LLC v. LLC DBA BOSS HAWG TRUCKING LOGISTICS RILES (2026)

I. Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of the Motion(s), as indicated below:

The following papers read herein: Numbered

Defendant's Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Exhibits 1

Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, Memorandum of Law and Exhibits 2

Defendant's Notice of Motion, affirmation and Exhibits 3

Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, Memorandum of Law and Exhibits 4

II. Background

On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendants by filing a summons and complaint seeking to recover monetary damages in the amount of $8,501.00 with interest, costs and disbursements for alleged breach of contract, personal guarantee and unjust enrichment concerning a Merchant Cash Advance Agreement (hereinafter, "Agreement") whereby Plaintiff agreed to buy all right of Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC's future receivables. On February 25, 2025, Defendant S. T. Riles (hereinafter, "Riles"), pro se, interposed an answer on behalf of Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC and himself.

On April 23, 2025, Defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) by motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim and improper venue ("Motion #1"). On August 14, 2025, Defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) seeking to file an amended motion to dismiss, in which Defendants sought to correct and supplement all prior papers ("Motion #2"). By decision and order dated November 18, 2025, Hon. B. LM denied Motion #1 as section 19 of the Agreement expressly provided that Defendants had contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in New York courts, and granted Motion #2 "solely to the extent that the amended notice of motion [was] accepted for filing and consideration with opposition" (see decision and order of Hon. B. LM, dated November 18, 2025, hereinafter "November 2025 Decision"). Motion #2 was otherwise denied (id.). The November 2025 Decision also ordered that Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC must appear by counsel and file a notice of appearance within sixty (60) days of the date of the order (id.).

On December 10, 2025, Defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3215 by motion seeking "Default Judgment and related relief", whereby Defendants sought an order (1) "[g]ranting default judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to timely oppose the motion as ordered by the Court;" (2) "[s]triking any untimely opposition or evidence filed by Plaintiff after the required deadline;" (3) "[o]rdering the immediate removal of any UCC liens, judgments, or encumbrances within 48 hours, with documentary proof of filing and removal delivered to Defendants;" (4) "[a]warding costs, sanctions, and such further relief as justice, law and equity may require, including but not limited to the amount itemized;" and (5) "preserving all special appearance, jurisdictional, and appellate rights for Defendants" ("Motion #3").

On the same day, Defendants filed a second motion, which requested "for status update and expedited ruling on fully-submitted default motion" ("Motion #4"). Although unclear, it appears that Defendants, in essence, requested for the same relief as in Motion #3, and in addition, claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction defense.

In opposition to Motion #3, Plaintiff argued that (1) Defendants' prior motion to dismiss had already been previously denied; (2) that Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC failed to retain counsel as directed in the November 2025 Decision; (3) that the Court had personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to section 19 of the Agreement; (4) that Plaintiff's Opposition was timely served; (5) that Plaintiff did not misrepresent the Agreement but provided a true e-signed copy of said Agreement; (6) that Defendants' own exhibits evidenced that Defendant ordered a stop payment on April 9, 2024, which was an event of default pursuant to section 14 of the Agreement; (7) that Defendants' allegation that Plaintiff has failed to validate the debt is not true; (8) that Defendant's purported payment of the alleged debt was unsupported by any documentary evidence; and (9) that Defendants' request for sanctions and monetary damages had no basis. Similar arguments were reiterated in Plaintiff's opposition to Motion #4.

Motions #3 and #4 were submitted without Defendants' alleged reply papers on February 10, 2026, and subsequently assigned to this Court for determination on April 23, 2026.

III. Discussion

i. Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC must be represented by counsel.

CPLR 321(a) states, in pertinent part:

"A party, other than one specified in section 1201 of this chapter, may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by attorney, except that a corporation or voluntary association shall appear by attorney, except as otherwise provided in sections 1809 and 1809-A of the New York city civil court act, section 1809 and 1809-A of the uniform district court act and sections 1809, and except as otherwise provided in section 501 and section 1809 of the uniform justice act."

[Emphasis added]

"[L]ike a corporation or a voluntary association, [a] LLC may only be represented by an attorney and not by one of its members who is not an attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York" (see Michael Reilly Design, Inc. v Houraney, 40 AD3d 592, 593 [2d Dept 2007] [internal citations omitted]; CPLR 321[a]). Here, Defendant Riles cannot appear on behalf of or represent Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC as it is a limited liability company. Defendants failed to comply with the November 2025 Decision, which ordered Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC to appear by counsel and file a notice of appearance within sixty (60) days of the date of the order (see November 2025 Decision).

In light of the foregoing, all branches of Motion #3 and #4 with respect to Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC are denied as said motions were filed by Defendant Riles on behalf of Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC.

The Court now turns to the remaining branches of Motions #3 and 4 with respect to Defendant Riles.

ii. Defendant Riles' request for "default judgment"

In his Motion #3, Defendant Riles argued pursuant to CPLR 3215 that Plaintiff was required to serve and file its opposition to his "Amended Motion to Dismiss by September 15, 2025" in accordance with Hon. A. T. T's Interim Order/Briefing Schedule dated August 18, 2025 (hereinafter, "Interim Order"), and that Plaintiff's alleged failure to do so warranted a default judgment in Defendants' favor (see Riles aff.).

This Court denies the branch of Motion #3 seeking default judgment for Plaintiff's alleged failure to timely serve/file its opposition as moot as the referenced Interim Order was issued in relation to Motion #2, which was previously decided by the November 2025 Decision (see November 2025 Decision).

Even if the merits of Defendant Riles' request were to be considered, the Court finds Defendant Riles' reliance on CPLR 3215 in support of his position to be unpersuasive as Plaintiff has not "abandoned" the instant action (see CPLR 3215[c] ["[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed"]; see also CPLR 3215[a] [a plaintiff may seek a default judgment against a defendant who fails to appear or answer]). CPLR 3215 does not apply here.

Accordingly, the branch of Motion #3 seeking "default judgment" in Defendant Riles' favor is denied. The branch of Motion #4 seeking the same is denied on the same ground.

iii. Defendant Riles' request for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint

Although Defendant Riles did not specify the CPLR provision under which he moved, the Court construes Motion #3 and 4 as one brought pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) as they sought dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.

Here, as Defendants had previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in their Motions #1 and #2, Defendant Riles was barred by the single-motion rule from making multiple CPLR 3211(a) motions (see CPLR 3211[e]; McLearn v Cowen & Co., 60 NY2d 686 [1983]). The purpose of the single-motion rule is to "protect the pleader from being harassed by repeated CPLR 3211(a) motions" (see Oakley v County of Nassau, 127 AD3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] [holding that the defendant's second motion to dismiss the complaint was in violation of the single-motion rule of CPLR 3211[e]]).

Accordingly, the branches of Motion #3 seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint based on alleged misrepresentation of the Agreement, Plaintiff's alleged failure to timely serve and file opposition papers, Plaintiff's alleged failure to validate the alleged debt at issue, and Defendants' alleged satisfaction of the debt are denied. The branch of Motion #4 seeking the same is denied on the same ground.

Accordingly, the branch of Motion #4 seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction is denied here again due to the single-motion rule pursuant to CPLR 3211(e). The November 2025 Decision denied such lack of jurisdiction argument because Section 19 of the Agreement expressly provided that Defendants had contractually consented to personal jurisdiction in New York courts (see November 2025 Decision).

iv. Defendant Riles' request for sanctions

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) and (b), the court has discretion to award "costs, including attorney's fees, as well as impose financial sanctions against an attorney or firm that engages in "frivolous conduct." A conduct is considered "frivolous" if "(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false" (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). "Trial judges should be accorded wide latitude to determine the appropriate sanctions for dilatory and improper attorney conduct" (see Pickens v Castro, 55 AD3d 443, 444 [1st Dept 2008]).

In his Motion #3, Defendant Riles failed to provide any evidence to support his allegation that Plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct. Therefore, the branch of Motion #3 seeking sanctions against Plaintiff is denied. The branch of Motion #4 seeking the same is denied on the same ground.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Motion #3, Defendants' "Motion for Default Judgment and related relief" is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED Motion #4, Defendants' "Motion for Default Judgment and related relief" is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear for pre-trial conference in room 428, Civil Court of the City of New York, County of New York, 111 Centre Street, New York, NY 10013 on a date to be decided by the Clerk; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC must appear by counsel by the forementioned pre-trial conference date; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Boss Hawg Trucking Logistics LLC's failure to appear by counsel by the forementioned pre-trial conference date shall constitute a default in appearance and that an inquest marking shall be granted to Plaintiff in the event of such failure; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon Defendants with notice of entry within thirty (30) days thereof.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.

DATE July 6, 2026

HON. WENDY CHANGYONG LI, J.C.C.

Wendy Changyong Li, J.