intersection sees an emergency vehicle with lights and sirens activated approaching, that individual is supposed to yield the right of way and stay clear of the intersection. She testified that, at some point during Healy's approach to the intersection, the lights on his vehicle would have been visible to other motorists. However, she stated she did not know when the lights would have been visible, because the surrounding circumstances—such as the lighting, the rain, glare from other cars, and the busyness of the intersection—could impact visibility. Ms. Flower acknowledged that she did not measure the "sight line" to the south from the I-84 exit ramp, nor could she give an estimate (id. at 52).

Defendant called Samuel Soto Jr. as its sole witness. Soto testified that he has worked as a corrections officer for 23 years and, at the time of trial, he worked at Fishkill Correctional Facility. He testified that he drives through the intersection where the accident occurred every day during his commute, as he was doing on the day of the accident. He described the weather conditions on the day of the accident as "damp" and "a little chilly" (T.1, at 86). Soto—like the Packs—approached the intersection from the I-84 exit ramp. He was the only person in his silver-colored vehicle at the time of the accident. He described the level of traffic that evening as "normal" (id. at 88).

As Soto neared the intersection, he observed that there was a red light ahead. He thus brought his vehicle to a stop in the left-hand left turn lane at the intersection, i.e., the lane to the left of claimants' vehicle. There was one vehicle in front of him. He stated that his window was open and his radio was turned off. Soto testified that, after he stopped, he observed Healy's trooper vehicle approaching from the south because he saw flashing lights and sirens. Soto estimated that from his position at the intersection, he could see 50 yards south down Route 300. He testified that the photograph in Exhibit F fairly and accurately represented the distance south that he could see. Soto stated that the distance could change depending on the conditions, but testified it was "pretty clear" on the night of the accident (id. at 92). Thus, he stated that he could see Healy's emergency lights from the distance depicted in Exhibit F.

Soto testified that when the traffic signal for his lane turned green, Healy's trooper vehicle was slightly behind the stop line on Route 300 northbound. Soto did not move his vehicle because Healy's trooper vehicle had not yet cleared the intersection. Contrary to the testimony of both Mr. Pack and Healy, Soto testified that the car in front of him also did not move. Soto noticed that the car in the lane next to him—claimants' vehicle—began to accelerate into the intersection. He then saw the collision occur between Healy's car and claimants' vehicle. After the accident, Soto testified that he got out of his car to check on the individuals involved in the collision, and that everyone involved was conscious and talking. Eventually, emergency vehicles arrived at the scene and another trooper talked to Soto and took his statement.

On cross-examination, Soto maintained that it was a "clear" night even after being told that other witnesses testified it was rainy and misty (id. at 102). He testified, however, that the photographs in Exhibit 7 accurately depicted that the roads were damp, and that it may have rained earlier. Soto also acknowledged that claimants might not have had the same view of traffic as he did because their vehicle was to the right and slightly ahead of his. Moreover, when asked about when he first saw Healy's vehicle, Soto said he could see it "coming up around the bend" on Route 300, which he estimated to be approximately 50 yards south (id. at 107). He stated that he saw the trooper vehicle approaching "in one of the travel[ ] lanes" and did not recall whether he saw it move to the left or right (id. at 108). He did not recall seeing Healy's vehicle in the shoulder of the road and specifically stated he believed it was "in the road the whole time" (id.). Soto also clarified the sequence of events with respect to his observation of Healy's vehicle: first, he heard the siren, and then he looked up and saw the lights. He estimated that 20 or 30 seconds passed from the moment he heard the siren until the time the accident occurred. Moreover, with respect to the emergency lights, Soto recalled seeing the troop car's white headlights, flashing colored lights in the grille, and red and white lights on the top of the vehicle.

On redirect, when Soto was asked whether there was "any question in [his] mind that th[e] approaching state police vehicle was fully visible and audible to anyone at th[e] intersection," Soto replied, "[p]ossibly," and "[i]t depends" (id. at 111-112). Soto reiterated that his window was open and testified that he "probably heard [the siren] before anybody else" (id. at 112). Finally, on re-cross, Soto testified that he was unable to estimate Healy's speed, and that Healy "might have tried" to slow down, but Soto was not sure (id. at 114). Overall, the Court found Soto's testimony to be credible, but inconsistent in some key respects with that of claimants and Healy. For example, Soto's testimony that Healy's vehicle was always in the roadway and never in the shoulder is contradicted by Healy's own testimony that he drove into the shoulder to try and navigate the intersection.

In addition to the testimony at trial, the Court reviewed all the documents and photographs entered into evidence. In addition to Healy's memorandum discussed above, Exhibit B contains an administrative narrative written by Healy's superior, Sergeant Christian McCarthy, which is based upon interviews with Healy and Mr. Pack. The narrative states that Mr. Pack "fail[ed] to observe" Healy's vehicle before entering the intersection (Exh B, at 7). In addition, it states that Healy reported that he saw "no vehicles approaching from any direction" before entering the intersection (id.). The Court gives Sergeant McCarthy's narrative no weight because it was not based on the Sergeant's personal knowledge. Exhibit B also contains supporting depositions from Mr. and Mrs. Pack taken the day after the accident, as well as a supporting deposition from Soto taken on the day of the accident. Mr. Pack's supporting deposition states, consistent with his testimony, that he looked to the left and to the right before entering the intersection. Mrs. Pack's supporting deposition has a minor inconsistency with her trial testimony to the extent that it states that the traffic light for vehicles on the I-84 ramp was already green when the Packs were approaching the intersection. Soto's supporting deposition is consistent with his testimony.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A motorist's decision to run a red light at a busy intersection would ordinarily constitute negligence as a matter of law (see Callahan v Glennon, 193 AD3d 1029, 1030-1031 [2d Dept 2021], citing VTL § 1111 [d] [1]). But in recognition of the public policy that drivers of emergency vehicles should be entitled, under some circumstances, to disregard the rules of the road "where necessary to carry out their important responsibilities" without fear of liability (Frezzell v City of New York, 24 NY3d 213, 217 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]), the Legislature has imposed a heightened standard of liability when considering their injury-causing conduct. Thus, VTL § 1104 grants the drivers of emergency vehicles " 'privileges' to disobey certain traffic laws when they are 'involved in an emergency operation' " (Anderson v Commack Fire Dist., 39 NY3d 495, 501 [2023], quoting VTL § 1104 [a]). Those privileges are enumerated in VTL § 1104 (b), which states that a driver of such a vehicle may, among other things, "[p]roceed past a steady red signal . . . but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation" (VTL § 1104 [b] [2]). When drivers exercise one of the privileges under section 1104 (b) during the course of an emergency operation, they are nevertheless required by VTL § 1104 (e) to operate the vehicle "with due regard for the safety of all persons" and are not protected "from the consequences of [their] reckless disregard for the safety of others." Section 1104 (e) thus establishes a reckless disregard standard of care " 'for determining civil liability for damages resulting from the privileged operation of an emergency vehicle' " (Kabir v County of Monroe, 16 NY3d 217, 230 [2011] [ellipsis omitted], quoting Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 500 [1994]). Importantly, however, the reckless disregard standard does not apply to all injury-causing conduct committed by drivers of emergency vehicles engaged in emergency operations. Indeed, "[i]f the conduct causing the accident resulting in injuries and damages is not privileged under [VTL] § 1104 (b), the standard of care for determining civil liability is ordinary negligence" (Kabir, 16 NY3d at 230-231).

Applying these well-settled principles here, defendant will be found to be at fault for the accident unless (1) Healy was engaged in an emergency operation at the time of the accident; (2) the conduct that caused the accident was privileged under VTL § 1104; and (3) Healy's conduct did not satisfy the heightened "reckless disregard" standard of care.

Initially, the parties do not dispute that Healy was operating an emergency vehicle and was engaged in an emergency operation at the time of the accident because he was "responding to . . . [a] police call" (VTL § 114-b; see Criscione v City of New York, 97 NY2d 152, 157 [2001] [noting that "a radio call to officers on patrol by a police dispatcher regarding a 911 complaint" qualifies as a "police call"]; see also VTL § 101).

Next, the Court finds that the injury-causing conduct in this case—Healy's decision to go through the red light at the intersection of Route 300 and the I-84 exit ramp—constitutes privileged conduct under VTL § 1104 (b) (2), which authorizes the driver of an emergency vehicle to "proceed past a steady red signal" if the driver "slow[s] down as may be necessary for safe operation" of the vehicle.⁴ As claimants suggest (see Reply Brf, at 1), the plain language of the statute appears to indicate that the requirement of slowing down to a safe speed is a condition upon the emergency vehicle driver's right to claim the privilege, and not just one factor among others to consider in a recklessness analysis. Although not clearly stated, to the extent claimants' reply brief can be construed as arguing that Healy's conduct was unprivileged because he did not slow down before entering the intersection and, thus, that negligence is the proper standard of care to be applied, such an argument lacks merit. The Fourth Department has held that the failure of a driver of an emergency vehicle to slow down before entering an intersection against a red traffic signal " 'does not render [the driver's] conduct unprivileged as a matter of law, but rather presents an issue of fact whether he acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others' " (Oddo v City of Buffalo, 159 AD3d 1519, 1522 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Perkins v City of Buffalo, 151 AD3d 1941, 1942 [4th Dept 2017]; see also Rice v City of Buffalo, 145 AD3d 1503, 1505 [4th Dept 2016]). Because no other Department of the Appellate Division appears to have reached a contrary conclusion on this issue, the Court is bound by the Fourth Department's precedent (see Oswald v Oswald, 107 AD3d 45, 47 [3d Dept 2013], citing Mountain View Coach Lines v Storms, 102 AD2d 663, 664 [2d Dept 1984]).

Having determined that Healy's conduct was privileged conduct within the meaning of VTL § 1104 (b), the Court must decide the ultimate question whether his conduct meets the "reckless disregard" standard of liability. Under this standard, the claimant must show a level of culpability greater than a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. Indeed, to satisfy the standard, there must be evidence that the emergency vehicle driver " 'has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow' and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" (Frezzell, 24 NY3d at 217, quoting Saarinen, 84 NY2d at 501). This "fact-specific inquiry . . . is focused on the precautionary measures taken by [the driver] to avoid causing harm to the general public weighed against [the] duty to respond to an urgent emergency situation" (Frezzell, 24 NY3d at 217-218; see Bourdierd v City of Yonkers, 213 AD3d 899, 901 [2d Dept 2023]). Factors relevant to the recklessness inquiry include: the nature of the underlying emergency; the nature of the road; traffic and weather conditions; the time of day; the speed of the emergency vehicle; whether the emergency vehicle driver followed departmental guidelines; and whether the vehicle's emergency signals were activated (see Gernatt v Gregoire, 217 AD3d 1340, 1342 [4th Dept 2023], citing PJI 2:79A). It is a claimant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the emergency vehicle driver acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others, and that the driver's conduct was the proximate cause of claimants' injuries (see Miller v Suffolk County Police Dept., 105 AD3d 918, 919-920 [2d Dept 2013]; see also PJI 2:79A; id. 2:70). As explained below, Healy failed to take basic precautionary measures to avoid causing harm to others—despite unfavorable traffic and weather conditions—and he took risks which were disproportionate to the needs of the underlying emergency. Thus, the Court finds that Healy acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Initially, the traffic and weather conditions at the time of the accident demanded a more cautious approach to the intersection. Witnesses at trial, including Trooper Healy, described the weather as misty and rainy, and testified that the roads were wet. Moreover, it was dark outside, and Mrs. Pack testified that the intersection was not very brightly lit. Healy acknowledged that the intersection where the accident occurred was complicated. Mr. Pack similarly stated that the accident occurred at a major highway interchange and credibly testified that the traffic was moderate to heavy at the intersection. It is undisputed that there were multiple rows of vehicles lined up on Route 300 northbound and the I-84 westbound exit ramp.

Next, contrary to his testimony, the Court finds that Healy failed to reduce his speed to the extent necessary to navigate the intersection safely. Ms. Flower's testimony and the CDR data show that Healy barely slowed his vehicle during the five-second period before the accident occurred and, in fact, was accelerating at the time he reached the intersection. Although he initially used the brake to slow from 67 miles per hour to 57 miles per hour, he put his foot back on the accelerator at 2.9 seconds before impact and the vehicle accelerated back to 61 miles per hour by 0.3 seconds before impact. Defendant did not introduce any evidence to rebut Ms. Flower's conclusion that Healy accelerated into the intersection, and his use of the accelerator shows that he intended to maintain a high rate of speed going into the intersection. Healy's last-ditch effort to brake right before the moment of impact was "merely reactionary and not precautionary" (Ellis v City of Buffalo, 218 AD3d 1131, 1136 [4th Dept 2023]) and, in any event, only slowed the vehicle to 60 miles per hour. Although neither party offered any evidence of the speed limit on Route 300, defendant concedes that Healy was traveling in excess of the speed limit and, further, that the trooper's speed is "certainly relevant" to the Court's assessment of recklessness (Def's Brf, at 19). Notably, although Healy could not recall how fast he was going at the time of the accident, he testified that he understood the risk of danger of passing through a red light at an intersection without sufficiently slowing down and the likelihood of harm to other motorists that would entail. And, especially considering the traffic and weather conditions described above, Healy should have known that approaching the intersection at a high speed increased the risk that other motorists would not have time to react to his emergency signals.

Healy also candidly admitted at trial that he did not properly use his emergency siren on the night of the accident. He testified that, despite being trained to have the siren constantly sounding, he would only activate it when approaching an intersection and deactivate it after he cleared the intersection (see McLoughlin v City of Syracuse, 206 AD3d 1600, 1602 [4th Dept 2022] [officer's alleged violation of policies regarding use of lights and sirens was relevant to determining recklessness]). He admitted that this was an intentional personal practice in which he engaged to avoid disturbing the locals. This intermittent use of the siren, however, greatly increased the risk of an accident by decreasing the chance that other motorists would hear Healy's vehicle approaching. Indeed, Healy acknowledged that the sound of the siren does not travel very far, and that other motorists often have difficulty hearing it. In addition, Healy also explained that in order to operate the siren intermittently, he had to manually depress the horn, essentially requiring him to operate the steering wheel one-handed while entering a busy intersection.

The risks created by Healy's failure to slow down sufficiently and use his siren properly were exacerbated by his decision to enter the intersection from the shoulder of the road, because it is an area in which one does not ordinarily expect vehicles to be traveling. Although entering from the shoulder may not have been an unreasonable decision under other circumstances, it was not safe to do so at Healy's speed and in light of the driving conditions that night. Moreover, Healy candidly acknowledged that he disregarded a safer method of approaching the intersection by entering from the left turn lane on Route 300 northbound.

With respect to the underlying police call, the Court recognizes that, although Healy was unaware of the exact nature of the incident to which he was responding, the situation could have been dangerous or volatile. Nevertheless, Healy's conduct in approaching the intersection was "disproportionate" and "overreactive" (Campbell v City of Elmira, 84 NY2d 505, 512 [1994]). Indeed, it is unlikely that slowing down to navigate a complicated intersection would have meaningfully impeded Healy's response time to the call. Although Healy reasonably would have wanted to reach his destination as soon as possible—as would any driver engaged in an emergency operation—he did not need to maintain a constant high rate of speed like an officer might under other circumstances, i.e., when attempting to apprehend a fleeing motorist (see e.g. Saarinen, 84 NY2d at 502-503; Wonderly v City of Poughkeepsie, 185 AD3d 632, 634 [2d Dept 2020]; Hubbard v Robinson, 184 AD3d 1097, 1098-1099 [4th Dept 2020]). Moreover, Healy also testified that he did not respond to the call immediately upon learning about the situation. To the contrary, he monitored the call for some period of time, and only decided to respond once he realized the local police were having difficulty locating a backup unit. Further, Healy testified that he did not use his radio to confirm he was responding to the call before the accident occurred. Although this may have been reasonable due to the radio blackout in place at that time, practically speaking it meant that, at the time of the accident, neither the persons involved in the underlying situation nor other police officers were specifically relying on him to respond or were even aware that he was on his way. Finally, Healy did not testify that the improper operation of his siren was in any way compelled by the nature of the call to which he was responding; rather, as he explained, he operated the siren intermittently simply to avoid disturbing neighborhood residents. The Court thus concludes that, although Healy's conduct was privileged, the State is not entitled to qualified immunity under VTL § 1104 because Healy proceeded into the intersection recklessly, and his reckless conduct was the proximate cause of claimants' injuries (see Gordon v County of Nassau, 261 AD2d 359, 359 [2d Dept 1999]; see also Baines v City of New York, 269 AD2d 309, 309 [1st Dept 2000]; Destino v State of New York, 203 AD3d 1598, 1599 [4th Dept 2022]).

As to the issue of comparative fault, defendant failed to meet its burden to establish that Mr. Pack bears any responsibility for the accident (see CPLR 1412; PJI 2:36). The Court rejects defendant's argument that Mr. Pack is wholly or partially at fault because he failed to yield the right of way to an approaching emergency vehicle (see VTL § 1144 [a]; Atkins v City of New York, 196 AD3d 622, 624 [2d Dept 2021]), or generally failed "to see what [wa]s there to be seen with the proper use of his senses" (Topalis v Zwolski, 76 AD3d 524, 525 [2d Dept 2010]). The Court credits Mr. Pack's testimony that he looked both ways before entering the intersection, and further credits the testimony of both claimants that they did not see Healy's emergency lights or hear the emergency siren. Defendant also did not demonstrate that Mr. Pack would have seen and heard Healy had he properly used his senses or otherwise offer evidence to show that Mr. Pack had sufficient time to react to Healy's emergency signals. As Mr. Pack testified, his view south on Route 300 would have been obstructed by the rows of vehicles waiting at the intersection on Route 300 northbound, and his view of the shoulder would have been at least partially blocked by the vehicles in the turning lane next to him to his left. Moreover, as explained above, Mr. Pack may not have heard the siren due to Healy's intermittent and improper use of it, and Healy himself acknowledged that the sound of the siren does not travel very far. And although defendant's witness, Soto, testified that he saw the emergency lights and heard the emergency siren, he declined to say that everyone at the intersection would have been able to do so. Indeed, Soto acknowledged that he had a different view of the intersection than other motorists and suggested he may have been the first to notice Healy was coming, particularly because his window was open, which may have increased his ability to hear and see Healy's vehicle. Finally, Mr. Pack's testimony—which was corroborated by Healy's post-accident memorandum and his testimony—that the vehicle to the left of the Packs' vehicle also began to move forward when the I-84 exit ramp light changed to green suggests that at least one other motorist also did not see and hear Healy approaching the intersection.

The heightened "reckless disregard" standard set forth under VTL § 1104 was established to prevent judges from second-guessing "the many split-second decisions that are made in the field under highly pressured conditions" (Frezzell, 24 NY3d at 217). Indeed, this qualified immunity enables emergency drivers to "act[ ] decisively and tak[e] calculated risks" without fear of liability for ordinary negligence (id.). But the accident here did not result from necessary rule-breaking, decisive action, or calculated risk-taking. Rather, the evidence shows that Healy disregarded serious risks of harm and failed to take basic precautions for the safety of other motorists when, on a dark and dreary night, he zipped through a red traffic light at a busy and complicated intersection from the shoulder of a wet road, without meaningfully slowing down or properly using his siren. His risky approach to the intersection was not necessitated by the underlying emergency, and he proceeded in this manner despite his awareness of the potential for accident or injury. The Court thus finds that defendant is 100% at fault for the accident based upon Healy's reckless disregard for the safety of others.

This decision only resolves the issue of liability to the extent of determining the apportionment of fault among the parties. As the Court explained at the outset of the liability trial, the issue whether claimants sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) remains to be determined at the damages trial (see Perez v State of New York, 215 AD2d 740, 741-742 [2d Dept 1995]). In addition, the parties are encouraged to work together in good faith to resolve the matter of damages. If the parties are unable to settle the matter on their own, following any additional discovery necessary on the extent of claimants' damages, the parties shall participate in a Court-facilitated alternative dispute resolution process (see 22 NYCRR Part 160). In the event a settlement is not ultimately reached, a trial on the issue of damages will be held as soon as practicable.

Any motions or applications not previously ruled upon are denied.

Let interlocutory judgment be entered accordingly.

March 26, 2025

Albany, New York

ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY

Judge of the Court of Claims

FOOTNOTES

1.   The caption in each claim has been amended sua sponte to reflect the only properly named defendant.

2.   Claimants' exhibits 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12, as well as defendant's exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, were so admitted.

3.   The portion of Healy's testimony from pages 161 to 165 of volume one of the trial transcript is improperly labeled as a "redirect examination"—it was in fact a continuation of the cross-examination. Likewise, the portion of the testimony from pages 165 to 168, incorrectly labeled as a "recross-examination," is actually the redirect examination.

4.   Although claimants have also suggested that Healy was driving in excess of the speed limit at the time of the accident (see VTL § 1104 [b] [3] [including such conduct as privileged under the statute]), they failed to adduce any evidence at trial to prove that Healy exceeded the speed limit. Surprisingly, neither party offered any evidence of the speed limit on Route 300 northbound at the location of the accident. Defendant's post-trial brief mentions a speed limit of 45 miles per hour (see Def's Brf, at 19), but that assertion is not supported by any citation to the trial record. Further, "the fact that an officer exceeds the speed limit does not by itself constitute a predicate for the imposition of liability" under VTL § 1104 (Schieren v State of New York, 281 AD2d 828, 831 [3d Dept 2001], citing Powell v City of Mount Vernon, 228 AD2d 572 [2d Dept 1996]). In any event, although Healy's speed is a factor to be considered in determining whether he was reckless under the circumstances, as discussed further below, his speed alone was not a proximate cause of the accident to the extent claimants have argued that Mr. Pack would have cleared the intersection before Healy reached it if Healy had been going slower (see Loder v Greco, 5 AD3d 978, 978 [4th Dept 2004]).

Zainab A. Chaudhry, J.