1090 LLC v. ET AL (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number 21-22 (motion no. 1) were read on this motion for leave to reargue.

Petitioner has moved for leave to reargue their prior application for a default judgment against "John Doe" and "Jane Doe."¹ The court had granted default judgment against Jamal Joseph, who remained in the apartment after the surrender of the tenant-of-record, but denied it as against the respondents named pseudonymously. In moving for leave to reargue, Petitioner again neglects to provide a description of "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," fails to detail any efforts made to ascertain their true identities, and does not even assert that such individuals actually exist or reside in the apartment. Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that, because these hypothetical individuals failed to appear, the court erred in failing to grant Petitioner judgment against them.

As observed by the Appellate Division, "the use of CPLR 1024 presents many pitfalls" (Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 29 [2d Dept 2009]). One is that a party cannot resort to suing a defendant as "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" unless they exercise due diligence to identify the individual by name and nonetheless are unable to do so (id. at 29-30). Failure to exercise due diligence "subjects the complaint to dismissal as to that party (id. at 30). A second "pitfall" is that when suing a defendant using a pseudonym such as "John Doe" or "Jane Doe," they must be described "in such form as will fairly apprise the party that they are the intended defendant" (id.). An insufficient description also subjects the complaint to dismissal (id.).

Petitioner does not dispute that it failed to comply with those requirements. Instead, it argues that "having defaulted, Respondents, John Doe and Jane Doe, are deemed to have admitted all traversable allegations in the petition" (NYSCEF Doc. 22). As a general statement of law, of course Petitioner is correct. "A defaulting defendant admits all traversable allegations in the complaint, including the basic allegation of liability" (Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v Islam, 220 AD3d 739, 741 [2d Dept 2023]).

But that does not relieve Petitioner of proving entitlement to default judgment in the first instance. "Some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action. The standard of proof is not stringent, amounting only to some first-hand confirmation of the facts (Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531, 535 [1st Dept 1987]). Here, Petitioner has not put forth any evidence, much less even asserted, that "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" are actual individuals residing in the apartment whose names they have not been able to determine. Petitioner is not entitled to judgment against "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" as placeholders for individuals who it cannot confirm actually exist (see Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v Manyevitch, 2026 NY Slip Op 26067 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2026]).

The court notes that a judgment against a "John Doe" is all but unheard of in civil practice outside of Housing Court. Instead, practice involving CPLR § 1024 requires that, after a plaintiff ascertains the identify of a defendant previously named pseudonymously, it amend the pleadings to substitute the actual individual for "John Doe" and serve the defendant with process (Bumpus, 66 AD3d at 29). Alternatively, instead of resorting to use of CPLR § 1024, with its "pitfalls," plaintiff could obtain the identities of other individuals who may be defendants from the named defendant, and the seek leave to join them (Bumpus, 66 AD3d at 34; see also PWV Acquisition Owner LLC v Montes de Oca, 87 Misc 3d 133[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51895[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion is granted in that Petitioner is given leave to reargue its prior application for a default judgment against "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," and after reargument the court adheres to its prior decision.

This is the court's decision and order.

Dated: August 12, 2026

Michael L. Weisberg, JHC

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Petitioner asserts "the court should not have dismissed the licensee holdover petition against John Doe and Jane Doe," a cursory review of the court's order reveals that the court merely denied the application for a default judgment against those parties and did not dismiss the petition.

Michael L. Weisberg, J.