John Lanorith, Claimant, v. State of New York, Defendant. (2026)

Claimant John Lanorith, proceeding pro se, filed this claim seeking $8,700 in damages from Defendant the State of New York for allegedly wrongfully confining him for 87 days while he was incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility. After considering the evidence and undisputed testimony presented at trial, the Court finds that Defendant wrongfully confined Claimant for 22 days from December 15, 2017, to January 5, 2018, and awards $3,300 damages ($150 per day).

I. RELEVANT FACTS

The Court conducted a trial on October 14, 2025, via Microsoft Teams, with the Court presiding in Manhattan, New York, and the parties appearing separately.

Claimant offered the following exhibits into evidence:

Claimant's Exhibit 1 — Claimant's Exhibit 1 — Claim

Claimant's Exhibit 2 — Claim

Claimant's Exhibit 3 — Verified Answer

Claimant's Exhibit 4 — Reply to Answer

Claimant's Exhibit 5 — Inmate misbehavior report, served on 10/17/2017

Claimant's Exhibit 6 — Review of Superintendent's hearing, served on 12/20/2017

Claimant's Exhibit 7 — Appeal form to commissioner, undated

Claimant's Exhibit 8 — Superintendent hearing disposition, dated 10/17/2017

Claimant's Exhibit 9 — Superintendent hearing disposition, dated 12/21/2017

Claimant's Exhibit 10 — Disbursement or Refund Request forms, 5/7/2018

The exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Claimant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he was placed in solitary confinement after an incident "on the day in question,"¹ October 11, 2017 (see also Claimant's Exhibit 1, p 5  ² ; Claimant's Exhibit 8).

Claimant testified that he was confined to a cell between two individuals who "liked to throw feces and urine at one another all day long, so I dealt with that for all three months." Claimant stated he "got hit with fecal matter." Claimant also was unable "to participate and practice religious services," lost property, and lost his program placement (Claimant's Exhibit 1, p 14). Claimant's visits were limited to once a week and he "was unable to get up and play with my grandchildren" (Claimant's Exhibit 1, p 14). Additionally, Claimant was confined to his cell for "about 21 hours a day" (id. at p 15).

Claimant's initial hearing ended on October 23, 2017 (Claimant's Exhibit 8). Claimant testified that the hearing officer did not investigate the incident, "found me guilty and gave me 180 days."

Claimant appealed the determination (Claimant's Exhibit 7). On December 15, 2017, the initial hearing disposition was reversed and a rehearing was ordered (Claimant's Exhibit 6, Review of Superintendent's hearing). The rehearing concluded on January 5, 2018 (Claimant's Exhibit 9). Claimant testified that he was found not guilty of all charges and was "released from the box the same day." Claimant testified that he was in solitary confinement for about 90 days. In an affidavit attached to his claim, Claimant stated that he was held in solitary confinement for 87 days starting on October 11, 2017 (Claimant's Exhibit 1, p 13).

While testifying, Claimant stated it was hard to "dredge" this matter up and that he gets "emotional" even though seven to eight years have passed since he was sent to solitary confinement.

Defendant moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that Claimant failed to meet his burden of establishing wrongful confinement. Specifically, Defendant's actions were privileged and Claimant failed to identify any rule or regulation that correction officials violated that would cause their actions to not be privileged.

Claimant opposed the motion, arguing that he submitted sufficient documentation.

The Court reserved decision on Defendant's motion and the claim.

II. Wrongful Confinement

To establish a prima facie claim for wrongful confinement, Claimant must establish through credible evidence that 1) Defendant intended to confine him, 2) he was aware of the confinement, 3) he did not consent to the confinement, and 4) the confinement was not privileged (see Rodgers v State, 78 Misc 3d 454, 457 [Ct Cl 2022]). Here, it is undisputed that Defendant intended to confine Claimant, that he was aware of the confinement, and that he did not consent to such confinement. The remaining issue, therefore, is whether the confinement was privileged.

It is well settled that a correctional facility employee's actions concerning disciplinary matters are "discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]). Correction employees' actions of starting and conducting disciplinary proceedings, "issuing misbehavior reports, conducting hearings, rendering dispositions, and placing incarcerated" individuals in punitive conferment (Rodgers, 78 Misc 3d at 457) "constitute discretionary conduct of quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" as long as the employees "act under the authority of and in full compliance with" the law (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 214).

This immunity remains in place so long as the underlying proceedings comply with applicable rules and regulations. If a correctional facility employees' actions exceed their scope of authority, violate applicable rules or laws, or fail to provide appropriate due process safeguards, then the immunity goes away and the State can be found liable (see Padilla v State of New York, 85 Misc 3d 1252[A], *3 [Ct Cl 2025]; see also Ramirez v State of New York, 174 AD3d 1635, 1636-37 [3d Dept 2019]). Generally, immunity attaches "even if the hearing determination is later administratively reversed" (Rodgers, 78 Misc 3d at 457).

When a disciplinary hearing determination is administratively reversed, the incarcerated individual is to be released from confinement (see e.g., Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982, 982 [4th Dept 1994]; Padilla, 85 Misc 3d at *2). Releasing an incarcerated individual from confinement is a "purely ministerial act" that does not involve discretionary authority and the State may be held liable for failing to perform this act (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 406 [Ct Cl 1986]). A cause of action for wrongful confinement "accrues once an incarcerated individual is released from the alleged wrongful confinement" (Delgado v State of New York, 82 Misc 3d 307 [Ct Cl 2023]).

Claimant here seeks compensation for 87 days spent in solitary confinement, beginning on October 11, 2017 (Claimant's Exhibit 1 at 14). The Court finds that Defendant's confinement of Claimant from October 11, 2017 (the incident date) to December 15, 2017 (the reversal date) was within Defendant's authority to commence and conduct formal disciplinary proceedings and was therefore privileged. Accordingly, Claimant's claim for wrongful confinement during this time fails.

However, the undisputed evidence and credible testimony before the Court establishes that Defendant continued to confine Claimant after December 15, 2017. At trial, Claimant testified that he was released the "same day" that he was found not guilty of all charges, which the evidence shows was January 5, 2018 (Claimant's Exhibit 9). Claimant also testified that he was confined for about 90 days. Claimant's affidavit attached to his claim and dated March 9, 2018, alleges that he was confined for 87 days, yielding a release date of January 6, 2018 (Claimant's Exhibit 1, p 13).

As Claimant's affidavit was written and sworn to closer to the events in question than his testimony at trial approximately eight years later, the Court credits Claimant's affidavit and finds that Claimant was released on January 6, 2018. Because Defendant should have released Claimant from confinement on the reversal date of December 15, 2017, the Court finds that Claimant was wrongfully confined for these 22 days.³

III. Damages

Determining damages for wrongful confinement involves an individualized assessment that considers the "evidence presented at trial" and the "distinct circumstances of each case" (Pennie v State of New York, 78 Misc 3d 1222[A] [Ct Cl 2023]). Generally, the amount of damages "is such a sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for injuries caused by defendant's wrongful act, including damages for physical and mental suffering" (Woodard v City of Albany, 81 AD2d 947, 947 [3d Dept 1981]). Courts may award damages for "mental anguish" and "loss of liberty during a period of unlawful confinement" (Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 988, 993 [Ct Cl 2010]). "Mental anguish" includes "discomfort, fear, lack of privacy and degradation" (id. [internal citations omitted]).

Because the amount of damages awarded is tailored to the case before the Court, such awards vary (see e.g., Sellers v State of New York, Ct Cl, May 25, 2011, Scuccimarra, J., claim No. 115392, UID No. 2011-030-012 [awarding $1,300 for 13 days ($100 per day) for general "deprivation" stemming from wrongful confinement]; Ames v State of New York, Ct Cl, Feb. 14, 2002, Scuccimarra, J., claim No. 101536, UID No. 2002-030-006 [awarding $525 for 7 days ($75 per day) due to loss of privileges and recreation, missing religious services, and suffering harassment from fellow incarcerated individuals]; Padilla, 85 Misc 3d at *5 [awarding $4,425 for 59 days ($75 per day) for loss of privileges]; Rodgers, 78 Misc 3d at 460 [$500 for 11 days ($45.45 per day) for mental anguish and impact on the claimant's ability to communicate with ill mother]).

Claimant testified—and Defendant did not dispute—that he was hit by feces and urine from neighboring individuals while he was confined. He further testified that he was unable to participate in religious services, lost his program placement, had limited visitation privileges, lost property, and was confined to his cell for 21 hours a day. Claimant's expressed difficulty in discussing these matters at trial reflects the "mental anguish" he suffered from this experience (Sanabria, 29 Misc 3d at 993). For these hardships, the Court awards Claimant $150 per day.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Claimant has established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Defendant wrongfully confined him for the 22 days between his hearing reversal on December 15, 2017, and his release on January 6, 2018. The Court awards Claimant $3,300 in damages plus statutory interest pursuant to CPLR 5002. Claimant may also recover any filing fee he paid pursuant to the Court of Claims Act § 11-a(2).

Defendant's motion to dismiss the claim insofar as it seeks to dismiss the claim for wrongful confinement for the period of October 11, 2017, to December 15, 2017, is hereby GRANTED.

Any and all other evidentiary rulings and motions upon which the Court previously reserved decision or has not previously determined are hereby DENIED.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

New York, New York

June 30, 2026

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are to the Court's audio recording of the October 14, 2025, trial.

2.   Exhibit page numbers reflect the page of the PDF.

3.   In accordance with General Construction Law (GCL) § 20, this calculation excludes December 15, 2017. GCL § 20 states that the "day from which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning." The day of reckoning is the day an event happens (see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v Schmidt, 299 NY 428, 431 [1949]). Here, that day is December 15, 2017.

Edwina G. Richardson, J.