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Robert Kurkowski, Plaintiff, v. Daniel Connor, Defendant.
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion
Papers Numbered
D's Supplemental Memorandum & Exhibits 1
P's Supplemental Memorandum & Exhibits 2
By Decision and Order After Non-Jury Trial, dated October 1, 2026, this Court awarded Plaintiff $10,880 for use and occupancy, and awarded Defendant $2,600 on his first counterclaim for the return of his security deposit. The parties were then directed to submit written submissions on their respective requests for attorneys' fees.
Having thoroughly evaluated the parties' memoranda of law and supporting documentation, the Court finds as follows:
Under the "American Rule" followed in New York, each party is generally responsible for its own attorneys' fees. A party seeking to shift that expense to its adversary must identify a specific contract, statute, or court rule that authorizes the award (Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 5 [1986]). Where a party relies upon a contractual fee-shifting provision, entitlement to fees is governed strictly by the text of the agreement, and may not be extended beyond its exact terms (Hooper Assoc. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d 487, 491-492 [1989]).
Paragraph 27 of the subject lease provides: "The successful party in a legal action or proceeding between Landlord and Tenant for non-payment of rent or recovery of possession of the Apartment may recover reasonable legal fees and costs from the other party." While this provision is reciprocal — allowing either the landlord or the tenant to recover reasonable attorneys' fees — recovery is strictly conditioned upon being the "successful party" in litigation specifically brought for the nonpayment of rent or the recovery of possession. The clause does not authorize fees for every dispute arising from the landlord-tenant relationship. Its application is limited solely to the categories of proceedings specified in the lease.
Accordingly, the parties' fee requests must be evaluated based on the nature and ultimate disposition of the specific proceedings for which they are sought.
a) The Prior Holdover Proceeding
Plaintiff seeks the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in the prior holdover proceeding.
He relies on Elkins v. Cinera Realty, Inc., 61 AD2d 828 [2d Dept 1978], to argue that the holdover proceeding and this subsequent plenary action constitute a single, continuous controversy, thereby enabling the recovery of the holdover fees here. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant's vacatur during the pendency of the holdover proceeding made him the "successful party" because he ultimately recovered possession of the subject premises.
However, Elkins does not support Plaintiff's position. There, the Second Department addressed the timing of an attorneys' fees application where successive summary proceedings were part of an ongoing dispute. The court held that a fee determination should await the "ultimate outcome of the controversy," explaining that it would be unjust to determine entitlement to fees based on each separate stage of what was a single, continuing controversy (id. at 828). Elkins governs when a controversy is ripe for a fee determination; it does not hold that a landlord can commence a separate plenary action to recover attorneys' fees incurred in an earlier, concluded summary proceeding.
Similarly, Soho Village Realty, Inc. v. Gaffney, 188 Misc 2d 261 [App Term, 1st Dept 2001], fails to provide a procedural basis for Plaintiff's claim. In Soho Village, the appellate court held that a landlord was the prevailing party entitled to fees where the tenant voluntarily vacated during the pendency of the holdover proceeding, thereby granting the landlord the central relief sought — possession. Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's vacatur here rendered Plaintiff the successful party, under paragraph 27 of the lease, Plaintiff's application fails because Soho Village does not address the procedural hurdle presented here: whether a landlord can recover fees from a prior holdover proceeding by commencing a separate plenary action after that summary proceeding was discontinued.
The material facts are undisputed. Defendant vacated the apartment during the pendency of the holdover proceeding. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Discontinuance, terminating that proceeding with prejudice and without costs to either party (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4, LT-312487-23/KI). Plaintiff did not seek an award of attorneys' fees in that summary proceeding, but instead requests them now in this subsequent plenary action.
New York courts have rejected this procedural posture. In 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 42 NY2d 886, 887 [1977], the Court of Appeals held that bringing a separate plenary action to recover attorneys' fees incurred in an earlier summary proceeding constitutes an impermissible splitting of a cause of action. The Second Department has likewise held that where a lease permits recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in a summary proceeding, the claim for those fees must be asserted in that proceeding, and that a separate plenary action to recover them constitutes impermissible claim-splitting (Landmark Props. v. Olivo, 62 AD3d 959, 960-961 [2d Dept 2009]).
Because Plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees arose from the holdover proceeding, it should have been asserted there. Plaintiff cannot circumvent the rule against claim-splitting by characterizing the separate cases as a single controversy. Furthermore, Plaintiff's election to discontinue the holdover proceeding with prejudice and without costs independently forecloses this application. Having terminated that proceeding without seeking fees, Plaintiff may not pursue them in this action, regardless of whether Defendant's vacatur resulted in the possession he sought.
Moreover, Defendant's vacatur did not divest the Housing Court of jurisdiction to entertain a fee claim (see EDJ Realty Inc. v. Sodano, 74 Misc 3d 129[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). An appellate court recently affirmed an award of attorneys' fees to respondents in an underlying holdover proceeding (207-209 W. 107th St., LLC v De La Cruz, — Misc 3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 26192 [App Term, 1st Dept 2026]). Accordingly, Plaintiff's application for attorneys' fees arising from the prior holdover proceeding is denied.
b) The Instant Plenary Action
This Court finds that neither party is entitled to attorneys' fees in the current action.
This case commenced after Defendant vacated the apartment, and was premised on Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment (use and occupancy) and property damage. Defendant answered, counterclaimed for the return of his security deposit, and sought a rent abatement based on a breach of the warranty of habitability. Consequently, this is not an action or proceeding "for nonpayment of rent or recovery of possession," as strictly required by paragraph 27 of the lease.
Because contractual fee-shifting provisions must be strictly construed (Hooper Assoc. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d at 491), a clause restricted solely to actions and proceedings for "non-payment of rent or recovery of possession" cannot be expanded to encompass a plenary action for post-surrender use and occupancy. Likewise, Defendant's recovery on his counterclaim for the return of his security deposit does not fall within the narrow categories outlined in paragraph 27. Therefore, the parties' respective applications for attorneys' fees arising from this plenary action are denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's application for attorneys' fees incurred in the prior holdover proceeding is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's and Defendant's respective applications for attorneys' fees in this plenary action are denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Date: November 13, 2026
E N T E R:
Hon. Turquoise Haskin, JCC
Turquoise Haskin, J.
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Docket No: CV-020965-23 /KI
Decided: November 13, 2026
Court: Civil Court, City of New York.
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