Matthew L Chiucchi, Plaintiff(s) v. The City of New York, New York City Public Schools, Defendant(s) (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers Numbered

Order to show Cause/ Notice of Motion and

Affidavits /Affirmations annexed Motion #1, filed April 16, 2026

Answering Affidavits/ Affirmations Motion #2, filed June 29, 2026

Reply Affidavits/ Affirmations

Memoranda of Law

Other Supplemental Aff. to Motion #1, filed June 8, 2026

Matthew L. Chiucchi (hereinafter referred to as the "Plaintiff") commenced this action against the City of New York and New York City Public Schools (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Defendants") by filing a Summons with Endorsed Complaint on August 26, 2025, for "personal injuries for $50,000.00," "due process, fundamental procedural rights violations," and "violations of Chancellor's Regulations A-820, A-443."

The Plaintiff then moved for an Extension of Time to Serve Summons and Complaint by filing an Order to Show Cause with the Court on April 16, 2026. The Court issued a Motion Briefing Schedule Order on May 20, 2026, directing the Plaintiff to file a supplemental affidavit with further information. The Plaintiff did so on June 8, 2026. On June 29, 2026, the Defendant cross-moved to dismiss. On July 22, 2026, the motion was marked "submitted."

Discussion

The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) provides:

"Service of the summons and complaint, summons with notice, or petition with a notice of petition or order to show cause shall be made within one hundred twenty days after the commencement of the action or proceeding If service is not made upon a defendant within the time provided in this section, the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service." NY C.P.L.R. 306-b

"Good cause" and "in the interest of justice" are two separate and distinct standards by which to measure an application for an extension of time to serve (Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95, 104 [Court of Appeals 2001]). If an extension request is premised on good cause, a plaintiff must establish reasonably diligent efforts at service as a threshold matter (Id at 105). If an extension request is premised on the interest of justice standard, it "requires a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties" (Id). "The statute empowers a court faced with the dismissal of a viable claim to consider any factor relevant to the exercise of its discretion. No one factor is determinative—the calculus of the court's decision is dependent on the competing interests of the litigants and a clearly expressed desire by the Legislature that the interests of justice be served" (Id at 106).

Nowhere in Plaintiff's affirmations does he allege that any reasonably diligent efforts were made at service. So the Court considers the extension request to be based on the interest-of-justice standard.

The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's supplemental affirmation to determine whether an extension should be granted in the interests of justice. In his Order to Show Cause, the Plaintiff states that he seeks an extension of time to serve "in the interest of justice" because he "acted diligently and in good faith in this matter." However, he does not describe what actions he took in good faith. He further asserts that he was "actively attempting to get a resolution;" that the Defendant had "actual notice of the events from the Notice of Claim;" and that the "public schools have the claim and did not suffer from any way to fully investigate it and no substantial prejudice has been demonstrated." These statements are vague and conclusory, and they do not explain why, nearly eight months after commencing the action, the Plaintiff could not affect service on the Defendant.

The Plaintiff's conclusory statements do not explain why he could not negotiate the resolution of the claim while simultaneously serving the City of New York with the summons and complaint for this matter. The Plaintiff's efforts to settle his dispute with the Defendant do not show due diligence in pursuing this action. Rather, they imply the priority was the settlement of the claim over the pursuit of this action.

The summons with endorsed complaint demands payment of $50,000.00 from the Defendant for "personal injuries" that are not described further by the complaint or the motion. The affirmation in support of the motion to extend time to serve the summons and complaint alleges the claim relates to the suspension of the Plaintiff's child by the N.Y.S. Department of Education. However, there are no details regarding the origin of the personal injuries or when they allegedly occurred. The Plaintiff states he filed a notice of claim with the City of New York, but he did not provide a copy to the Court, nor state when the alleged personal injury occurred. The Plaintiff was given the opportunity to supplement his motion with evidence to demonstrate the "interest of justice" standard he is seeking, but he did not provide any exhibits or evidence to support that standard.

The Court is mindful that the Plaintiff is an unrepresented litigant. While the rules of evidence and civil procedure are more relaxed in a Small Claims Part matter (maximum recovery of $10,000), this matter was filed in the Civil Part seeking the maximum damages permissible pursuant to the jurisdiction of the Court. Litigants in the Civil Court Part, even when self-represented, must comply with the legal standards and burdens of proof set forth in the law regardless of the absence of legal knowledge by the party. The Plaintiff's motion does not meet the standard to grant an extension in the interests of justice. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion is denied.

The Defendant cross-moves to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR § 306-b on the ground that service was not timely made. The condition precedent to filing a claim for a tort (personal injury) against the City of New York requires the litigant to file a notice of claim with the New York City Comptroller's office within a specific time period (Municipal Law § 50-e). That provision states:

(a) In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special proceeding against a public corporation, as defined in the general construction law, or any officer, appointee or employee thereof, the notice of claim shall comply with and be served in accordance with the provisions of this section within ninety days after the claim arises; " (Municipal Law § 50-e).

The Defendant's cross-motion alleges that the Plaintiff was notified by the Office of the Comptroller that the notice of claim was defective and the Plaintiff did not correct the deficiencies. The disallowance of the notice of claim  ¹ stated that, "If a parent is filing on behalf of a child, both the parent and child's name must be included in the notice of claim." Therefore, the notice of claim did not "comply with" the provisions of Municipal Law § 50-e.

The Defendant's motion argues that the filing of this claim without first filing a proper notice of claim also makes this action defective. The Plaintiff's only recourse was to timely request leave of the Court for late service of an amended notice of claim. The Plaintiff did not make that request. Furthermore, since the statute of limitations for the action has now expired (Municipal Law § 50-i), the time to file for leave to amend the notice of claim has also lapsed.

The Defendant also argues the Plaintiff did not offer any evidence of the meritorious nature of the claim. Finally, the Defendant argues the Plaintiff has failed to address the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Decision

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently support the motion for an extension of time to serve the summons in the interest of justice, and the Defendant has properly raised issues of law that warrant granting of the motion to dismiss the complaint.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's motion to extend is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

This is the Decision and Order of the Court.

Date: September 15, 2026

Hon. Robert J. Helbock

Judge of the Civil Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Exbibit E attached to the Defendant's Cross-motion to Dismiss the Summons and Complaint.

Robert J. Helbock Jr., J.