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Brooklyn Housing Preservation LP, Petitioner(s) v. Evonne Highsmith; PATRICIA HIGHSMITH, Respondent(s)
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND ARGUMENTS
This is a nonpayment summary proceeding commenced against Evonne and Patricia Highsmith.1 Respondent appeared pro se and subsequently obtained counsel who filed a motion to amend the pro se answer, and to "dismiss and/or, summary judgment" for failure to allege service of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") Notice of Occupancy Rights ("VAWA notice), or "in the alternative, to the extent [p]etitioner claims such notices were served appropriately, any purported VAWA forms are not HUD-approved and are facially defective and expired on their face, warranting dismissal." Respondent also claims that petitioner "does not claim to have served a GCEL [Good Cause Eviction Law] Notice on Ms. Highsmith with the rent demand at all" which warrants dismissal of the petition.2 In the alternative, respondent, who is a beneficiary of a Section 8 Housing Voucher, seeks a stay of this proceeding pending a grievance regarding her tenant share of the contract rent. (NYSCEF Doc No. 15, respondent's attorney's affirmation in support.) On July 10, 2026, the court issued an order requiring respondent to either provide proof of a grievance pending at NYCHA, or proof that an Article 78 proceeding had been commenced to challenge NYCHA's purported failure to adjust respondent's subsidy share.3 (NYSCEF Doc No. 33.)
In opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss, petitioner argues that respondent lacks standing to raise her VAWA notice defense because federal courts have determined that VAWA does not create a "private right of action," and because respondent has not claimed entitlement to VAWA protections. Petitioner also advances that "compliance with, and enforcement of [VAWA] is purely a question of federal law." (NYSCEF Doc No. 26, petitioner's attorney's affirmation in opposition ¶¶ 24, 26-27.)
Petitioner has cross-moved to "amend its notice hereunder pursuant to the Violence Against Woman Act (sic), deeming the amended notice attached hereto as Exhibit A timely served and filed nunc pro tunc, and for any further relief that this Court deems just and proper." (NYSCEF Doc No. 25, notice of cross-motion [sequence 2].) Petitioner argues the court should allow amendment pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for the reason that failure to serve a VAWA notice is a [non-prejudicial] mistake[ ]" and that CPLR 2001 allows the court to ignore same. (NYSCEF Doc No. 26, petitioner's attorney's affirmation in opposition ¶¶ 33, 36-37)
On the return date of the motion, petitioner argued that "a rent demand is not a notice of termination," and, thus, the plain language of the VAWA statute does not require that the VAWA notice be served with a rent demand as it is a notice to cure the tenant's default.4
In this regard, petitioner advances that neither VAWA nor its implementing regulations define "notice of eviction." (NYSCEF Doc No. 35, petitioner's supplemental brief.) Petitioner analogizes an RPAPL 711 (2) rent demand in a nonpayment proceeding to a notice to cure in a holdover case, as both provide the tenant an opportunity to remedy the issue and avoid adverse consequences. In holdovers, petitioner contends, the first adverse consequence is the notice of termination; in nonpayment proceedings, it is the service of the petition and notice of petition. Thus, the rent demand is a preliminary, corrective notice and not the functional equivalent of a termination notice. (NYSCEF Doc No. 35, petitioner's attorney's supplement mem of law.)
In turn, respondent advances a well-reasoned public-policy argument that a rent demand served under RPAPL § 711(2) qualifies as a "notification of eviction" within the meaning of VAWA. (NYSCEF Doc No. 36, respondent's supplemental brief.) Respondent argues that Congress designed VAWA's housing protections to ensure survivors receive notice of their federal rights before facing eviction or homelessness. Respondent's position is that HUD's regulations require covered housing providers to serve the VAWA notice of occupancy rights and certification form with any eviction-related notice, using intentionally broad language to capture all predicate notices, not just petitions or formal termination notices. Respondent further advances that because a rent demand is the first step in any nonpayment eviction and the earliest formal notice warning a tenant that nonpayment may lead to an eviction proceeding—and because of the possibility that tenants may "self-evict" upon receiving such a notice—serving VAWA notices with the rent demand best reflects Congress's intent that tenants in federally assisted housing be informed of their VAWA protections at the earliest possible moment, before litigation begins and before the risk of eviction materializes. Respondent has urged the court to be guided by the definition of "owner eviction notice" found in 24 CFR 982.310 (e) (2) (ii) (Eviction Notice). (NYSCEF Doc No. 36, respondent's attorney's supplement affirmation.)
For the following reasons, respondent's motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment is granted, petitioner's cross-motion to amend the petition is denied, and that branch of respondent's motion which is to amend her answer is denied as academic.
DISCUSSION 5
Legal Standards and Relevant Statutes
As the parties have not clearly charted a course for summary judgment, the court will consider respondent's motion to dismiss and/or summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the petition. (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994].) "[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four comers factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail." (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977] [internal citations omitted].) "Whether a [petitioner] can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss." (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005].)
"Applications for leave to amend pleadings under CPLR 3025 (b) should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment (1) would unfairly prejudice or surprise the opposing party, or (2) is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. The determination to permit or deny amendment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. No evidentiary showing of merit is required under CPLR 3025(b). The court need only determine whether the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient to state a cause of action or defense, or is patently devoid of merit. A court shall not examine the legal sufficiency or merits of a pleading unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt." (Chinapen v Sookdeo, 237 AD3d 658, 658-659 [2d Dept 2025] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]; Parkoff v Rieger & Fried, LLP, 241 AD3d 1357, 1358 [2d Dept 2025] [same]; Munjal v Ziebke, 2025 NY Slip Op 25144 [Civ Ct, NY County 2025] [a petition may be amended to properly plead GCEL].)
VAWA was originally enacted in 1994; the Act's statutes and implementing regulations have undergone several amendments since that time, most recently in 2025, when the VAWA forms in question in this proceeding (HUD-5380 and HUD-5382), were updated. (CMS, New Update Regarding Violence Against Women Act Forms, Sept. 19, 2025, available at https://www.cms-results.com/2025/09/new-update-regarding-violence-against-women-act-forms/, last visited August 5, 2026.) One of the purposes of VAWA is to provide housing stability protections for eligible individuals in "covered buildings."6 The protections include ensuring survivors have the right to remain in housing they occupy, providing protections against eviction or displacement, and access to emergency housing and transfer assistance.7 Petitioner has not disputed that it is a "covered" housing provider or participates in a "covered program." Pursuant to 24 CFR 5.2005 (a) (2) (iii), "[t]he notice required by paragraph (a) (1) (i) of this section and certification form required by paragraph (a) (1) (ii) of this section must be provided to an applicant or tenant . . . [w]ith any notification of eviction or notification of termination of assistance[.]"
"[VAWA protections apply to] victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking who are applying for, or are the beneficiaries of, assistance under a HUD program covered by the Violence Against Women Act[.] . . . Notwithstanding the title of the statute, protections are not limited to women but cover victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, regardless of sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation." (24 CFR 5.2001 ["Applicability"].)
Despite the appellation of the statute, VAWA protections are not limited to women and are available to four categories of violence: domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. The statute casts a wide net and applies to victims, their family members, and lawful occupants of their households, regardless of sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation.8
Application of the Law to This Nonpayment Summary Proceeding
In resolving this motion, the court's task is only to determine whether a RPAPL § 711(2) rent demand falls within the meaning of a "notice of termination" or a "notice of eviction," such that the VAWA notice and certification form must be appended thereto.
Housing Court Judges across New York City have issued decisions dismissing summary holdover proceedings for failure to append the updated VAWA notice and certification form to unamendable notices of termination. (See e.g. Durand v Nelson, 2026 NY Slip Op 32043[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County 2026]; Williamsburg Hous. Preserv. LP v Thompson, 2025 NY Slip Op 33532[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]; Rahman v Lewis, 84 Misc 3d 720 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2024]; Carnegie Park Preservation LP v Cintron, Civ Ct, NY County, Apr. 29, 2024, Arrindell, J., index No. 305163/22.)
The court agrees with the foregoing decisions in so far as the proceedings at issue were holdover proceedings. However, the court disagrees that a predicate "rent demand" served prior to the commencement of a nonpayment proceeding is a "notice of termination" to which the VAWA notices must be attached. (Compare Joe Cent. Brooklyn LLC v Upshaw, 2026 NY Slip Op 30924[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2026] [no VAWA notice attached to rent demand, nonpayment petition dismissed]; Cross Bronx Preserv. LLC v Delgado, 2025 NY Slip Op 31036[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2025] [same].)
Is a Rent Demand a Notice of Termination? No.
New York courts have held that a rent demand served pursuant to RPAPL 711 (2) does not terminate a tenancy. Rather, a rent demand cautions that the alleged overdue rent must be paid within 14 days of the notice or surrender the premises. (Id.) If the tenant does not pay, or surrender after the expiration of the demand notice, the landlord may commence a summary eviction proceeding to obtain a final judgment of possession which will allow for the issuance of a warrant of eviction. Execution of the warrant will terminate the tenancy.
New York courts interpret RPAPL 711 (2) to provide an opportunity for cure, not termination. (See Yui Woon Kwong v Sun Po Eng, 147 Misc 2d 750 [Civ Ct, NY County 1990], affd as mod sub nom. Kwong v Eng, 153 Misc 2d 118 [App Term, 1st Dept 1991], affd 183 AD2d 558, 583 [1st Dept 1992] [noting in dicta that "[t]he three-day notice which demands payment of all rent requested in the petition or vacate and surrender the housing accommodation is equivalent to a notice to cure"]; see also 1719 Gates LLC v Torres, 85 Misc 3d 556, 560 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2025] [before commencing a nonpayment summary proceeding a landlord must serve "a 14-day good faith rent demand . . . where the tenant has the option to cure the default" in order to avoid litigation].) Moreover, the public policy rationale supporting the interpretation of an RPAPL 711 (2) rent demand as a notice to cure is New York's longstanding recognition that rent withholding is a legitimate means for tenants to compel landlords to comply with housing maintenance standards, without fear that their tenancies will be terminated for the sole reason that they are withholding their rent to coerce necessary repairs. This interpretation is also consistent with cases that have found a RPAPL 711 (2) rent demand and a notice of termination cannot coexist.9
Accordingly, the court declines respondent's entreaty to find that a RPAPL 711 (2) rent demand is a notice of termination. However, respondent's strongest argument lies in the definition of "owner's notice of eviction" found in 24 CFR 982 (e) (2) (ii).
Is a Rent Demand a Notice of Eviction? Yes.
VAWA does not provide rules of construction or interpretive guidance regarding the definition of "notice of eviction." Accordingly, this court looks to similarly worded applicable regulations for guidance. 24 CFR 982.310 (e) (2) (ii) (Eviction Notice) provides in full: "Owner eviction notice means a notice to vacate, or a complaint or other initial pleading used under State or local law to commence an eviction action (emphases added)." The rent demand is the first legally significant notice a tenant receives before the commencement of a summary eviction proceeding premised upon nonpayment of rent. The demand sets forth the landlord's factual bases for the claim, the tenant's right to either cure the default or vacate the premises, and enables a tenant to mount a defense should the tenant choose to litigate the proceeding. No nonpayment proceeding can survive the failure to serve this required statutory notice which plays a procedural role akin to a pleading. The rent demand functions as the "initial pleading" in a nonpayment proceeding. However, petitioner has appended an outdated VAWA notice of occupancy rights and certification form to the rent demand. Because the amended 2025 VAWA notice is substantively superior to the prior version -- incorporating updated confidentiality safeguards and current statutory and regulatory requirements, as well as offering a more accessible, user-friendly format -- and because predicate notices are not amendable, Chinatown Apts., Inc. v Chu Cho Lam, 51 NY2d 786 (1980), the petition is dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the petition is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioner's cross-motion to amend the petition is denied as academic; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent's motion to amend her answer is denied as academic.
This is the decision and order of the court.
DATED: August 7, 2026
Brooklyn, NY
Karen May Bacdayan, JHC
FOOTNOTES
1. Evonne Highsmith ("respondent") is represented and hereinafter is the only respondent to whom this decision and order refers.
2. Respondent's attorney withdrew that branch of the motion seeking dismissal for failure to comply with the Williams v NYCHA, 81 CIV 1801 (SDNY Feb. 2, 1995, RJW), which requires for some proceedings, that the New York City Housing Authority must be notified of certain proceedings in a particularized manner.
3. Respondent provided neither proof of a pending grievance, nor proof that an Article 78 had been filed. For this reason, the court denies that branch of respondent's motion that seeks a stay of this proceeding.
4. This argument -- petitioner's most compelling -- was not advanced in petitioner's affirmation in support of their cross-motion. In Tirado v Miller, 75 AD3d 153 (2d Dept 2010), the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court which had decided in the movant's favor with respect to a "nondispositive discovery issue decided upon procedural grounds" for reasons not specifically argued by the moving party." Id. at 154. The Tirado court reasoned:"General relief clauses, for such other, further, or different relief, are often included in notices of motion by practitioners to cover the possibility that the appropriate relief is not what the movant has specifically asked for, but is close enough to enable the court to grant it. The presence of a general relief clause enables the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced." Id. at 58 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).Two years later, the Appellate Division, Second Department distinguished the holding in Tirado from a motion seeking dispositive relief. In Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assocs., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 53 (2d Dept 2014), the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court which had denied a motion for summary judgment based on arguments that had not been made by the non-moving party. While petitioner's motion herein comprised a general relief clause that prayed "for any further relief any that this Court deems just and proper," in the spirit of Rosenblatt, the court called the parties back and requested additional briefing on this question of law.
5. Contrary to respondent's argument that petitioner has not alleged service of the GCEL notice, NYSCEF Doc No. 15 at 13, petitioner alleged in the petition that "[t]he subject premises is not subject to Real Property Law Article 6-A, 'the Good Cause Eviction Law' and [p]etitioner has served [r]espondent(s) a notice pursuant to Real Property Law 231-C identifying the basis for this determination. Said notice is annexed hereto and specifically incorporated herein." NYSCEF Doc No. 1, petition ¶ 8. Likewise, the affidavit of service for the rent demand alleges that the "30 Day Notice and Good Cause Notice" were served on respondents. NYSCEF Doc No. 3 at 3, affidavit of service. This is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. v 5 Star Holdings NY, LLC, 64 Misc 3d 148(A), 2019 NY Slip Op 51402(U) (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019) ("When a nonpayment petition alleges the service of a statutory rent notice, the petition must state the manner of service, or the affidavit of service of the notice must be attached to the petition. A landlord that fails to annex the affidavit of service or allege the manner that a written rent notice was served may cure the defect in its petition by proving the service of the rent notice at trial.") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
6. For a list of covered housing programs visit the HUD Exchange website available at https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/6968/chart-of-vawa-covered-housing-programs/, last accessed July 31, 2026.
7. See the "Interagency Statement on the Violence Against Women Act's Housing Protections, available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/InteragencyVAWAHousingStmnt092024.pdf, last accessed July 31, 2026.
8. Petitioner's argument that respondent does not claim protection under the statute as a victim of domestic violence is unavailing. Based on serious confidentiality concerns, it is this court's opinion that all tenants in covered housing must be served with the VAWA notice of occupancy rights and self-certification form whenever they receive a notice of eviction or a notice of termination of assistance. Such uniformity serves to preserve anonymity in public court documents. Serving only tenants about whom a landlord suspects or has actual knowledge of domestic violence singles out those individuals. Relatedly, because of privacy protections, and fear of stigma, it is appropriately difficult to know who is a victim and who is not. Relatedly, serving everyone also serves the laudable goal to capture and inform individuals who may be afraid to come forward due to fear for their safety, or stigma.
9. For example, in Greenport Preserv., LP v Heyward, 74 Misc 3d 46 (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021), the tenant resided in a HUD assisted, "project-based Section 8 building." The landlord sought to sue the tenant in Housing Court for nonpayment of rent. The governing federal regulations provide the only permissible grounds for termination of the subsidy, including, inter alia, "termination of assistance based upon a tenant's failure to pay rent," which is a "material breach of the lease." (Id. at *2; 24 CFR 247.3 [c] [4].) 24 CFR 247.4 mandates service of a notice that must, among other things, advise that the tenancy is terminated on a date specified therein and instruct that failure to vacate may result in the commencement of judicial proceedings. (Heyward at 48.) In Heyward, the landlord served the tenant with a notice simultaneously terminating the tenancy as required by the federal regulations, and demanding the payment of the alleged rent arrears pursuant to RPAPL 711 (2) in order to avoid termination of the tenancy. The Appellate Term, Second Department affirmed the civil court's dismissal of the proceeding, observing that a rent demand and a termination notice are fundamentally incompatible because a nonpayment proceeding is premised on an existing contractual relationship and cannot be maintained where the relationship has been terminated.
Karen May Bacdayan, J.
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Docket No: LT-321234-25 /KI
Decided: August 07, 2026
Court: Civil Court, City of New York.
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