ABASOV v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC (2026)

The claimant has moved pursuant to CPLR § 2221 seeking to reargue a decision and order dated August 19, 2026 which granted the defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the action. The defendant has opposed the motion. Pursuant to CPLR § 2219(a) the court reviewed all the papers submitted including the statement of claim, the notice of motion and the affirmation in support, the opposition and the reply and heard oral arguments. After reviewing all the arguments this court now makes the following determination.

The claimant, an Uber driver, commenced this action against Uber asserting violations of minimum pay rules, access to airport pick-ups and other claims related to pay. The defendant filed a motion seeking to dismiss on the grounds that pursuant to the agreement entered into between Uber and the claimant driver all such claims may only be raised in an arbitration proceeding. The court granted that motion. The claimant now moves seeking to reargue that determination asserting that pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1) [hereinafter “FAA”] the claimant conducts sufficient interstate business to be exempt from arbitration and that consequently this action in state court is proper. As noted, the motion is opposed.

Conclusions of Law

A motion to reargue must be based upon the fact the court overlooked or misapprehended fact or law or for some other reason mistakenly arrived at in its earlier decision (Diosmaira v. New York City Transit Authority, 238 AD3d 854, 235 NYS3d 97 [2d Dept., 2025]).

Article 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act exempts from arbitration, seamen, railroad employees and “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” (id, see, Circuit City Stores Inc., v. Adams, 532 US 105, 121 S.Ct 1302 [2001]). Although Uber's contracts with its drivers once contained a carve out for small claims matters (see, Meyer v. Uber Technologies Inc., 868 F3d 66 [2d Cir. 2017]) the contract between the claimant and Uber in this case contains no such exemption. The arbitration agreement specifically states that “this arbitration provision also applies, without limitation, to disputes between you and us, or between you and any other entity or individual, arising out of or related to your application for and use of an account to use our Platform or Driver's App as a driver ” (Section 14.1(c) of the User Agreement).

The claimant argues that as an Uber driver he is classified as a transportation worker and consequently cannot be compelled to appear for any arbitration agreement pursuant to Article 1 of the FAA.

There are no New York state cases that have examined whether the FAA's carve-out exempts Uber drivers from participating in arbitration (cf., Rigano v. Uber Technologies Inc., 84 Misc 3d 1208(A), 218 NYS3d 799 [Supreme Court Westchester County 2024]). However, the matter has been dealt with in various federal courts.

In Capriole v. Uber Technologies Inc., 7 F4th 854 [9th Cir. 2021]) the court held that Uber drivers are not interstate workers and are therefore not exempt from arbitration pursuant to the carve-out contained in Article 1 of the FAA. The court explained that the primary nature of the work is the determining factor whether the worker is engaged in interstate transportation. The court concluded that Uber drivers are not “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” (see, FAA (9 U.S.C. § 1) since, as a “local taxicab service” the driver's work “predominantly entails intrastate trips” (id)). This remains true even if an Uber driver occasionally takes a customer to another state, usually an airport, since the “central part of the job description” of an Uber driver consists of intrastate travel. Therefore, since an Uber driver's “occupation is not defined by its engagement in interstate commerce” the driver “does not qualify for the exemption just because she occasionally performs that kind of work” (id, see, also, Rogers v. Lyft Inc., 2022 WL 474166 [9th Cir. 2022]). Other federal courts that have considered this question have reached the same conclusions (see, generally, Ostavics v. Lyft Inc., 535 F.Supp3d 1 [D.C.C. 2021], Cunningham v. Lyft Inc., 17 F4th 244 [1st Cir. 2021]). However, a minority of other courts have reached the opposite result. First, in a pre-rideshare case the court held that cement drivers who “occasionally” made deliveries in other states were considered to be engaged in interstate transportation and fell within Article 1's exemption. The court reasoned that “there is no basis in the text of § 1 for drawing a line between workers who do a lot of interstate transportation work and those who cross state lines only rarely; both sorts of workers are ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’  ” (International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast Inc., 702 F.3d 954 [7th Cir. 2012]). In Haider v. Lyft Inc., 2021 WL 1226442 [S.D.NY 2021] the court held that rideshare drivers in New York certainly transported passengers in interstate commerce and were thus entitled to Article 1's care-out. The court explained that the fare schedule contemplated interstate travel, comprises a component of the rideshare company's earnings in the tri-state area and most drivers accept fares without regard to geography. The court rejected the argument that a particular driver may hardly ever cross state lines. The court held that “both the quantity and nature of Lyft's connections to hubs of interstate travel lead the Court to conclude that its drivers engage in interstate commerce even when they do not personally cross state lines” (id). Again, in Islam v. Lyft Inc., 524 F.Supp3d 338 [S.D.NY 2021] the court held that rideshare drivers are engaged in interstate transportation and are therefore entitled to the carve-out of Article 1 of the FAA and are not required to participate in arbitration.

Other courts have proposed a third option, namely, permitting the parties to engage in discovery to determine whether the driver can satisfy the requirements of Article 1's carve-out (see, Singh v. Uber Technologies Inc., 939 F.3d 210 [3rd Cir. 2019]). Indeed, in Aleksanian v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2023 WL 7537627 [2d Cir. 2023] the court held the complaint failed to provide sufficient information wherein the court could evaluate whether the Article 1 exemption was applicable. The court explained that the complaint “says little about whether the class of transportation workers are engaged in interstate commerce or sufficiently related work Because the issue cannot ‘be decided on the face of the complaint discovery is required’ ” (id).

However, upon the conclusion of all discovery exchanged and a thorough review of that discovery, both courts emphatically held that Uber drivers are not interstate transportation workers pursuant to Article 1 of the FAA and consequently must participate in arbitration (see, Singh v. Uber Technologies Inc., 67 F4th 550 [3rd Cir. 2023], Aleksanian v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2026 WL 836134 [2d Cir. 2026]). In Aleksanian (supra) the court held that “Uber drivers for the relevant period are not “engaged in ․ interstate commerce” as that term is used in Section 1 of the FAA” (id). The court explained that for the carve-out to apply, interstate transportation must be a “central part” of the job description of Uber drivers. The court pointed out that less than three percent of all Uber fares involved interstate pick-ups or drop-offs. Thus, over ninety-seven percent of all fares were conducted within the respective states. The court also rejected reliance upon Haider v. Lyft Inc., 2021 WL 1226442 [S.D.NY 2021] and Islam v. Lyft Inc., 524 F.Supp3d 338 [S.D.NY 2021] asserting that they pre-date a consensus formed among the circuit courts that Uber drivers (or Lyft drivers) do not fall within the FAA's Article 1 carve-out. Likewise, in Singh (supra) the court concluded that Uber drivers do not engage in interstate transportation for purposes of the FAA. The court explained that “as a class, Uber drivers are in the business of providing local rides that sometimes—as a happenstance of geography—cross state borders. Remove interstate commerce from the equation, and the work of Uber drivers remains fundamentally the same” (id).

Thus, there are no circuit courts that hold Uber drivers engage in interstate transportation (see, also, Block v. Flowers Foods Inc., 121 F4th 753 [10 Cir. 2024]). In reaching its conclusion the court in Aleksanian, (supra) explained that “the question is not whether any Uber drivers make any interstate trips. They do. The question is whether, as a nationwide class, they are engaged in interstate commerce as the phrase is used in Section 1 of the FAA. According to the record and the groundswell of case law, they do not” (id).

Therefore, in this case, the claimant, as an Uber driver does not engage in interstate transportation. Therefore, the arbitration carve-out of Article 1 of the FAA does not apply to him. Consequently, he must submit to arbitration pursuant to the agreement with Uber. Thus, the motion seeking to reargue is denied.

So ordered.

Mark Kagan, J.