Starr Densford, Plaintiff, v. LORELEY SHORTTE (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of this motion:

Papers Numbered

Order to Show Cause / Notice of Motion 1

Affidavits/Affirmations annexed 2, 3, 4

Answering Affidavits/Affirmations 6

Reply Affidavits/Affirmations 8

Memoranda of Law 5, 7

Other

Upon the foregoing cited papers, defendants' motion for partial dismissal is denied for the following reasons:

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants on October 3, 2025, seeking alleged rental arrears and other damages resulting from defendants' early vacatur.

Plaintiff is the landlord of the residential premises located at 504 W. 136th Street, Unit 4C, New York, NY 10031 ("the Premises"). Pursuant to a lease renewal agreement dated July 1, 2025, plaintiff rented the Premises to defendants with a lease term running through June 30, 2026 with an option to terminate early on March 31, 2026.

Defendants timely paid rent through September 30, 2025. On October 3, 2025, plaintiff accepted defendants' surrender of possession of the Premises without waiving any rights under the lease and expressly reserving all claims for rent, damages, and other charges.

Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking to recover the remainder of the rent due under the lease, as well as costs associated with attempts to re-rent the Premises.

Defendants now move, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (a) (7), to dismiss a portion of the first cause of action, and the second and third causes of action in their entirety.

The crux of defendants' argument arises out of plaintiff's failure to append to the lease renewal notice of good cause eviction law.

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleadings are afforded a liberal construction, and a plaintiff is given the benefit of every possible favorable inference. See Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314, 326 (2002). "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss." EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. 5 NY3d 11, 19 (2005).

Article 6-A of the Real Property Law (hereinafter referred to as "Good Cause Eviction Law" or "GCEL") became effective on August 18, 2024. It requires, inter alia, that landlords, as defined by the statute, "append to or incorporate into any initial lease [and] renewal lease" notice of the GCEL as detailed in Real Property Law ("RPL") § 231-c (citations omitted).

Here, the parties do not dispute that GCEL was in effect at the time the renewal lease was executed, nor do they dispute that plaintiff failed to provide defendants with such notice in the renewal lease.

The basis of defendants' motion to dismiss is premised on the notion that plaintiff's failure to provide notice of GCEL with the renewal lease renders the entire lease invalid and unenforceable. Thus, defendants argue, without a valid lease, they were renting pursuant to a month-to-month tenancy and are not liable for the remaining rental obligations under the lease.

In opposition, plaintiff asserts that she is a small landlord, as defined by GCEL, and she is exempt from the notification requirements pursuant to RPL § 231-c. Plaintiff further argues that nothing in the plain language of RPL § 231-c indicates that the Legislature intended to render a lease void, invalid, or unenforceable as a result of this omission.

Defendants concede that they have no authority for their proposition, although they assert it is merely a result of the law's newness, and they highlight there is no authority against their proposition. In support of their argument, defendants draw parallels to eviction proceedings where courts have found that failure to include the GCEL notice renders predicate notices in a summary proceeding invalid.

Indeed, in RPL § 217, the Legislature did specifically provide that "[n]o action shall be maintainable and no judgment of possession shall be entered for housing accommodations" unless the landlord has complied with all provisions of GCEL. RPL § 217.

The "familiar rule in the construction of statutes" is that "where a new right is created, or a new duty imposed, by statute, if a remedy be given by the same statute for its violation or nonperformance, the remedy given is exclusive." Kingswood Mgt. Corp. v Salzman, 272 AD 328, 330 (1st Dept 1947) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the Legislature made clear that a proceeding for a judgment of possession would not stand where the landlord has not complied with the provisions of GCEL. However, the legislature made no such similar provision for plenary actions for monetary judgments. Had the legislature intended for an omission of the requirement under RPL § 231-c to render a lease void, it could have expressly provided for such a consequence.

Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the intent of the Legislature focused solely on protecting tenants against bad faith evictions. Indeed, Senate Bill S305 indicates that the "purpose of this legislation is to prohibit the eviction of residential tenants or the non-renewal of residential leases without good cause." Senate Introducer's Mem in Support of 2023 NY Senate Bill S305.

In this case, it is undisputed that the defendants were not evicted but left voluntarily on their own accord. Thus, this case does not fall under the umbrella of the stated purpose of GCEL, which is to protect tenants against improper evictions. Absent a clear statutory mandate to void all leases in their entirety for failure to abide by RPL § 231-c, this Court will not invalidate a lease arising out of facts that do not even purport to involve an eviction. Drelich v Kenlyn Homes, Inc., 86 AD2d 648, 649 (2d Dept 1982) ("In construing a given statutory enactment, a court should not by construction extend such statute beyond its express terms or the reasonable implications of its language") (citations omitted). Furthermore, plaintiff is a small landlord as defined under GCEL in RPL § 211, exempting her from the requirements of GCEL.¹

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

DATE August 25. 2026

HON. ALLISON R. GREENFIELD

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court acknowledges that an exempted landlord is still required to provide notice that they are exempted under RPL § 231-c, which was not done here. However, the Court considers the plaintiff's undisputed small landlord status when analyzing the facts and whether they fall within the intended ambit of GCEL.

Allison R. Greenfield, J.