Rahmatullo Hikmatov, Plaintiff, v. Vitaly Shkolnikov, Defendant (2026)

A trial on this matter was held on August 5, 2026. Plaintiff Rahmatullo Hikmatov ("Hikmatov" or "plaintiff") brought this action against defendant Vitaly Shkolnikov ("Shkolnikov" or "defendant") seeking $27,000 for failure to provide proper services in connection with the rental of residential space. Plaintiff seeks the return of rent and security deposit payments made to defendant in the amount of $6,600, and reimbursement for utility expenses in the amount of $2,000. The remainder of the $27,000 sought is damages for emotional distress. Plaintiff was unrepresented and testified with the assistance of Russian interpreters. Defendant appeared with counsel. For the reasons set forth below, judgment is granted in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $600.

Facts

The parties entered into a written agreement for plaintiff to rent a room in defendant's apartment at 1375 East 18th Street, Apartment C10, Brooklyn, for $600 per month, with a $600 security deposit. The agreement provided for a term commencing January 3, 2024, and ending January 3, 2025. Defendant was himself a tenant of the apartment under a lease ("paramount lease") with 1375 EAST18 ST BROOKLYN, LP, the building owner ("owner"). Although the parties' arrangement was therefore a subtenancy, their agreement was titled "Rental Agreement" and identified defendant as the landlord and plaintiff as the tenant. The parties' respective versions of the rental agreement were admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit A. Upon reviewing the documents, this court found no substantive difference between them. (Tr at 10, 13—15.)

Plaintiff testified that he learned of the available room through a newspaper advertisement and contacted defendant. According to plaintiff, he understood that defendant was the landlord and later discovered that defendant was renting the apartment from the building owner. Plaintiff contended that defendant had deceived him by identifying himself as the landlord and that defendant's own lease prohibited him from subletting. Neither party produced the paramount lease at trial. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant was a tenant of the apartment but maintained that he stood in the position of a landlord in relation to plaintiff. (Tr at 4—5, 10—11, 28—30.)

Plaintiff also disputed whether defendant provided the space promised under the agreement. He testified that, instead of receiving an entire room, he was given a portion of a room separated from defendant's portion by a partition. According to plaintiff, defendant promised to remove the partition and provide him with the larger space but never did so. Plaintiff further testified that defendant worked as a truck driver and was absent for extended periods, and that other occupants also rented partitioned spaces in the apartment. (Tr at 5.)

The parties presented photographs of the premises, marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Defendant's Exhibit B, which the court reviewed. Plaintiff identified the portion he occupied and the adjoining portion occupied by defendant. The court observed that the two spaces appeared approximately equal in size. Defense counsel represented that plaintiff's space contained a bed, chair, and table, had a door with a lock, and afforded plaintiff shared use of the kitchen and bathroom. Plaintiff maintained that the partition and separate door had been installed by defendant within what had previously been a single room. (Tr at 11, 16—19.)

It was undisputed that plaintiff paid defendant a total of $6,600. Plaintiff initially described this amount as eleven monthly payments of $600, but, when the court questioned him concerning the security deposit, he stated that the total included the deposit. This court therefore advised plaintiff that additional records of his payments were unnecessary because receipt of the $6,600 was not contested. Defense counsel expressly stated that defendant was not asserting a counterclaim. (Tr at 13, 16, 25, 33.)

Plaintiff testified that, in mid-December 2024, he returned from purchasing groceries and found the apartment door locked from the inside. According to plaintiff, defendant refused to admit him, told him to leave, and threatened to discard his belongings. Plaintiff called the police, but defendant allegedly continued to refuse entry after they arrived. Plaintiff testified that he ultimately regained access at approximately 1:00 a.m., when another occupant opened the door to leave the apartment. He further testified that defendant thereafter discontinued the electricity and gas before the rental agreement expired, requiring plaintiff to pay for those services himself. (Tr at 5—8, 12.)

Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant discontinued the utilities after leaving the premises, but maintained that plaintiff subsequently obtained service in his own name for his continued use of the apartment. Plaintiff acknowledge in his testimony that defendant had paid the utilities before his departure. Upon reviewing the rental agreement, the court observed that it contained no provision allocating responsibility for utilities. (Tr at 11—12, 19.)

This court reviewed defendant's notarized letter dated April 2, 2025, in which defendant stated that he had moved out of the apartment on December 26, 2024, relinquished his rights to it, and surrendered possession to the landlord. Plaintiff relied on that letter to dispute defendant's contention that the deterioration of the parties' relationship had compelled defendant to leave. Defense counsel maintained that the parties' conflicts, including repeated police involvement, caused defendant to vacate. (Tr at 24—25.)

Plaintiff remained in the apartment after defendant's departure. The owner subsequently commenced a holdover proceeding against plaintiff [1375 East 18 St Brooklyn LP v. Rahmatullo Hikmatov et al (LT-317474-25/KI)], to which defendant was not a party. The court reviewed documents from that proceeding, including a judgment of possession entered on December 11, 2025, and took judicial notice of a so-ordered stipulation requiring plaintiff to vacate by February 14, 2026. The stipulation was marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Plaintiff testified that he vacated in accordance with its terms. (Tr at 22—26.)

Plaintiff also offered a police report to support his assertion that defendant had falsely represented himself as the landlord. Defendant's hearsay objection was sustained and this court did not accept the report as proof of the alleged misconduct. Plaintiff sought to present videos concerning the parties' interactions and the police response, but those videos were not played during the trial. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the court permitted plaintiff to submit the videos by email, with a copy to defense counsel, and permitted defense counsel to submit legal authority.

Law and Analysis

The first issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to the return of the rent he paid defendant on the grounds that defendant deceived him by identifying himself as the landlord in the rental agreement without disclosing that he was himself a tenant of the owner. "The relation created by a sublease is for all general purposes the ordinary relation of landlord and tenant." 74A NY Jur Landlord and Tenant § 804. A sublessor ordinarily stands in the same legal relationship to a sublessee as a landlord does to a tenant. Rahi v Nehari, 2018 NY Slip Op 31707[U], *2 (Civ Ct, NY County 2018), citing International Bus. Machs. Corp. v Joseph Stevens & Co., L.P., 300 AD2d 222, 223 [1st Dept 2002]). Defendant's status as a tenant under the paramount lease was therefore not inconsistent with his status as plaintiff's landlord under their rental agreement. Accordingly, the designation of defendant as "landlord," standing alone, does not establish that he misrepresented his ownership of the premises or otherwise deceived plaintiff.

Plaintiff further contended at trial that the sublease was unlawful because the paramount lease between defendant and the owner prohibited subletting. Neither party produced the paramount lease at trial, and its alleged prohibition against subletting was therefore not established. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff seeks to enforce that alleged restriction, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff was in privity of contract with the landlord for the purpose of enforcing defendant's obligations under the primary lease. See, Binder v. Tolou Realty Assoc., Inc., 205 AD3d 870, 871 (2d Dept. 2022).

Nor did plaintiff demonstrate that he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the primary lease between defendant and the owner and was therefore entitled to enforce its provisions. A third party may only "sue as a beneficiary on a contract made for [its] benefit," and "an intent to benefit the third party must be shown, and, absent such intent, the third party is merely an incidental beneficiary with no right to enforce the particular contracts." Dormitory Auth. of the State of NY v Samson Constr. Co., 30 NY3d 704, 710 (2018). To establish third party beneficiary status, a party must allege: "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for its benefit, and (3) that the benefit to it is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate it if the benefit is lost." Board of Mgrs. of 100 Congress Condominium v SDS Congress, LLC, 152 AD3d 478, 480 (2d Dept. 2017). A subtenant's status alone does not confer such rights where the landlord neither undertook a duty toward the subtenant nor intended to confer a benefit upon the subtenant. See, NRP LLC I v Elo Mgt. LLC, 56 Misc 3d 80, 83—84 [App Term, 1st Dept 2017], citing Tamco Enters. v Mitsubishi Elec. Am., 190 AD2d 623 [1st Dept 1993]). As the record at trial contained no evidence that the landlord was aware of plaintiff at the time of the paramount lease, much less that he intended to incur a duty with respect to plaintiff, plaintiff cannot be found to be a third-party beneficiary to the paramount lease and therefore cannot maintain an action to enforce a provision within it.

Furthermore, this court takes judicial notice of "undisputed court records and files" Khatibi v. Weill, 8 AD3d 485, 485 (2d Dept. 2004). Plaintiff did not dispute the assertion in the owner's holdover petition in the related matter of 1375 East 18 St Brooklyn LP v. Rahmatullo Hikmatov et al (LT-317474-25/KI), that the subject premises was a rent-stabilized apartment [NYSCEF Doc.1]. Pursuant to RPL 235-f(3), a lessee of a rent stabilized apartment is permitted to sublease a room in the apartment. See, Diamond v Menasche, 141 Misc 2d 899 (Civ. Ct. NY Co. 1988) (Where tenant of rent stabilized apartment took in roommate to whom she subleased the master bedroom, roommate was "occupant" under RPL § 235-f(1)(b) and was permitted to reside with lessee in rent stabilized apartment pursuant to the statute). Accordingly, this court finds no basis to award plaintiff $6,000 for rent paid, and that demand is denied..

Plaintiff did not establish entitlement to reimbursement for the utility payments he made following defendant's relinquishment of his own rights to the apartment on April 2, 2025. The rental agreement contained no provision requiring defendant to include utilities in the monthly rent or otherwise pay plaintiff's utility expenses. Moreover, plaintiff conceded that defendant paid the utilities until defendant vacated the premises and relinquished his tenancy, and that plaintiff began paying those expenses only thereafter, while continuing to occupy the apartment. Thus, the payments for which plaintiff seeks reimbursement were attributable to his continued occupancy after defendant's departure. In the absence of proof that defendant remained obligated to pay those expenses, plaintiff's claim for reimbursement is denied.

Finally, plaintiff may not recover damages for emotional distress merely upon establishing a breach of the rental agreement or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A breach of a contractual duty, without an independent basis for liability, does not support recovery for emotional distress. See, Wehringer v Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of NY, 57 NY2d 757, 759 (1982); Perlbinder v Vigilant Ins. Co., 190 AD3d 985, 990 (2d Dept 2021). The Second Department has likewise rejected an attempt to recover such damages under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress where the asserted duty arose solely from the parties' contractual relationship. See, Curtis-Shanley v Bank of Am., 109 AD3d 634, 635 (2d Dept 2013). Nor does characterizing a contractual breach as a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing render emotional-distress damages recoverable. Perlbinder, supra, 190 AD3d at 990. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks compensation for emotional distress arising solely from defendant's alleged failure to provide the accommodations or services promised under the rental agreement, that demand is denied.

Plaintiff is, however, entitled to the return of his $600 security deposit. General Obligations Law ("GOL") 7-108(1-a)(b) requires the return of a tenant's entire security deposit upon vacatur, "except for an amount lawfully retained for the reasonable and itemized costs due to non-payment of rent, damage caused by the tenant beyond normal wear and tear, non-payment of utility charges payable directly to the landlord under the terms of the lease or tenancy, and moving and storage of the tenant's belongings." Under subdivision (1-a)(e), a landlord must provide an itemized statement identifying the basis for any retention and return the remaining deposit within fourteen days after the tenant vacates; failure to comply results in forfeiture of the right to retain any portion of the deposit. The landlord bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the amount retained (GOL 7-108[1-a][f]). Here, defendant presented no evidence that he provided the required itemized statement within fourteen days after plaintiff vacated or otherwise established a lawful basis for retaining the deposit. Accordingly, the deposit may not simply be applied against an additional month's rent. Judgment is granted in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $600 representing the return of his security deposit. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Date: October 8, 2026

Hon. Tehilah H. Berman

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County

Tehilah H. Berman, J.