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SCG MiMa Towers LLC, Petitioner(s), v. Kenneth Noble, JANSEN SALSICH, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Respondent(s).
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of the motion(s):
Papers NYSCEF Doc. Nos.
Notice of Motion (Seq. 5) and supporting papers 74-75
Affirmation in Opposition and supporting papers 83
Affirmation in Reply and supporting papers 84
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the court's decision and order is as follows:
Petitioner SCG MiMa Towers LLC commenced this summary nonpayment proceeding in October 2024, alleging Respondent Kenneth Noble to have owed $99,500.00 in rental arrears at a monthly rent of $9,950.00 (see Petition, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). The arrears have allegedly grown, steadily and significantly, since 2024 (see Ledger, NYSCEF Doc. No. 63 [claiming $268,650.00 owed through March 2026]). In defending against Petitioner's claim, Respondent has endeavored to assert an equitable setoff defense in connection with his alleged entitlements under certain Chinese sovereign bonds. The court summarized Respondent's defense in a prior decision and order as follows:
Respondent claims to be the owner of certain sovereign bonds issued in 1937 by the Republic of China, and he asserts that in connection with these bonds he is owed $5,070,692.00 in principal and interest. He argues that following the 1949 proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), liability for repayment under the 1937 bonds passed to the PRC. He asserts that Petitioner SCG MiMa Towers LLC, through a series of nested entities, is ultimately owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shanghai Municipality, which is a political subdivision of the PRC, and that Petitioner—like the PRC—is essentially controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. On this basis he argues that Petitioner is an alter ego of the PRC and is therefore liable for the PRC's obligations under the 1937 bonds. He asserts as an affirmative defense that Petitioner's obligations under the bonds should be set off and credited against any rental arrears, and that after this set off nothing would remain owed to Petitioner.
(see Decision/Order, NYSCEF Doc. No. 69).
On July 6, 2026, the court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to strike Respondent's setoff defense and denying Respondent's motion for leave to conduct discovery regarding Petitioner's alleged status as an alter ego of the PRC (id.). The court reasoned that any claim Respondent might have in connection with the bonds was time-barred, and because the bond claim did not arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences as Petitioner's rent claim, CPLR 203(d) did not render it timely as a defense or counterclaim herein (id.).
Respondent now moves for leave to reargue the motion. A motion for leave to reargue must be "based upon matters of fact or law overlooked or misapprehended" by the court in determination of a prior motion (CPLR 2221 [d] [2]). Respondent argues, in essence, that the court misapprehended the distinction between the equitable doctrines of recoupment and setoff, and in so-doing erroneously concluded that the setoff defense asserted by Respondent was time-barred. As it did in its prior order, the court assumes for the purposes of this motion the truth of Respondent's unproven factual allegations.
Respondent's moving papers are scholarly and intriguing. He cites ample authority for the proposition that in various circumstances courts have allowed parties to set off claims arising from repudiated bonds against claims by the governmental issuers of the bonds in question, or their successors or alter egos (see, e.g., Natl. City Bank of New York v Republic of China, 348 US 356 [1955] [claim under Chinese treasury notes could be set off against Chinese claim on deposit account]; United States v Natl. City Bank of New York, 90 F Supp 448 [SDNY 1950] [bank permitted to set off claim under Russian treasury notes against Russian claim on deposit account]). He correctly notes that statutes of limitations address the availability of remedies rather than the continuing existence of the debts in question (see Wagner v Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P., 196 AD3d 410, 410-411 [1st Dept 2021] [expiration of statute of limitations "did not extinguish the underlying obligation"]). And he is right, too, that the court's analysis in the prior decision and order failed to recognize, at least explicitly, the distinction between setoff and recoupment, or the fact that CPLR 203(d) represents a codification only of the latter (see 182 Franklin St. Holding Corp. v Franklin Pierrepont Assoc., 217 AD2d 508, 509 [1st Dept 1995] [recognizing CPLR 203(d) as a codification of the doctrine of equitable recoupment]).
While the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Practice Act, and the Civil Practice Law and Rules have done much over the last century and a half to soften the historical distinctions between setoff and recoupment (see Keon v Saxton & Co., 257 NY 412, 415 [1931] [observing that modern codifications discouraged "slender and inequitable distinctions" between these categories, in contrast to historical formulations where "somewhat arbitrary and artificial" rules had "surrounded defendants with impediments often subversive of justice"]), the two concepts remain analytically distinct. Faced with a plaintiff's claim, a defendant may assert a counterclaim or defense of recoupment on the basis of a countervailing claim against the plaintiff arising from the same transaction as the plaintiff's initial claim (Constantino v State, 99 Misc 2d 362, 365 [Ct Cl 1979]). Thus, a claim of recoupment is best understood not as an independent claim, but rather as a demand that the court take a fuller view of the transaction or occurrence at issue and evaluate any damages owed on the transaction holistically (id. at 364 ["[S]uch a process does not allow one transaction to be offset against another, but only permits a transaction which is made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole."]). A claim of setoff, on the other hand, does not arise from the same transaction as an initial claim—rather, it is based on some other transaction or occurrence between the parties (see Matter of Matter of Midland Ins. Co., 79 NY2d 253, 259-263 [1992] [setoffs need not arise from the same transactions as initial claims]). Unlike a claim of recoupment, a setoff is essentially a distinct claim from the plaintiff's initial cause of action. Understood in this way, it is uncontroversial to conclude that CPLR 203(d)'s discussion of defenses and counterclaims arising from "the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends" refers to claims of recoupment rather than setoff.
The implicit premise underpinning Respondent's entire theory is that despite the above-described differences, both recoupment and setoff share in common exemption from the statute of limitations that would apply were the claims asserted affirmatively rather than defensively. But Respondent offers no authority supporting this premise, and it is simply an inaccurate statement of the law. While a recoupment claim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the initial claim is timely notwithstanding the prior expiration of the statute of limitations, a claim of setoff is still bound by the limitations period applicable to an affirmative claim (Van Ness v Kenyon, 208 NY 228, 235-236 [1913] [time-barred claim cannot be asserted as setoff]; Cooperstown Cattle Co. v Smith, 275 AD 240, 242 [3d Dept 1949] ["A set-off or counterclaim cannot be asserted if a statute, such as the statute of limitations, has run against it."]; Otto v Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 268 AD 400, 402 [2d Dept 1944], affd, 294 NY 798 [1945] ["[W]hether set-off is denominated a defense or a counterclaim, if it is based upon a claim against which the applicable Statute of Limitations has run, it cannot be interposed as a defense."]).
The sole authority referenced by Respondent for the important claim that a setoff is exempt from the statute of limitations is United States v National City Bank of New York, (90 F Supp 448 [SDNY 1950]). Respondent argues that in National City Bank the defendant was successful on a setoff defense arising from repudiated treasury notes notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations. But in that case, considering provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law then in effect, the court explicitly concluded that the claims arose under the same transaction (id. at 454). To the extent that Respondent relies upon Wagner v Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P., (196 AD3d 410 [1st Dept 2021]), his reliance is misplaced. In that case, unlike the instant matter, the parties had expressly negotiated, in connection with a bridge loan, that the creditor could repay itself from monies owed to the debtor on other transactions. The court found that this provision rendered the transactions related, giving rise to a claim of recoupment (id. at 411).
Respondent takes issue with the court's prior reliance upon Town of N. Hempstead v Cty. of Nassau, (149 AD3d 1134 [2d Dept 2017]), and argues that the Second Department's plain statement that the "common-law right of setoff cannot be exercised to recover upon claims that are time-barred" has no applicability to his efforts here to raise a setoff defense. But this is a distinction without a difference. The trial court decision affirmed by the Second Department makes this clear:
There is no legal support for the proposition that a common law right of set-off (as opposed to a claim for equitable recoupment as codified in CPLR 203[d]) is not subject to a statute of limitations. Once such a right is asserted in an action as a defense, counterclaim or by any other nomenclature, its legal sufficiency—including its timeliness—is put to the test. Here, the County's assertion of a set-off does not pass that test.
(Town of N. Hempstead v County of Nassau, 52 Misc 3d 790, 797 [Sup Ct, Nassau Cnty 2016] [internal citations removed and formatting modified]).
Respondent's setoff claim is simply not viable. The statute of limitations applicable to claims on bonds issued by foreign governments is six years (CPLR 213 [2]; Bainbridge Fund Ltd. v Republic of Argentina, 37 F4th 847, 852 [2d Cir 2022] [foreign sovereign bonds not covered under CPLR 211's 20-year statute of limitations]). Respondent concedes that the claim, raised affirmatively, would not be timely. Because there is no reasonable basis to conclude that Respondent's claim under the 1937 bonds arises from the same transaction or occurrence as Petitioner's claim for rent—which would render it timely per CPLR 203(d)—the claim is time-barred and therefore without merit. For these reasons, the court adheres to its prior decision and order striking the setoff claim and denying leave to conduct discovery.
THEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that Respondent's motion for leave to reargue is granted and, upon reargument, the court adheres to its prior decision; and
ORDERED that the parties shall appear in Part F, Room 523, on December 10, 2026, at 9:30am, for all purposes consistent with this order including settlement or referral to the trial part.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
DATE November 10, 2026
Hon. Adam R. Meyers, JHC
Adam R. Meyers, J.
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Docket No: Index No. LT-318344-24 /NY
Decided: November 10, 2026
Court: Civil Court, City of New York.
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