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Nazim Gafur, Petitioner, v. Ramesh Singh, PUSPWATTIE PERSAUD, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE, Respondents.
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent Ramesh Singh's motion to dismiss (seq. 2) and petitioner's amended cross-motion to amend the petition (seq. 4):
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion & All Documents Annexed 1 (NYSCEF #13-16)
Affirmation in Reply and in Opposition 2 (NYSCEF #24)
Notice of Amended Cross-Motion & All Documents Annexed 3 (NYSCEF #26-31)
Affirmation in Opposition to Amended Cross Motion 4 (NYSCEF #32)
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on respondent's motion and petitioner's amended cross-motion, consolidated for determination herein, is as follows.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This summary holdover proceeding based upon a notice of termination dated October 8, 2026 was commenced in February 2026. Respondent Ramesh Singh ("respondent") appeared through counsel in April 2026. Thereafter, respondent's counsel moved to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) for respondent, which was granted by this court on June 30, 2026.
In August 2026, respondent filed a motion to dismiss. Ultimately, petitioner opposed the motion and filed an amended cross-motion to amend the petition. After opposition to the amended cross-motion was submitted, this court heard argument on both motions on November 2, 2026.1
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION
Respondent seeks dismissal on multiple grounds, namely that the termination is defective and that the petition fails to plead the required "small landlord" disclosures pursuant to the Good Cause Eviction Law (GCEL). Petitioner opposes dismissal in all respects and seeks to amend the petition to correct any GCEL-related pleading deficiencies.
As for respondent's first argument, that the predicate notice is defective because it expires on a date, January 31, 2026, that predates the date of the notice itself, the court finds that this mistake, standing alone, does not render the notice defective. Recently, in analogous circumstances, the Appellate Term, Second Department held that a notice that contained a date with an erroneous year due to a typo was not defective when it referenced the correct date when the lease expired and petitioner did not commence a proceeding until more than 90 days had elapsed from service of the notice (see 47-05 Ctr. SPE, LLC v Hack, 89 Misc 3d 132[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 51314[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2026] [Citing Oxford Towers Co., LLC v Leites, 41 AD3d 144, 144 [1st Dept 2007]). Here, the predicate notice contains an errant date of October 8, 2026 and expires on January 31, 2026. As the notice was served as of October 17, 2025, it is apparent that the intended date of the notice was in 2025, rather than 2026; moreover, petitioner gave more than 90 days' notice of termination before commencing this proceeding (see RPL § 226-c; Hack, 2026 NY Slip Op 51314[U], *3). Thus, the court does not find that the notice is defective because of the inclusion of the errant issuance date.
Respondent also seeks dismissal on the basis that the petition did not provide the required disclosures to claim the "small landlord" exemption under GCEL.
Real Property Law § 214(1) creates an exception for:
"[P]remises owned by a small landlord provided than in connection with any eviction proceeding in which the landlord claims an exemption from the provisions of this article on the basis of being a small landlord, such landlord shall provide to the tenant or tenants subject to the proceeding the name of each natural person who owns or is a beneficial owner of, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the housing accommodation at issue in the proceeding, the number of units owned, jointly or separately, by each such natural person owner, and the address of such units, excluding each natural person owner's principal residence[.]"
Real Property Law § 211(3)(a) defines "small landlord" as a landlord of no more than
ten units in the state, unless a different number of units is applicable under a local law outside of New York City (cross-referencing to RPL § 213(b)). In addition, RPAPL § 741(5-b) was added as part of the GCEL amendments. Under RPAPL § 741(5-b), a petition must "append or incorporate the information required by [RPL § 214(1)]" if an exemption from the GCEL pursuant to RPL § 214(1) is claimed. The requirements contained in RPAPL § 741(5-b) became effective on August 18, 2024 (see Morgan v Caesar, 2026 NY Slip Op 51308[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2026]).
In Caesar, the Appellate Term, Second Department held that the failure to properly plead information required by the GCEL, including the "small landlord" information, will result in dismissal (see Caesar, 2026 NY Slip Op 51308[U], * 2; see also Munjal v Ziebke, 87 Misc 3d 956, 960 [Civ Ct, NY County 2025]; Fellin v Martinez, 2025 NY Slip Op 33503[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County 2025]). Here, there is no dispute that the original petition completely lacked the information required by RPL § 214(1). In the amended cross-motion, petitioner now seeks to amend the petition to include a "Schedule A" with information regarding other properties belonging to the owners of the subject property (see NYSCEF Doc. 30).
The disclosures included in petitioner's proposed "Schedule A" allege, in sum and substance, the following: that petitioner and his wife, Nazim Gafur, co-own the subject premises and three (3) separate two-family properties in Richmond Hill, New York, one of which houses two of Nazim Gafur's family members, and that co-owner Salim Gafur, petitioner's brother, owns no other property in New York state. However, the proposed amendment does not state the address or number of housing units owned by each co-owner. The reference to the respective properties being "two-family" properties applies, without further explanation, to their legal, rather than, actual usage (see Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL) § 4(6); Matter of Cruz v New York City Off. of Admin. Trials & Hearings, 236 AD3d 651, 652-654 [2d Dept 2025]). With other remedial regulatory and statutory schemes governing housing in New York, the actual usage of the property at issue, rather than the legal usage, is controlling (see Matter of Cruz, 236 AD3d at 654 [Civil penalties imposed where substantial evidence showed that the subject two-family property was occupied by "more than the legally authorized number of families[.]"]; Balay v Manhattan 140, LLC, 104 AD3d 491, 493 [1st Dept 2022] ["The issue of whether a building is subject to rent stabilization turns on the function of the units as housing accommodations not the 'legality' of their usage in the absence of a certificate of occupancy."]; Malden v Wykoff S.P., LLC, 192 AD3d 1002 [2d Dept 2021] [Owner of a de facto multiple dwelling occupied contrary to certificate of occupancy and without meeting the Multiple Dwelling Law registration requirements barred from recovering rent]; Sima Realty LLC v Philips, 282 AD2d 394, 395 [1st Dept 2001]).
Similarly, the court finds that a functional conception of the term "unit" as defined in the GCEL "small landlord" provisions to be sound, as the statute is also remedial in nature (see Emerald Lofts LLC. v Echevarria, 87 Misc 3d 798, 801 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025] ["GCEL, subject to certain exceptions, limits landlords from recovering possession of certain categories of apartments or housing accommodations except for good cause as defined by [RPL § 216]."]; 3515 Eastchester Rd., LLC v Soto 88 Misc 3d 721, 725-726 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2025]; 1719 Gates LLC v Torres, 85 Misc 3d 906, 907 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2024] ["Primarily codified in the newly-enacted article 6-A of the Real Property Law, GCEL offers significant new eviction protections to tenants in covered dwellings, including most residential housing accommodations built before 2009 where the landlord owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 10 units of housing within New York State[.]"]). Therefore, the disclosure requirements in RPL § 214(1) and RPAPL § 741(5-b) appropriately encompass the numbers and addresses of existent, rather than the merely legally classified, residential units owned by the respective owners.2
As petitioner's proposed amended petition does not adequately describe the number and addresses of the units owned, jointly or separately, by each co-owner of the subject property, it does not comport with the requirements set out in RPL § 214(1) and RPAPL § 741(5-b). Accordingly, the proposed amendment lacks merit and is not permissible under CPLR § 3025(b) (Faiella v Tysens Park Apts., LLC, 110 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2d Dept 2013] [Amendment not permitted where "the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit."]; but cf. Inga v Revenco, 86 Misc 3d 1210[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50911[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]; Sin Hang Lau v Yun He Zheng, 86 Misc 3d 859 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]). Petitioner's cross-motion is denied as a result.
Upon the denial of the cross-motion, the petition must be dismissed due to the fundamental GCEL "small landlord" pleading omissions (see Caesar, 2026 NY Slip Op 51308[U], *2; Volunteers of Am.-Greater NY, Inc. v Almonte, 17 Misc 3d 57, 59 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2007], affd sub nom. Matter of Volunteers of Am.-Greater NY, Inc. v Almonte, 65 AD3d 1155 [2d Dept 2009]). Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted pursuant to the foregoing determinations. The clerk shall issue a judgment dismissing the petition (see CPLR § 411).
This Decision/Order will be filed to NYSCEF.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Dated: November 4, 2026
Queens, New York
HON. CLINTON J. GUTHRIE, J.H.C.
FOOTNOTES
1. At argument, petitioner withdrew an earlier cross-motion to amend the petition.
2. The court notes that the term "unit" is not specifically defined in the Definitions section of the GCEL (see RPL § 211). However, as the term "unit" is referred to elsewhere (see RPL §§ 214(3), 214(4), 214(5), 214(6), 214(7), 214(9), 214(15)) as a component part of a "housing accommodation," which is defined as "any residential premises, including any residential premises located within a mixed-used residential premises" (RPL § 211(1)), there is a statutory implication that a "unit" is any discrete dwelling space within a residential premises (see Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 NY3d 712, 721 [2012] [A statute " 'must be construed as a whole and . . . its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other.' "] [Quoting People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192, 199 [1979]). Tellingly, in Barrow v Griffith, 2026 NY Slip Op 31293[U], *8 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2026], the court noted that the sole authority offered by the ejectment plaintiff to support her claim that an "illegal" unit was not within the ambit of the GCEL was a nonexistent appellate decision.
Clinton J. Guthrie, J.
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Docket No: Index No. L&T 301548 /26
Decided: November 04, 2026
Court: Civil Court, City of New York.
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