Pedro Diaz, Claimant, v. The State of New York, Defendant. (2026)

Papers Considered:

Motion to Renew, Affirmation & Exhibits Annexed 1-4

Affirmation in Opposition 5

Upon the foregoing papers, the Motion by Claimant Pedro Diaz (hereinafter "claimant") for leave to renew the Court's previous decision dismissing his Claim against Defendant, State of New York (hereinafter "State"), is denied in accordance with the following decision.

By Decision and Order filed March 31, 2025, this Court granted the State's motion to dismiss the wrongful confinement Claim, finding that it accrued on October 23, 2022, the date that claimant was released from solitary confinement; thus, he had 90 days from that date or on or before January 21, 2023, to serve either a notice of intention to file a claim or file the Claim (see Diaz v State of New York, UID No. 2025-064-019 [Ct Cl, Vargas, J., Feb. 24, 2025]). Since claimant served his notice of intention on February 12, 2024, well over one year after his Claim accrued, this Court found it untimely and dismissed the Claim due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction (see id.).

Now, by Motion filed March 12, 2026, claimant moves to renew this Court's February 24, 2025, decision, pursuant to CPLR 2221 (e), based on intervening changes in the law that would purportedly change the Court's prior determination. He argues that the "amendments designated as part of a comprehensive prison reform bill removes the filing deadlines provided for in Section 10" (Aff. in Support, ¶ 3). Because he has filed a notice of appeal, claimant argues that his case is still sub judice, therefore "new laws effective [December 19, 2025] apply to this case as they fit squarely within a motion to renew" (id., ¶¶ 5-6)

By Affirmation in Opposition filed April 7, 2026, the State argues that the chapter amendments relating to Court of Claims Act §§ 10 and 11 were to take effect immediately and any statutes that take effect immediately are applied prospectively and not retroactively. The State explains that the amendments for time limitations governing claims for injuries that occur while an incarcerated individual is in state custody only apply to periods of custody that end on or after the December 19, 2025, effective date. This Court agrees.

It is well-settled that a motion to renew must be based upon new facts, not offered on the prior motion, that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that "there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination" (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]; see Johnson v State of New York, 95 AD3d 1455,1456 [3d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Chapter 36 Amendments to the Prison Reform Bill enacted on February 13, 2026, are retroactive to the effective date of December 19, 2025 (see L 2026, Ch 36, § 1, part J). Pursuant to those amendments, "any person who suffers physical, psychological, or other injury or condition while in custody shall have . . . the full benefit of the limitations period" and, in addition, "shall have a two-year window following the date of the person's release from that period of custody within which to commence an action based on such injury or condition" (Court of Claims Act § 10 [11]; see CPLR 208-a; Streat v State of New York, UID No. 2026-073-006 [Ct Cl, Perer, J., March 6, 2026]). Also, Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) would not apply to any otherwise time-barred claims or causes of action revived by CPLR 208-a (see id.).

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the claimant's motion fails. The record reflects that claimant seeks renewal of this Court's decision and reinstatement of his Claim, contending that the designated amendments apply to him because his case is sub judice. Contrary to claimant's contention, the recently enacted legislation has no applicability here, as the instant Claim was dismissed on February 24, 2025 — several months before the December 2025 effective date. Additionally, claimant has misread the statute, as the 90-day limitations period contained in Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) still applies (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [11]; CPLR 208-a).

The notable change is that in the event that an incarcerated individual leaves State custody, the new legislation allows for a two-year window for said individual to file a personal injury claim without requiring a notice of intention to file a claim (see CPLR 208; Court of Claims Act § 10 [11]; Streat v State of New York, UID No. 2026-073-006). However, claims that were already time-barred prior to December 19, 2025, cannot be revived or extended (see id.). At this juncture, claimant's pending appeal has no effect on whether he qualifies for those amendments, as he remains in the State's custody and his Claim was time barred prior to the effective date of the statute.

Based on the presented record, the Court finds that claimant has failed to demonstrate that the prison reform legislation presents a change in the law that would change the Court's prior dismissal of his Claim.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the claimant's Motion, M-103676, is denied.

May 12, 2026

New York, New York

JAVIER E. VARGAS

Judge of the Court of Claims

Javier E. Vargas, J.