649 DE LLC v. ADELSA TAVERAS (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent Adelsa Taveras's motion for summary judgment:

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion & All Documents Annexed 1 (NYSCEF #12-20)

Affirmation in Opposition & All Documents Annexed 2 (NYSCEF #22-25)

Reply Affirmation 3 (NYSCEF #26)

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on respondent's motion is as follows.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This summary nonpayment proceeding was commenced in July 2024. On July 24, 2024, respondent Adelsa Taveras ("respondent") filed a pro se answer. In September 2024, counsel appeared for respondent. Ultimately, respondent's answer was amended on consent in May 2025. Thereafter, respondent made the instant motion for summary judgment. Following adjournments for briefing, this court heard argument upon the motion on January 12, 2026.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

On a motion for summary judgment, "the proponent . . . must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact[.] . . . Once this showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action." (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986] [internal citations omitted]). Respondent seeks summary judgment upon her overcharge defense and counterclaim. Petitioner opposes the motion in all respects.

Respondent claims that she has been overcharged since the inception of her tenancy in 2021. The crux of respondent's argument is that under the provisions of Part F of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSPTA) [L 2019, ch 36, § 1, part F], respondent's rent should be based upon the "most recent reliable annual registration filed and served . . . six years prior to the most recent registration statement," plus subsequent lawful increases (NYC Admin. Code § 26-516(a)(i)). Recently, the Appellate Division, First Department endorsed the application of Part F's provisions to rent-stabilized tenancies commencing after the effective date of the HSTPA, specifically holding that prospective (post-enactment) application did not have retroactive effect (see Matter of West Pierre Assoc. LLC v Harvey, 241 AD3d 413, 413 [1st Dept 2025]). Respondent asserts that the "most recent reliable" registration is from 2016, when the legal regulated rent was registered as $1,342.16. In response, petitioner argues that although it only acquired ownership in 2019, the increases taken after 2016 are justified and based on substantial improvements made in 2017, at least according to the prior owner (see Eleanor Patrick Aff., ¶ 8).

To determine the most recent reliable registration in the overcharge context, the court "shall consider all available rent history which is reasonably necessary to make such determination[ ][.]" (NYC Admin. Code § 26-516(h); see also Harvey, 241 AD3d at 414).¹ Respondent annexes a certified DHCR (Division of Housing and Community Renewal) Registration Apartment History ("rent history") for the subject premises to her motion (NYSCEF Doc. 15). The rent history shows that the apartment was registered at a legal regulated rent of $1,342.16 in 2016. In 2017, it was registered at a legal regulated rent of $3,067.50, with a preferential rent of $2,850.00. There is only a notation of "Vac/Leas" next to the 2017 registration. In opposition, petitioner's agent asserts that the former owner was entitled to the over 200% increase in 2017 because of "substantial improvements made in 2017." (Eleanor Patrick Aff., ¶ 8). However, no proof of these "improvements" is proffered, and the agent acknowledges that the statement about improvements is based on hearsay.

Under the pre-HSTPA version of NYC Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5a), a vacancy lease could contain a rent increase of 20% in the event of a 2-year lease or 20% less the difference between the Rent Guidelines Board (RGB) allowable increase for a two-year lease minus the allowable increase for a one-year lease in the event of a 1-year lease. As the DHCR rent history indicates that the 2017 vacancy lease had a 1-year term, the maximum vacancy allowance was 18%, since the difference between the RGB increases for a two-year lease and a one-year lease was 2% (see RGB Apartment/Loft Order #48). However, since the prior tenant was in occupancy for 21 years (according to the DHCR rent history), petitioner was entitled to a further longevity increase pursuant to former NYC Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5a) and 9 NYCRR 2522.8(a)(2)(ii) (see Matter of Ador Realty, LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 25 AD3d 128, 131-132 [2d Dept 2005]; Andrew Jackson Realty Co., L.P. v Patan, 86 Misc 3d 127[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50834[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]). Based on the formula allowed in those regulations, petitioner was entitled to a longevity increase of $169.05.² Taken together, petitioner was legally permitted to take an 18% vacancy increase of $241.59 and a longevity increase of $169.05 on top of the prior (2016) legal regulated rent of $1,342.16. This totals $1,752.80, which is far less than the $3,067.50 registered as the legal regulated rent in 2017.

While a landlord could claim Individual Apartment Improvement increases (IAIs) pre-HSTPA (see Matter of Boyd v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 23 NY3d 999 [2014]), petitioner has not submitted any credible, admissible proof of actual improvements that would justify the increase of the rent to $3,067.50 in 2017 (see Davis v Graham Ct. Owners Corp., 211 AD3d 629, 630 [1st Dept 2022]; Ecumenical Community Dev. Org., Inc. v GVS Props. II, LLC, 168 AD3d 522 [1st Dept 2019]). As the increases taken afterwards (including during respondent's tenancy) were tainted by the unjustified rent registered in 2017, the court finds that the rents sought in the petition exceed the lawful rent, contrary to what is alleged in the petition (see Matter of Syllman, 233 AD3d at 979; PWV Acquisition, LLC v Paradise, 59 Misc 3d 130[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50430[U], *2 [App Term, 1st Dept 2018]). Thus, respondent's motion is solely granted to the extent that the petition is dismissed on the basis that the rents sought therein are unlawful.

However, the court has no basis on this record to grant respondent summary judgment upon her overcharge counterclaim. Respondent presents no proof of any payments made during her tenancy, so it is impossible for the court to assess whether any damages are warranted (see Borden v 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P., 24 NY3d 382, 392-393 [2014]). Accordingly, respondent's motion is denied, without prejudice, as to respondent's overcharge counterclaim. The proceeding will be restored for all purposes, including trial transfer, on respondent's counterclaims on October 29, 2026 at 9:30 AM in Part D (New York County).

This Decision/Order will be filed to NYSCEF.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Dated: September 23, 2026

Queens, New York

HON. CLINTON J. GUTHRIE, J.H.C

FOOTNOTES

1.   Independently, the court may consider all available rent history for the specific purpose of determining of propriety of the legal regulated rent where no overcharge claim is asserted, even when the alleged improper increases occurred pre-HSTPA (see Matter of Syllman v New York State Div of Hous. & Community Renewal, 233 AD3d 977, 979 [Retroactive application of HSTPA amendments to assess overcharge damages is barred by Regina, while recourse to the amendments is permitted solely to calculate the legal regulated rent.]; 720 Riverside Owners Corp. v Moghadam, 87 Misc 3d 133[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51896[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]).

2.   The prior rent of $1,342.16 is multiplied by .6% for a figure of 8.05, multiplied by 21.

Clinton J. Guthrie, J.