Nowlin, Plaintiff(s), v. Paws Gurus, Defendant(s). (2026)

I. Background

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff commenced the instant action for replevin against Defendant, a dog daycare, dog hotel and dog grooming business, by filing of a summons and complaint seeking to recover possession of a dog named "Duchess" or "Leticia," a female pit bull terrier mix.¹ Defendant joined the action by interposing an answer.

This Court conducted a bench trial on the matter on March 11, 2026 and March 16, 2026, where Plaintiff appeared pro se, and Defendant appeared by counsel.

Plaintiff introduced five (5) exhibits, marked Exhibits 1-5, which were admitted into evidence. Defendant introduced two (2) exhibits, marked Exhibits A-B, which were admitted into evidence. The authenticity or the completeness of the content of the exhibits were not in dispute.

II. Witness testimonies and exhibits

i. Testimony of Plaintiff

Plaintiff testified that on or about June 9, 2022, Duchess was given to him by the owner of Defendant, V. Torres (hereinafter, "Torres") as a gift. When Plaintiff told Torres that his dog, "Poochie," a pit bull and beagle mix, had passed away, Torres informed him that Duchess was in need of a new home as a stranger had found Duchess and had dropped Duchess off at Defendant's facility.

Plaintiff testified that Duchess was in his exclusive care up until November 30, 2023. Plaintiff testified that an individual named "D. Rosa" (hereinafter, "Rosa") cared for Duchess as Plaintiff worked five (5) days a week and that Plaintiff and Rosa had entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff would pay Rosa $100.00 per week in cash for dog care services. Plaintiff further testified that he also hired a dog walker to walk Duchess while Plaintiff was at work.

Plaintiff testified that he had a stroke and was at the hospital for a period of two (2) weeks in October 2023. During Plaintiff's stay at the hospital, Duchess and Plaintiff's other dog, Bo, were boarded at Paws Country Club, a dog hotel. According to Plaintiff, after his return from the hospital, he noticed that Bo was coughing and took Bo to the veterinary clinic. Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff then dropped off Duchess at Defendant's facility on November 30, 2023, as a precaution against Duchess contracting whatever Bo had. Plaintiff further testified that Torres offered to care for Duchess as Plaintiff was still recovering from the recent hospital stay and had mobility issues.

On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff was informed by Torres that Duchess had given birth to eight (8) puppies. Plaintiff testified that Torres informed Plaintiff that Torres would continue to care for Duchess while Duchess was nursing the puppies. Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff had been unaware of Duchess' pregnancy up until that time, and that Plaintiff had not noticed any changes in Duchess apart from the fact that she had gained some weight.

Plaintiff testified that despite Plaintiff's subsequent demands for the return of Duchess, Torres thereafter refused to return Duchess to Plaintiff and that Duchess was removed from Defendant's facility without Plaintiff's knowledge or consent. Plaintiff testified that Duchess was currently in the care of Rosa and Torres.

In support of such claims, Plaintiff introduced a number of exhibits, which are listed as follows: a dog license certificate for Duchess dated February 11, 2024; dog license renewal certificate for Duchess dated September 15, 2025; dog license certificate for Bo dated September 15, 2025; vaccination status reports; an invoice from VCA Park East Animal Hospital dated December 15, 2022 with respect to Bo and Duchess; Vetco Clinic visit summary dated March 26, 2023; screenshots of receipts for dog food, leash, prebiotics and flea and tick topical treatment; screenshots of what appears to be payments made to the dog walkers; screenshots of what appears to be payment made to Rosa for dog care services; receipts from Defendant dated December 9, 2022 and February 17, 2023; invoice from Paws Country Club dated January 15, 2024; and text messages between Plaintiff and Torres.

ii. Testimony of Torres, owner of Defendant

Torres testified that Torres was the owner of Defendant, a dog daycare, dog hotel and dog grooming business. Torres testified that Plaintiff used to utilize Defendant's dog daycare services for Plaintiff's prior dog, Poochie.

Torres testified that in or about May 2022, a man called Steven informed Torres that he had found a dog on 110th St. and Madison Ave, New York, NY, and that he was going to take the dog to a nearby animal shelter. When Torres accompanied Steven to the shelter, they learned that the said shelter was not taking any additional dogs due to a pneumonia outbreak. Torres subsequently attempted to locate the dog's owner by creating posts on various social media platforms and posters for a local newspaper. The said dog remained in Torres' care for a month thereafter without being claimed. Torres subsequently named the dog "Leticia" and attempted to find a home for Leticia.

According to Torres, Torres was informed by Plaintiff that Plaintiff's prior dog, Poochie, had passed away. Torres testified that she asked Plaintiff if Plaintiff wanted another dog and introduced Plaintiff to Leticia. Torress testified that Plaintiff inquired as to whether Leticia was spayed. Torres testified that when Torres informed Plaintiff that she did not think Leticia was spayed, Plaintiff became excited, saying that Leticia could have puppies. According to Torres, Torres expressly stated her opposition to breeding Leticia and gave Leticia to Plaintiff on the condition that Plaintiff would have Leticia spayed and not allow Leticia to have puppies. Torres testified that Plaintiff agreed to have Leticia spayed and took Leticia home. Leticia was subsequently renamed "Duchess" by Plaintiff.

On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff appeared unannounced with Duchess at Defendant's facility. Torres testified that she observed that Duchess' mammary glands were enlarged and that Duchess was displaying signs of pregnancy or having recently given birth. Upon Torres questioning Plaintiff regarding Duchess' symptoms, Plaintiff stated that Duchess was gaining weight and denied that Duchess had given birth to puppies. Torres testified that Plaintiff returned Duchess to Torres, stating that he was unable to care for Duchess.

Torres testified that she took Duchess to the veterinary clinic on December 2, 2023, where the veterinarian confirmed by ultrasound and later by an x-ray scan that Duchess was pregnant and gave Torres instructions regarding delivery of the puppies. On December 8, 2023, Duchess gave birth to a litter of eight (8) puppies at Rosa's apartment. Torres testified that while Torres temporarily kept Duchess and the puppies, Torres subsequently asked Rosa to care for the dogs.

On December 13, 2023, Torres informed Plaintiff that Duchess had given birth. Torres testified that Plaintiff texted Torres on occasion asking for Duchess' return. According to Torres, Torres informed Plaintiff that she was keeping Duchess and the puppies because of Plaintiff's failure to spay Duchess, which was in breach of their agreement.

In support of such claims, Defendant introduced a number of exhibits, which are listed as follows: screenshots of posts on Facebook, dated May 13, 2022, and Pawboost; a flyer for Pawboost; screenshots of Instagram messages; rabies vaccination certificate dated May 31, 2022; veterinarian receipt, dated May 31, 2022; a photograph of Duchess in May 2022; a photograph of Duchess on November 30, 2023; a veterinary x-ray report, dated December 6, 2023; and a veterinary exam receipt dated December 2, 2023.

iii. Testimony of A. Koledin, customer of Defendant

A. Koledin (hereinafter, "Koledin") testified that she was a customer of Defendant, who had been utilizing Defendant's grooming services for her two (2) dogs for the past three (3) to four (4) years. Koledin testified that Koledin was present at Defendant's facility on November 30, 2023 when her dog, Dexter, was getting groomed. According to Koledin, she was sitting in a chair by the door of the facility waiting to pay for the grooming services received by Dexter, when she personally witnessed Plaintiff and Torres talking to each other. Koledin testified that Torres was standing in the doorway of the facility, holding the door open while Plaintiff was facing Torres.

Koledin testified that Plaintiff stated to Torres that he could no longer care for Duchess. Koledin further testified that Torres agreed to take Duchess back and expressed concerns about Duchess possibly being pregnant and Duchess' aggressive behavior.

iv. Testimony of Rosa

Rosa testified that Rosa and Plaintiff had an agreement where Plaintiff would pay $100.00 per week for Rosa to watch Duchess, but that Rosa was only paid in part for her services. Rosa testified that Plaintiff left Duchess with Rosa, whereupon Rosa solely kept and cared for Duchess from Summer through Fall of 2022.

While Duchess was in Rosa's care, Plaintiff purchased a dog named Bo, a beagle, before subsequently returning to Rosa to pick up Duchess. Rosa testified that she had suspicions that Plaintiff intended to mate Bo and Duchess so that Plaintiff could make a replica of Poochie, Plaintiff's deceased dog, which was a pit bull and beagle mix.

Rosa testified that Plaintiff did not want to care for Duchess when Duchess was in heat and would leave Duchess at Rosa's apartment. According to Rosa, Plaintiff had complained to Rosa that Duchess would ingest fecal matter, to which Rosa responded that Duchess would only do so because Duchess was hungry. Rosa further testified that she used to work for two (2) animal facilities in the past and had noticed that Duchess was underweight. When Rosa informed Plaintiff of her concerns regarding Duchess' weight, Plaintiff stated to Rosa that Duchess was his dog and that Plaintiff would feed Duchess when Plaintiff wanted to.

Rosa further testified that Plaintiff was unfit to be Duchess' owner, stating that Plaintiff resided in a one-bedroom apartment, which was littered with dirty dog pads.

According to Rosa, Torres called Rosa on the same day that Duchess was brought to the Defendant's facility by Plaintiff. Rosa testified that Rosa took over the care of Duchess and her eight (8) puppies. Rosa testified that Rosa was with Duchess when Duchess gave birth and subsequently spent two (2) months thereafter caring for Duchess and her litter of puppies. Rosa testified that all of Duchess' puppies were neutered or spayed and that they were given away to Rosa's family members. Rosa testified that Duchess remains in Rosa's care.

III. Discussion

The nature of the dispute at hand concerns the superior possessory right to Duchess, a companion animal. Under New York Law, companion animals are treated as personal property (see Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 13 AD3d 150, 150 [1st Dept 2004] ["[P]ets are treated under New York law as personal property"]). To establish a cause of action for replevin, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff has a superior possessory right to property in a defendant's possession (see Reif v Nagy, 175 AD3d 107, 120 [1st Dept 2019] [internal citation omitted]).

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Defendant, a dog daycare, dog hotel and dog grooming business, is not the proper defendant because Torres, the owner of Defendant, was acting in her personal capacity when she interacted with Plaintiff with respect to matters concerning ownership of Duchess. Based upon parties' testimonies and evidence admitted during the trial, there is no indication that Defendant was engaging in a business transaction with Plaintiff at the time Duchess was given to Plaintiff on June 9, 2022 or when Duchess was entrusted in Torres' care on November 30, 2023. The mere fact that Plaintiff's interactions with Torres on the aforementioned dates occurred at Defendant's facility and that Plaintiff had utilized Defendant's services on December 9, 2022 and February 17, 2023 as evidenced by the receipts proffered by Plaintiff, is insufficient to substantiate a claim for replevin against Defendant. In addition, Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence indicating that Duchess had been boarded at Defendant's facility on November 30, 2023 or remained at Defendant's facility thereafter.

As for Plaintiff's submission of a dog license certificate for Duchess, dated February 11, 2024 and a dog license renewal certificate for Duchess, dated September 15, 2025, the Court finds that the said certificates are irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether Plaintiff had superior possessory right to Duchess as the said certificates postdate the events at issue and therefore do not establish Plaintiff's possession of Duchess for the relevant period of June 9, 2022 through November 30, 2023. Thus, the said certificates have no bearing on the facts relevant to this Court's determination.

Furthermore, the testimonies of Plaintiff, Torres and Rosa establish that Defendant, the dog care facility, did not have possession of Duchess when the lawsuit was filed. Plaintiff himself testified that Duchess was in the care of Torres and Rosa, while both Torres and Rosa testified that Duchess was in the care of Rosa. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for replevin against Defendant (see Reif at 120; see also Matter of Mclaughlin, 88 AD3d 1197, 1198 [3d Dept 2011] [internal citations omitted] ["[A] replevin action is not maintainable unless the defendant had possession of the property at the commencement of the action"]). Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had, in fact, named Torres and Rosa as the defendants in the instant action, which Plaintiff did not, or that Torres and Rosa are the proper defendants, which is a proposition that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrated, the Court nevertheless dismisses Plaintiff's complaint. Here, Torres alleged that Torres and Plaintiff had entered into a verbal agreement whereby Duchess was given by Torres to Plaintiff on the condition that Plaintiff would have Duchess spayed and not allow Duchess to have puppies. Torres averred that Plaintiff was in breach of said agreement due to Plaintiff's failure to spay Duchess, and that as such, the ownership of Duchess should be reverted to Torres. Conversely, Plaintiff contested the existence of such agreement.

The question now is whether the aforementioned verbal agreement existed as alleged by Torres. To prevail on a breach of contract claim, the moving party must establish the existence of a contract, the performance pursuant to the contract, the breach of contractual obligations, and damages resulting from such breach (see Harris v Seward Park Housing Corp., 79 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2010] [internal citation omitted]). It is well established that an enforceable contract requires "an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound" (see Kolchins v Evolution Markets, Inc., 128 AD3d 47, 59 [1st Dept 2015] citing 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 9). In addition, there must be a meeting of the minds between all contracting parties, such that there is a "manifestation of mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms" (see Thome v Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, 70 AD3d 88, 103 [1st Dept 2009] [internal citation omitted]).

While the fact that Duchess gave birth to a litter of puppies is evidence that Plaintiff failed to spay Duchess, the Court finds that Torres' testimony alone is insufficient to establish the existence of a verbal agreement between Torres and Plaintiff conditioning Plaintiff's ownership of Duchess upon Duchess being spayed (see Kramer v Greene, 142 AD3d 438, 439 [1st Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ["An oral agreement may be enforceable as long as the terms are clear and definite and the conduct of the parties evinces mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms"]).

However, the existence of such alleged verbal agreement is not necessarily dispositive of Torres' or Plaintiff's respective superior possessory right to Duchess as this Court's primary inquiry is not merely who holds superior possessory right to Duchess but which disposition is "best for all concerned." The measure of "best for all concerned" as stated in the case of Raymond v Lachmann has become the standard when deciding pet ownership cases in the State of New York (see Raymond v Lachmann, 264 AD2d, 340, 341 [1st Dept 1999]; Feger v Warwick Animal Shelter, 59 AD3d 68, 72 [2d Dept 2008]; L.B. v C.C.B., 77 Misc 3d 429 [Sup Ct. Kings County 2022]; LeConte v Kyungmi Lee, 35 Misc 3d 286 [Civ Ct. NY County 2011]). Such standard has been interpreted as "[striking] the best balance between a strict property analysis and the more extensive interests analysis involved in child custody cases" (see Mundo v Weatherson, 2022 NY Slip Op 50125[U], 74 Misc 3d 1215[A] [Civ Ct. NY County 2022] [internal citations omitted]). The Court is therefore required to consider intangible factors such as why each party would benefit from having Duchess in their life and why Duchess has a "better chance of prospering, loving and being loved in the care of one party or the other" (see Mitchell v Snider, 2016 NY Slip Op 50877[U], 51 Misc 3d 1229[A] [Civ Ct. NY County 2016] [internal citation omitted]).

In applying the best for all concerned standard, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish that Plaintiff endeavored to meet Duchess' emotional needs. While Plaintiff has demonstrated that Plaintiff made efforts to hire a dog walker and a dog sitter to care for Duchess while he was at work five (5) times a week, it is evident that Plaintiff's work schedule limited his ability to spend significant time caring for Duchess himself. The January 15, 2024 invoices sent by Paws Country Club to Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff's two (2) dogs were boarded at Paws Country Club for a substantial period from July 2023 through November 2023, spanning approximately four (4) months. There was no testimony as to why the dogs remained boarded for such an extended period of time at Paws Country Club as Plaintiff merely alleged that they were boarded at the said dog hotel for a few weeks in October 2023 during Plaintiff's stay at the hospital. Moreover, the Court finds that Rosa's testimony was credible as to the fact that Plaintiff left Duchess in Rosa's exclusive care from Summer through Fall of 2022. In sum, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to show that he had committed substantial time and energy caring for Duchess himself.

With respect to Duchess' medical needs, both Plaintiff and Torres provided proof of vaccination and receipts from veterinary clinics. However, as evidenced by Plaintiff's failure to recognize that Duchess was pregnant and for merely attributing the changes in Duchess' body to weight gain, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff adequately attended to such matters. Based on the testimonies during the trial, the signs of pregnancy in Duchess were immediately noticed by Torres, resulting in Torres subsequently taking Duchess to the veterinary clinic. The photograph ofDuchess included in the May 13, 2022 Facebook post (see Defendant's Exhibit A) compared with the photograph of Duchess taken by Torres on November 30, 2023 (see Defendant's Exhibit B) corroborated Torres' testimony regarding the notable changes to Duchess' physical appearance as a result of the pregnancy that should have raised immediate concerns to Plaintiff.

In light of the foregoing, even assuming that the Court were to entertain the possibility that the named defendant in this suit is either Torres or Rosa, which it is not, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie case that Duchess has a "better chance of prospering, loving and being loved" in Plaintiff's care (see Mitchell v Snider, 2016 NY Slip Op 50877[U], 51 Misc 3d 1229[A] [Civ Ct. NY County 2016] [internal citation omitted]). Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon Plaintiff with notice of entry within thirty (30) days thereof.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.

Dated: September 9, 2026

County of New York

Hon. Wendy Changyong Li

udge of the Civil Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The dog at issue was initially named "Leticia" by Vera Torres, the owner of Defendant. "Leticia" was subsequently renamed "Duchess" by Plaintiff.

Wendy Changyong Li, J.