Mohammed Helal, Petitioner, v. ET AL (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number 19-25 (motion no. 1) were read on this motion for a stay of execution of the warrant of eviction.

Respondent has moved the court for an extension of time to vacate her unregulated apartment of six years. Ten months ago, in an agreement entered into with the benefit of counsel, she agreed to vacate by June 30, 2026. She and her husband have two children. They have a CityFHEPS voucher. They have applied for countless apartments. But regrettably, though not surprisingly in city with a vacancy rate of less than 2%, the family has not located another apartment to which to move.

The court submits that those statutes, such as RPAPL § 753 and CPLR § 2201, that might be relied upon as authority to further stay Respondent's eviction are not operable in these circumstances. This is not a case where the court has entered judgment after trial or a motion for summary judgment and, exercising its discretion under RPAPL § 753, set its own timeframe for possession by Petitioner. Nor is it one where an apartment is available for move-in in just a few weeks, and so a short stay is required in the interests of justice to prevent short-term trauma. And it is not the case that Respondent is unrepresented and thus could be said to have suffered from an imbalance of power and experience, and therefore fared poorly in settlement negotiations.

Instead, after the proceeding was adjourned multiple times, defenses evaluated, and an answer filed, the parties entered into settlement negotiations and came to an agreement. "Stipulations of settlement are judicially favored, will not lightly be set aside, and are to be enforced with rigor and without a searching examination into their substance as long as they are clear, final and the product of mutual accord" (Riesenburger Props., LLLP v Pi Assoc., LLC, 225 AD3d 803 [2d Dept 2024]). The outcome here, that Respondent has not yet found a new apartment, cannot be said to come as a surprise to any of the parties (cf. Chelsea 19 Assoc. v James, 67 AD3d 601 [the tenant's loss of possession "is not a forfeiture, but merely the contracted-for consequence of his noncompliance with the stipulation" (internal citations omitted)]). Nor does Respondent allege any facts that have interfered with her apartment search that did not exist at the time of settlement.

Under the facts herein, it is not for the court to effectively rewrite the parties' agreement or to undermine the Legislature's creation of a summary remedy for landlords. Respondent has received the benefit of the time bargained for, and then some. There is no basis for the court to alter the parties' intended result. If this result is undesirable, "the problem is one to be addressed by Legislature" (Chazon, LLC v Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410, 416 [2012]).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion is denied.

This is the court's decision and order.

Dated: August 14, 2026

Michael L. Weisberg, JHC

Michael L. Weisberg, J.