Chong Yuet Li, Plaintiff(s), v. Clean Air Car Service & Parking Corporation, Defendant(s). (2026)

After a bench trial held before me on June 4, 2026, the Court finds as follows:

Plaintiff Chong Yuet Li commenced this action on January 18, 2024, via endorsed complaint, seeking a total of $25,383.72 allegedly owed as compensation between 2018 and 2021 while working for Defendant Clean Air Car Service & Parking Corporation ("Clean Air"). Clean Air denies liability, contending that Plaintiff is an independent contractor under the parties' agreement and further that any outstanding payments are subject to a condition precedent (insurance company approval and payment) that has yet to occur or come due. Clean Air also asserted counterclaims in its answer, including its allegation that Plaintiff breached the contract between the parties.

At trial, Plaintiff presented his case pro se with the assistance of Mandarin interpreters. Defendant, represented by its attorney David Wood and its company President and attorney Kevin Wang, in turn presented its defense and counterclaims. Upon the evidence and testimony adduced at trial, this Court finds the following:

Plaintiff is a Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC") licensed driver.

Clean Air is a transportation services provider in New York City granted authority by the TLC and Medicaid and/or Medicare program. The services include non-emergency medical trips assigned by senior centers, medical insurance companies and/or their agents, and trips booked by the public.

On March 5, 2016, and again on September 14, 2018, the parties entered into a Driver Agreement for Plaintiff to provide transportation services in exchange for access to Clean Air's clientele and fares for services rendered. Plaintiff signed the agreement for himself. Both parties testified that this is a standard contract that Clean Air provides to all of its drivers. The contracts were prepared by Defendant. The agreement contains a provision that says that "Driver hereby acknowledges that he/she has read and understood this Agreement and further acknowledges that Driver has had opportunity to consult with independent counsel of their choosing with regards to the terms and conditions of this Agreement . . . ." The agreement goes on to say that the signers to the Agreement have "read and understand[ ] the agreement in its entirety . . . ." The agreement makes clear in multiple sections that Plaintiff is an independent contractor, and not an employee of Defendant. Plaintiff testified that he "worked under that agreement."

Under paragraph 5 of the agreement, Plaintiff would submit daily trip sheets and, in turn, Defendant would pay Plaintiff 70% of the "daily fare total remaining after applicable insurance service fees are deducted" and keep 30%. Under the contract provisions, Defendant would initially pay only 63%¹ of each trip fare within seven days of Plaintiff's "timely submission of the trip records detailing the completion of the trips . . . ." after insurance fees are deducted. The contract provides that Defendant would pay Plaintiff the remaining 7%² "within three months "subject to the approval and payment from the insurance company, their agents, and/or other services wherein [Defendant] shall use best efforts to obtain the full amount reported on the trip records." In the next sentence, the contract provides that "Drivers shall be liable for any consequences related to non-approval or non-payment from the insurance company, their agents, and/or other services due to inaccurate information on the trip records."

With regard to cancelled trips, the agreements provide that Defendant "shall notify [Plaintiff] of any cancelled trips within a reasonable amount of time" and that "[i]f [Plaintiff] completes a cancelled trip absent notification from [Defendant] or due to any miscommunication resulting in [Plaintiff] completing the trip through no fault of their own, then [Defendant] shall pay $5 to [Plaintiff] to cover [Plaintiff]'s losses." However, in the event that Defendant notifies the Plaintiff that the trip is cancelled and Plaintiff "chooses to complete cancelled trips" anyway "after being notified by" Defendant, Plaintiff "shall bear all costs without any compensation from [Defendant]."

Additionally, there is a provision in the agreement identified as "Business Exigencies," which says that "in the event there is a significant decline in the average number of trips due to business exigencies including but not limited to . . . loss of contract with insurance companies, Company, at its discretion may review this Agreement and make appropriate adjustments in regard to Driver's payment obligations under this Agreement." However, in a later provision, in Paragraph 12, the contract says that it "may be modified only by a writing signed by the Parties."

The stated end date of the April 5, 2016 contract is April 5, 2019, pursuant to paragraph 13 of that contract. However, the later September 14, 2018 contract has conflicting terms regarding the end date of the contract. Paragraph 3k refers to a "stated end date of September 14, 2020." Paragraph 13 says that the Agreement "become[s] effective on the date of its execution and will remain in effect for three (3) years until 4/5/2019 unless it is terminated . . . ." But three years from the September 14, 2018, date of the contract execution is September 14, 2021.

Plaintiff's Claims

Via his endorsed complaint, Plaintiff seeks a total of $25,383.72, including $20,860.52 on a claim for failure to pay wages and $4,523.20 for failure to pay for services rendered. At trial, Plaintiff further asserted that he was entitled to double damages under the New York City Freelance Isn't Free Act § 20-929 and 20-933. Plaintiff did not specifically allege breach of contract in his endorsed complaint, nor did he cite to the law for which he now asserts double damages.

Plaintiff's specific claims presented at trial are as follows:

First, Plaintiff claims that there are eight pay periods in late 2020 and late 2021 where Defendant failed to pay him for any of his trip fares. According to the documentation introduced by Plaintiff, he is entitled to $10,191.36 for those pay periods, which reflect the 63% portion that he says should have been paid within seven days of trip record submission as per the parties' agreement. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff made these trips, that he was not paid for them, and that the total value of this portion of Plaintiff's claim is "around 10,000." Defendant did not challenge any of the details in the exhibits provided. Plaintiff testified that the printed electronic records themselves originated from Defendant's own files and that they were printed directly from Defendant's emails to him (although the handwritten markings and computations shown on the exhibits were written by Plaintiff).

Second, Plaintiff claims an additional $10,668.96 for trip fares owed to him under contract provision 5 (a) (iii) which provides that he is to receive 7% of the trip fare within 3 months after the insurance company review. Pursuant to that provision, Plaintiff argues that the 7% portion of trip fares remains outstanding. The Court notes that Plaintiff's exhibits are unclear as to what specific time periods and pay periods are at issue. The Court further notes that some of the math that Plaintiff is using to arrive at the $10,668.96 figure is not sufficiently spelled out or explained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-A and Plaintiff did not testify as to the details of the exhibit or the calculations he did. However, as discussed further below, the Court ultimately finds that Plaintiff cannot succeed on this claim under the plain contract language, so it will not dwell on the details of Plaintiff's evidence in support of this claim.

Third, Plaintiff identifies 157 rides that he refers to as "No pay trips" that occurred between 2019 and 2021, with the 70% portion totaling approximately $3,963.24 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-A).

Additionally, Plaintiff testified that Defendant violated TLC regulations by not paying him timely. Plaintiff also asked in his written materials that Defendant and/or its counsel be sanctioned for alleged rude behavior and frivolous defenses; however, Plaintiff did not offer any testimony in this regard.

Defendant's Arguments

Defendant's primary defense offered during trial is that the third-party insurance company National Medical Transit Insurance Company ("MedTrans") defaulted and that Clean Air was therefore unable to collect payments to pay Plaintiff and its other drivers. Defendant testified that MedTrans collapsed, owing Clean Air $250,000. Clean Air prepaid drivers from company funds; however, because MedTrans failed to pay Defendant, it did not have funds to pay out remaining balances. In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant did not provide any documentation regarding the insurance company's alleged default.

Defendant denies owing Plaintiff the 7% portion which remains unpaid for any trips on the grounds that the contract language says that the 7% portion is "subject to the approval and payment from the insurance company . . . ."

While Defendant does not deny that Plaintiff is owed 63% for the first group of trips identified under the contract, Defendant also argues that because it did not receive payment from the insurance company that it can effectively claw back payments. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has no proof that Defendant received payments from MedTrans for the trips at issue here. Plaintiff did not present any evidence in that regard.

As for the third group of Plaintiff's claims involving the 157 "No pay trips," Mr. Wang testified that those were trips that were cancelled by MedTrans and that Plaintiff was therefore not entitled to payment for them. Mr. Wang's testimony acknowledges that Plaintiff completed these trips. However, Mr. Wang said that Plaintiff was properly not paid by the insurer because they were cancelled trips. Mr. Wang testified that drivers sometimes seek to complete trips that are cancelled in the hopes of getting paid by the insurance company. Plaintiff did not rebut that specific point.

Defendant also argues that any claims pertaining to trips predating January 18, 2018, would be barred by the statute of limitations because Plaintiff's claims are based in contract, which has a six-year statute of limitations under New York law. However, Defendant did not assert a statute of limitations defense in its answer: Defendant only asserted five defenses: (1) lack of standing; (2) failure to state a cause of action; (3) equitable estoppel; (4) failure to mitigate damages; and (5) the doctrine of unconscionability. Additionally, Defendant did not identify which specific trips or which specific claims should be excluded on statute of limitations grounds.

Defendant asserted that all of its other drivers were similarly situated to Plaintiff and that all of those other drivers agreed to settle with Clean Air (or Mr. Wang personally) for partial reimbursement. Defendant asserted that Plaintiff here was the only driver who was unwilling to settle and that he became personally hostile to Clean Air and its employees.

Defendant also objects to Plaintiff articulating any claims as "wages" because Defendant's view is that the parties were "business partners."

In its answer, Defendant asserts counterclaims totaling $60,000 for breach of contract and tortious interference with business notwithstanding that the Court's jurisdictional limit is $50,000. Plaintiff did not respond in writing to Defendant's counterclaims.

Discussion

Violations of TLC Rules

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff asserted during trial that Defendant violated TLC rules and that he should be entitled to recover damages on account of those violations. However, any alleged violation of TLC rules would need to first be brought before the NYC Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings. (See generally Matter of Uddin v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn. 2012 NY Slip Op 32246(U) [Sup Ct, NY County Aug. 29, 2012].) The TLC rules do not provide for a private right of action to appear in Civil Court in the first instance. Accordingly, this Court will not consider any of Plaintiff's claims or alleged damages based on any alleged violations of TLC rules.

Plaintiff's First Wages Claim for Unpaid Pay Periods in Late 2020 and 2021 (63% Claim)

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to full 70% reimbursement for eight pay periods in late 2020 and 2021 (covering November 30, 2020-December 27, 2020, and October 25, 2021-November 21, 2021) that remain unpaid. However, the Court has reviewed the documentation that Plaintiff provided and has determined that the $10,191.36 that Plaintiff calculated represents 63% payment, not 70% payment.³ During his cross-examination, Plaintiff agreed that the $10,191.36 as submitted was based on the 63% amounts. (Tr. 57:11-13 [Q. "Is it the truth that you identify 90 percent of 70 percent with the amount, $10,191.36; is that correct?" A. "Yes."])

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to the 63% recovery during the contract period. The agreement says with no uncertainty that "[w]ithin seven (7) days of Driver's timely submission of the trip records detailing the completion of the trips, Company shall pay Driver ninety percent (90%) of the seventy percent (70%) of the daily fare total remaining after insurance service fees are deducted." Defendant did not introduce any evidence rebutting the fact that these trip records were submitted timely. Accordingly, the contract is clear that Plaintiff was entitled to receive 63% (90% times 70%) of the fares covering those eight pay periods.

However, one relevant issue not addressed by the parties at trial is that the contract at issue has an end date that precedes some of the trips at issue. As mentioned above, there are three different end dates that appear in the September 14, 2018 contract: (1) Paragraph 3k refers to a "stated end date of September 14, 2020"; (2) Paragraph 13 references the date April 5, 2019; and (3) Paragraph 13 also references three years after the execution date, which would be September 14, 2021.

The Court thus has to resolve this contract language discrepancy in order to determine which trips at issue postdate the contract at issue here and whether Plaintiff would be eligible to receive payment for trips that postdate the contract.

Contract language is ambiguous when it is "reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation" (Chimart Assoc. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570, 573, 489 NE2d 231, 498 NYS2d 344 [1986]), "and there is nothing to indicate which meaning is intended, or where there is contradictory or necessarily inconsistent language in different portions of the instrument" (Travelers Ins. Co. v Castro, 341 F2d 882, 884 [1965]). "It has long been the rule that ambiguities in a contractual instrument will be resolved contra proferentem, against the party who prepared or presented it" (151 W. Assoc. v Printsiples Fabric Corp., 61 NY2d 732, 734, 460 NE2d 1344, 472 NYS2d 909 [1984]). Hence, a contract which is internally inconsistent in material respects or that reasonably lends itself to two conflicting interpretations is subject to the rule invoking strict construction of the contract in the light most favorable to the nondrafting party (see generally Fernandez v Price, 63 AD3d 672, 880 NYS2d 169 [2009]; 242-44 E. 77th St., LLC v Greater NY Mut. Ins. Co., 31 AD3d 100, 815 NYS2d 507 [2006]; Turner Press v Gould, 76 AD2d 906, 429 NYS2d 239 [1980]).

(Natt v White Sands Condominium, 95 AD3d 848, 849 [2d Dept 2012].)

The evidence presented at trial makes clear that the contract at issue is one that Defendant prepared and provides to all of its drivers on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Plaintiff did not have any input regarding any of the contract provisions. Accordingly, the Court will resolve this ambiguity in favor of the non-drafter, and select the latest possible contract end date, which is September 14, 2021.⁴

That would mean that the four pay periods covered by this claim from November 30, 2020 through December 27, 2020 took place while the 2018 contract was in effect. However, that would also mean that the four pay periods from October 25, 2021 through November 21, 2021 postdated the end of the contract period. Accordingly, the Court must determine if Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the period that postdates the end of the contract.

The Court notes that neither side gave any testimony or provided any other reason to believe that the contract terms understood by the parties changed in any relevant way during 2021. The 63% and 7% arrangements were described as having been applicable throughout the time that Plaintiff worked. Defendant did not argue that the payment structure changed in any way during the parties' relationship. No other payment arrangement was described. The only change noted was Defendant's eventual inability to pay drivers pursuant to the agreements on account of the insurance company defaulting. And even in that regard, there was no evidence presented to the Court that Defendant informed Plaintiff that he should not work between October and November 2021 because of possible lack of funds or other changed circumstances.

While the contract has a "Business Exigencies" provision in Paragraph 6a that allows Defendant to "review th[e] Agreement and make appropriate adjustments in regards to Driver's payment obligations" "in the event there is a significant decline in the average number of trips due to business exigencies including but not limited to . . . loss of contract with insurance companies," at no time did Defendant indicate to Plaintiff or the Court that it would be exercising its rights under that provision. Additionally, the Court finds that Defendant did not establish that there was a "significant decline in the average number of trips due to business exigencies," which is a necessary condition for that provision to potentially come into play.⁵

Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties' conduct establishes the existence of an implied contract for any trips that Plaintiff completed after September 14, 2021, with the identical payment structure as in the Agreements. (See Martin v Campanaro, 156 F2d 127, 129 [2d Cir. 1946] ["When an agreement expires by its terms, if, without more, the parties continue to perform as theretofore, an implication arises that they have mutually assented to a new contract containing the same provisions as the old"]; Branic Intl. Realty Corp. v City of New York, 27 Misc 3d 1222(A), 2010 NY Slip Op 50845(U) [Sup Ct, NY County 2010] [where the parties "continued performing pursuant to [the] terms [of an expired contract," they "thereby establish[ed] the existence of an implied contract"]; see also Watts v Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 188 AD2d 799, 801 [3d Dept 1992] [parties' conduct after expiration of written contract, including continued rendition of services and acceptance of those services, "clearly establish a contract implied in fact with substantially the same terms and conditions as embodied in the expired written contract"]; Empire State Fuel Corp. v Warbasse-Cogeneration Techs., Partnership, L.P., 26 Misc 3d 1215(A), 2007 NY Slip Op 52665(U) [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2007] ["a renewal of contract may be implied from the parties' conduct where" contract expired but "the parties continue to [do] business together as before"]).

Thus, Plaintiff has fully asserted his entitlement to this portion of his claims for these 8 pay periods in late 2020 and late 2021, totaling $10,191.36.

Plaintiff's Second Wages Claim for Payment of Remaining 7% (7% Claim)

Plaintiff claims an additional $10,668.96 for trip fares owed to him under contract provision 5(a)(iii), which provides that he is to receive 7% of the trip fare within 3 months after the insurance company review. Pursuant to that provision, Plaintiff argues that the 7% portion of various trip fares remain payable to him from Defendant.

The relevant contract provision reads as follows:

The remaining ten percent (10%) shall be paid within approximately three (3) months subject to the approval and payment from the insurance company, their agents, and/or other services wherein Company shall use best efforts to obtain the full amount reported on trip records. Drivers shall be liable for any consequences related to non-approval or non-payment from the insurance company, their agents, and/or other services due to inaccurate information on the trip records.

The Court finds that this provision raises at least three relevant inquiries: (1) Did the insurance company approve and make payment for the trips at issue? (2) Did the Company use its best efforts to obtain the full amount reported on trip records? (3) Is the "subject to the approval and payment from the insurance company" limited to circumstances where trip records are inaccurate?

For each of these questions, the Court finds in favor of Defendant.

First, Defendant credibly established that the insurance company defaulted and thus did not approve and make payment of the 7% portion for the trips at issue. The Court finds no reason to doubt Defendant's testimony on this point. Although Plaintiff demanded at trial that Defendant put forth additional evidence to establish the insurance company's default, Plaintiff had an opportunity during discovery to obtain documents or witnesses that could rebut Defendant's testimony. Plaintiff failed to do so, and thus was unable to rebut Defendant's credible showing that the insurance company did not provide payment pursuant to this provision.

Second, the Court finds that Defendant used its best efforts to obtain the full amounts. Although testimony on this point was scant, Mr. Wang did say that Defendant tried but was unable to come up with the funds from the insurance company and therefore he had to resort to paying drivers out-of-pocket to make up some of the difference. (See Tr. 67:1-2 [Wang: "[W]e dispute with them, argue with them. They completely closed their business."].) Plaintiff failed to present evidence that Defendant's efforts in this regard fell short of the "best efforts" set forth in the contract.

Third, the Court finds that the plain reading of the contract provisions is that the 7% is paid "subject to the approval and payment from the insurance company . . . ." and without limitation regarding the insurance company's reason for non-approval or non-payment. "Courts look to the plain language of contracts when interpreting their meaning." (Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 30 NY3d 572, 601-602 [2017].) If an agreement is "complete, clear and unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms." (Beardslee v Inflection Energy, LLC, 25 NY3d 150, 157 [2015] [citation omitted].) "[C]ourts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing." (Id. [citation omitted]) "[W]here two seemingly conflicting contract provisions reasonably can be reconciled, a court is required to do so and to give both effect" (Meehan v County of Suffolk, 144 AD3d 642, 644 [2d Dept 2016] [emphasis omitted]).

While Plaintiff argues that his interpretation of the last sentence of paragraph 5(a)(iii) is that that the only reason why Plaintiff would be denied payment of the 7% is if trip records turned out to be inaccurate, the Court finds that is in a separate sentence and does not establish a limitation of the sentence that immediately precedes it. In other words, the contract describes a general principle: that payment of the 7% portion is subject to insurance company approval. Then the contract further expands on that general principle with a specific issue that may arise: that the insurance company may deny the 7% portion in the event that trip records submitted by drivers are inaccurate. However, the latter sentence does not mandate that inaccurate trip records are the only reason why the insurance company would fail to approve payment. This plain reading of the contract reconciles both provisions and gives both effect; meanwhile, if Plaintiff's interpretation were credited, the first sentence would need to be rewritten to specifically limit the insurance company non-payment to instances where the trip records are inaccurate. The Court declines to rewrite the contract as Plaintiff asks.

Plaintiff testified that he disagreed that the 7% was "contingent" on Defendant or Plaintiff receiving payment from the insurer, and that "no one ever stated it like this . . . at the time of signing the agreement." (Tr. 29:25-30:1.) However, the Court finds that this provision is unambiguous as drafted and thus it will not consider extrinsic evidence pertaining to the parties' understanding at the time of contract signing. (See Kocak v Dargin, 199 AD3d 456, 457 [1st Dept 2021] ["Resort to extrinsic evidence is inappropriate if the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous."] [internal quotations and citation omitted].) The contract in paragraph 12 specifies that the Agreement itself is the agreement of the parties, and that other "promises . . . or representations, whether oral or written, not expressly set forth in this Agreement are of no force and effect."

While Plaintiff testified that "[t]he whole clause, the contents, are kind of ambiguous for my English" and that the provision is "harder for me to understand with my level [of] English" (Tr. 47:22-23), that does not result in the Court reading the contract in a way that would conflict with the plain meaning of the contract language. The contract specifies that Plaintiff acknowledges reading and understanding the contract and having had an opportunity to consult with counsel of his own choosing. Plaintiff voluntarily signed the agreement. He acknowledged during trial that the clause as written applies and that the document speaks for itself. "A party who executes a contract is presumed to know its contents and to assent to them." (Moon Choung v Allstate Ins. Co., 283 AD2d 468, 468 [2d Dept 2001].) "An inability to understand the English language, without more, is insufficient to avoid this general rule." (Holcomb v TWR Express, Inc., 11 AD3d 513, 514 [2d Dept 2004] [citation omitted].)

Further, the Court finds that this contract provision cannot be deemed an unconscionable or unenforceable provision. Mr. Wang credibly testified that Defendant did not receive the 7% reimbursement from the insurance company and that any payments to cover those losses would have to come out of Defendant's own pocket through no fault of its own. Thus, as written in the contract, both sides bear the risk of insurance company default. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find this to be an unconscionable contract provision. (See Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d 1, 10 [1988] [establishing unconscionability requires, in part, "contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party"].)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established entitlement to his wages claim for $10,668.96.

Plaintiff's Third Claim for Services Regarding Unpaid Trips

Plaintiff's claims for unpaid services involve 157 "No pay trips" that he identifies in his Exhibit 3-A.⁶ Those 157 trips span from 2019 through 2021.⁷

Mr. Wang testified that those were trips that were cancelled by MedTrans and that Plaintiff was therefore not entitled to payment for them. Mr. Wang testified that Plaintiff completed these trips despite the fact that they were cancelled by the insurance company. Defendant argued that it did not owe Plaintiff any monies for these trips because the trips were cancelled. Plaintiff did not rebut Defendant's testimony that the trips were cancelled by the insurance company.

During trial, neither side identified or discussed the contract provisions regarding cancelled trips. The contract discusses cancelled trips in Paragraph 3g2 as follows:

Company shall notify Driver of any cancelled trips within a reasonable amount of time. Driver agrees that Driver shall bear all costs without any compensation from Company if Driver chooses to complete cancelled trips after being notified by Company. If Driver completes a cancelled trip absent notification from Company or due to any miscommunication resulting in Driver completing the trip through no fault of their own, then Company shall pay $5 to Driver to cover Driver's losses.

Defendant's position is that the second sentence is what occurred here and thus that because the trips were cancelled, "Driver shall bear all costs without any compensation from Company if Driver chooses to complete cancelled trips after being notified by Company." However, Defendant did not introduce any evidence of whether or when Plaintiff was "notified by [the] Company" and if so, whether that was "within a reasonable amount of time." Given that Defendant did not introduce any evidence in this regard, the Court finds that the last sentence of the provision is triggered, as the Driver completed the cancelled trips through no fault of his own and/or due to failure of Defendant to properly and timely notify him of the cancellation. Accordingly, the contract provides that Plaintiff is entitled to receive $5 per cancelled trip during the contract period to cover Plaintiff's losses.

The damages inquiry nonetheless continues here because, as for Plaintiff's 63% claim discussed above, there are trips that postdate the contract end date of September 14, 2021. But unlike the 63% claim, Plaintiff did not establish that there was an implied contract between the parties after September 14, 2021, providing for $5 per cancelled trip. In fact, there was no evidence whatsoever produced by either side pertaining to the $5 per cancelled trip contract provision. Accordingly, the Court is without sufficient information to determine whether the parties continued this arrangement after September 14, 2021. "[T]he fact that the parties continue to deal under some sort of informal arrangement does not, without more, mean that all the terms of the expired formal contract continue to apply." (Town of Webster v Village of Webster, 280 AD2d 931, 934 [4th Dept 2001] [citation omitted]; Twitchell v Pittsford, 66 NY2d 824, 825 [1985] [Court of Appeals affirming Appellate Division decision Twitchell v Pittsford, 106 AD2d 903, 904 [4th Dept 1984] containing same quoted language].) Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish any claim for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment in this regard because Defendant credibly established that these were cancelled trips and thus that it did not receive payment for these trips.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for cancelled trips that postdate the agreement on September 14, 2021. A review of Exhibit 3-A indicates that there are 12 trips identified that are dated after September 14, 2021, all of which occurred in October 2021. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to receive $5 each for the remaining 145 trips that occurred during the contract period, or $725 for this claim.

Plaintiff's Entitlement to Double Damages Pursuant to the Freelance Isn't Free Act

In Plaintiff's submission to the Court and at trial, Plaintiff asserted entitlement to double damages due to Defendant's alleged violation of the New York City Freelance Isn't Free Act, NYC Admin Code § 20-933. Plaintiff did not specifically assert this claim in his endorsed complaint. Defendant did not assert that this claim was improperly raised and/or that Defendant was given insufficient notice that Plaintiff would assert this claim. Plaintiff indicates that Defendant was aware that he would be making this argument.

This Court's practice has been to allow litigants latitude when they file endorsed complaints. "Endorsed pleadings are a purposefully-crafted mechanism of the Civil Court Act to promote access to justice for everyday New Yorkers (a feature, not a bug, of Civil Court practice), and as long as a plaintiff can articulate an arguable cause of action, through a combination of pleadings language, motions or other practice, a cause of action that might otherwise require specificity in pleading may proceed by endorsed complaint." (Penades v Port Auth. of NY, 2024 NY Misc LEXIS 24751, at *2-4 [Civ Ct, New York County Aug. 16, 2024, No. CV-009590-24/NY] [citations omitted]; see also Holloway v New York City Transit Auth., 182 Misc 2d 749, 753 [Civ Ct, NY County 1999] ("the only substantive pleading requirement of an endorsed complaint is that it shall set forth the nature and substance of the cause of action," and "that courts have sustained endorsed complaints which merely allege 'defamation' "). At any time, Defendant could have moved for Plaintiff to serve and file a "formal pleading" pursuant to CPLR 902(e) in order to better understand Plaintiff's claims, but it never did so. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff may assert damages at trial under the Freelance Isn't Free Act.

NYC Administrative Code § 20-927 defines "freelance worker" as a person "hired or retained as an independent contractor by a hiring party to provide services in exchange for compensation." (NYC Code § 20-927.) The Court finds that Plaintiff, in his role as a TLC-licensed driver, satisfied that definition here, as the parties' Agreements repeatedly identify Plaintiff as an independent contractor and identify the respective roles the parties have consistent with this definition. Defendant also meets the definition of a "hiring party," because it "retain[ed] a freelance worker to provide any service" and is not a governmental entity. (NYC Code § 20-927.)

NYC Administrative Code § 20-929 provides that "contracted compensation shall be paid to the freelance worker [ ] on or before the date such compensation is due under the terms of the contract." (NYC Code § 20-929(a).) That provision also says that "[o]nce a freelance worker has commenced performance of the services under the contract, the hiring party shall not require as a condition of timely payment that the freelance worker accept less compensation than the amount of the contracted compensation." (NYC Code § 20-929(b).)

For violations of section 20-929, Code § 20-933(b)(3) provides that "a plaintiff who prevails on a claim alleging a violation of section 20-929 is entitled to an award for double damages . . . ." (NYC Code § 20-933(b)(3).) New York courts have found that double damages may be found payable to freelance workers pursuant to this section. (See, eg, Whitfield v Law Enforcement Emples. Benevolent Assn. Leeba, 2025 NY Misc LEXIS 19294, 2025 LX 625885, at *6-7 [Sup Ct, NY County Aug. 4, 2025, No. 656521/2022] [Lebovits, J.] [finding that a plaintiff prevailing on a claim under § 20-929 is entitled to double damages under § 20-933])

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established an entitlement under these Code provisions to double damages for any "contracted compensation." However, because Defendant did not sign an express contract for trips that occurred after September 14, 2021, the Court finds that double damages only apply to the portion of Plaintiff's claims that pre-date the September 14, 2021 expiration of the parties' agreement, which specifically spelled out "the date [ ] compensation is due."

That means as follows: For the first part of Plaintiff's claim pertaining to the 63% payment for eight pay periods, Plaintiff is entitled to double damages for the four pay periods that occurred in 2020. According to Plaintiff's exhibits, those trips add up to $3,918.49, so the doubled damages would total $7,836.98. As for the four pay periods under this claim that occurred in October and November 2021 totaling $6,272.87, Plaintiff is not entitled to double damages for those trips since they postdate the parties' express September 14, 2018 contract.

Double damages are also applicable to Plaintiff's claim for services for unpaid trips. As discussed above, there are 145 total trips subject to this claim during the express contract period. As the contract entitles Plaintiff to $5 per cancelled trip, that totals $725 in damages. Code § 20-929 says that where, as here, "[i]f the contract does not specify when the hiring party must pay the contracted compensation or the mechanism by which such date will be determined, [compensation must be paid] no later than 30 days after the completion of the freelance worker's services under the contract." As Defendant did not make timely payment pursuant to the parties' express contract, Code § 20-933(b)(3) applies, so Plaintiff is entitled to receive double damages for this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to $1,450 in total damages under this claim.

Total Damages Under All of Plaintiff's Claims

Reflecting all of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff is entitled to total damages of $15,559.85.⁸

Sanctions

Plaintiff has alleged that defense counsel should be sanctioned for alleged "rude behavior" and "the conduct of frivolous defense." The Court declines to award sanctions and finds that Defendant and its counsel did not engage in sanctionable conduct.

Defendant's Counterclaims

The Court finds that Defendant's counterclaims fail. There is no term in the contract that would entitle Defendant to seek a clawback of payments previously made to Plaintiff on account of the default of the third-party insurance company. Nor would there be any offset against payments found owed to Plaintiff here. As discussed above, Defendant did not provide evidence to the Court that the "Business Exigencies" provision of the contract was triggered. Defendant did not produce any evidence that would support its tortious interference with business counterclaim. Finally, Defendant did not produce any evidence supporting the $60,000 figure that it is seeking in its counterclaims.

Date Upon Which Interest Runs Pursuant to CPLR § 5001

The final issue for the Court to resolve (which went unaddressed by the parties at trial) is on what date interest begins accruing pursuant to CPLR § 5001. Plaintiff's summons asserted that interest should accrue beginning July 29, 2019. However, Plaintiff did not provide any evidence at trial as to why July 29, 2019, would be a proper date for interest to accrue.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that interest cannot run from July 29, 2019, because all of Plaintiff's alleged damages occurred on or after that date.

CPLR § 5001(b) provides that where, as here, "damages were incurred at various times, interest shall be computed upon each item from the date it was incurred or upon all of the damages from a single reasonable intermediate date." (CPLR § 5001(b) [emphasis added].) Given that the damages occurred on dozens of different dates, the Court finds that it must select a reasonable intermediate date for the purpose of determining interest accruals. (See Bridge Pub. Relations & Consulting, Inc. v Hylan Elec. Contr., Inc., 65 AD3d 603, 605 [2d Dept 2009] [finding a single reasonable intermediate date was appropriate where damages incurred at various times].)

Here, the vast majority of the damages at issue occurred with respect to trips centered around December 2020 and November 2021. Accordingly, the Court finds that May 15, 2021, would be a reasonable intermediate date for the purposes of computing interest pursuant to CPLR 5001. (See Wolf v American Tech. Ceramics Corp., 84 AD3d 1224, 1226 [2d Dept 2011] [where "the plaintiff's damages accrued on various dates" over a two-year duration, "a reasonable intermediate date would be the date halfway between the date of the first and last paycheck the plaintiff would have received had the agreement not been breached"]; Matter of Argyle Realty Assoc. v NY State Div. of Human Rights, 65 AD3d 273, 286 [2d Dept 2009] [April 15, 1996 date selected as a reasonable intermediate date based on damages that occurred between November 1995 and September 1996].)

Conclusion

Pursuant to the discussion above, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to receive total damages of $15,559.85 with interest from May 15, 2021. This total reflects all damages pursuant to Plaintiff's wages and services claims as found by the Court pursuant to the parties' agreements, with partial double damages awarded pursuant to NYC Admin Code 20-933(b)(3).

A summary of Plaintiff's damages awarded here is as follows:

Accordingly, it is hereby

Ordered that regarding Plaintiff's claims, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the amount of $15,559.85, with interest beginning May 15, 2021; and it is further

Ordered that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing, with prejudice, Defendant's counterclaims; and it is further

Ordered that Plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order, together with notice of entry upon the Defendant and the Clerk of the Court within 20 days of this order.

This constitutes the Post-Trial Decision of the Court.

Date: September 17, 2026

Brooklyn, NY

Hon. Javier Ortiz, JCC

FOOTNOTES

1.   The language in the contract says that the "Company shall pay Driver ninety percent (90%) of the seventy percent (70%)." For simplicity of language and ease of understanding purposes, the Court will refer to this figure as 63% rather than 90% of 70%.

2.   The contract refers to this as "[t]he remaining ten percent (10%)" of the "seventy percent (70%)." For simplicity of language and ease of understanding purposes, the Court will refer to this figure as 7% rather than 10% of 70%.

3.   The $10,191.36 is a sum of the column "pPerson," which reflects the "Amount" minus the 30% for the Company ("pCompany") minus the 7% that is dependent on the insurance company "pPerson." To illustrate this, the first trip on Exhibit 2-C-C for the 1101-1107 (2021) pay period is TripID 1121346150A. There, the "Amount" is 22.39, the "pCompany" is 6.72, the "pReserve" is 1.56, and the "pPerson" is 14.11. Therefore, the pPerson amount is 63% of the total Amount. The subtotal adds up the pPerson in each row, and comes with a total figure of $1,722.83 for the 1101-1107(2021) period, which matches the figure shown on Plaintiff's summary exhibit 2-A.The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not provide a trip-by-trip breakdown for the pay periods November 8-14, 2021, and November 15-21, 2021, in his Exhibit 2-C-C despite calculating damages from those trips. Nonetheless, the figures are provided in the summary exhibit 2-A, which records Plaintiff testified originated from Defendant, and Defendant did not dispute their accuracy. Accordingly, the Court has no reason to question that the summary page reflects the totals of the individual trips during those pay periods.

4.   The Court notes that it also has reason to believe that September 14, 2021 was the end date that was intended, as the 4/5/2019 date was likely inadvertently kept in from the 2016 contract, and the September 14, 2020 date likely had a typographical error in the year.

5.   Given that the Court finds that this contract provision is inapplicable here, it does not reach the question of whether such provision would be enforceable as written.

6.   Plaintiff asserted $4,523.20 for this claim in his endorsed complaint, but the evidence presented at trial in Exhibit 3-A totaled $3,963.24.

7.   The Court found in its review of the records submitted by Plaintiff in Exhibit 3-A that trips dated April 11-12, 2021, may include some duplicate records because the names and trip ids are nearly identical and the amounts are the same (eg "Elizabeth Viloria", trip id ZOOFFJWS0AA for $25 versus "VILORIA ELIZBETH", trip id ZOQQFFJWSOAA for $25). However, during trial Defendant did not challenge any records as duplicative. Accordingly, the Court will assume that each of the records submitted by Plaintiff in Exhibit 3-A are distinct trips.

8.   To summarize, this total consists of (a) $7,836.98 of double damages ($3,918.49 times two) for the failure to pay the 63% portion for four pay periods from November 30-December 27, 2020; (b) $6,272.87 for the failure to pay the 63% portion for four pay periods from October 25-November 21, 2021; and (c) $1,450 of double damages ($725 times two) for the failure to pay $5 per cancelled trip for 145 trips during the express contract period.

9.   As stated above, Plaintiff's total asserted claims alleged in his endorsed complaint were technically for $25,383.72.

Javier Ortiz, J.