PCMH 2950 v. ET AL (2026)

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion; Affirmation in Support; Exhibits; Affidavit of Service NYSCEF # 7 -14

Order to Show Cause; Exhibits; Affidavit of Service NYSCEF # 19-28

Opposition to Motion; Exhibits NYSCEF # 31 -35

Reply Affirmation; Exhibits; Affidavit of Service NYSCEF # 37-48

Opposition to Order to Show Cause; Affidavit of Service NYSCEF # 49-50

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on this motion is as follows:

Petitioner PCMH 2950 GRAND CONCOURSE L.P. ("Petitioner") commenced the instant summary nuisance holdover proceeding against Respondents DEMETRI WILSON ("Wilson"), JOHN DOE and JANE DOE (collectively "Respondents") alleging various substantial violations of the subject-lease.

The Bronx Defenders then filed a Notice of Appearance for Wilson.

Respondent now files the instant application seeking inter alia: dismissal of the subject-proceeding or in the alternative, Respondent leave to file an Answer ("Respondent's Motion").

In support of Respondent's Motion, Respondent asserts the Petition should be dismissed because of Petitioner's acceptance of checks during the "window period." Petitioner's alleges a failure to serve a Good Cause Eviction Law Notice ("GCEL Notice") with the Notice of Termination and Petition, improper service of the Petition.

Concurrent with the filing of Respondent's Motion, Respondent filed a Judicial Subpoena Duces Tecum, directing Petitioner to provide various records related to Respondent's tenancy of the subject-premises (the "Respondent's Subpoena").

Thereafter, Petitioner moved by Order to Show Cause to quash Respondent's Subpoena, alleging Respondent's Subpoena is a discovery demand, and that it should be quashed because Respondent's Motion is pending ("Petitioner's OSC").

In opposition to Respondent's Motion, Petitioner alleges that Respondent's counsel filed a supplemental affirmation without leave of court; that Respondent's affirmation is not in compliance with CPLR 2106; that Petitioner did not vitiate the termination notice through acceptance of DSS payments; that Petitioner was not required to serve a GCEL Notice with the Notice of Termination; that the Petition was properly served on Respondent; and that portions of the Answer should be barred as they lack merit.

In opposition to Petitioner's OSC, Respondent alleges that Respondent's Subpoena seeks relevant information that is important for trial.

The GCEL Notice

"New York's Good Cause Eviction Law (GCEL) was enacted on April 20, 2024 (L 2024, ch 56, part HH). The statute imposes several new notice provisions obligating landlords to state if housing accommodations are subject to Good Cause in lease offers and pre-eviction notices (id. at §§ 2-5). QN St. Albans Holdings LLC v. Sands, 85 Misc 3d 275, 277, 219 N.Y.S.3d 856, 857—58 (NY Civ. Ct. 2024).

As part of those requirements, the GCEL requires a Notice pursuant to RPL § 231-c to "be appended to or incorporated into 'any initial lease, renewal lease, notice required pursuant to [RPL § 226-c(1)(a)], notice required pursuant to [RPAPL § 711(2)], or petition pursuant to [RPAPL § 741].' See also RPAPL § 741(5a) and (5b). The RPL § 231-c Notice must state whether the premises are subject to or exempt from the GCEL; if the premises are exempt, why they are exempt; and if the premises are subject to the GCEL, the statutory good cause ground for eviction." 3515 Eastchester Rd., LLC v. Soto, 88 Misc 3d 721, 725—26, 242 N.Y.S.3d 896, 900 (NY Civ. Ct. 2025)

Notably, the requirement to serve a GCEL Notice is required "pursuant to [RPAPL § 711(2)], or petition pursuant to [RPAPL § 741]." See also RPAPL § 741(5a) and (5b)." (emphasis supplied) Id.

Case law has further emphasized that this requirement is not only applicable to nonpayment proceedings, but also to holdover proceedings.

"Under GCEL, a holdover tenant must receive the specific, statutorily prescribed notice embedded in RPL § 231-c which is distinct from the RPAPL statutory "rent demand" with its more liberal cure provisions." Bedrock Equities LLC v. Husain, 257 N.Y.S.3d 655, 662—63 (NY Civ. Ct. 2026).

Further, it is evident from the statutory text, the case law and the language of the GCEL Notice itself that it was intended to apply to proceedings such as the instant one as the GCEL Notice incorporates a section regarding a nuisance holdover based upon the substantial breach of the tenancy obligation. See, Id. at 661. See also, GCEL Notice at [4] [F].

In opposition, Petitioner relies solely on Latchmin & Singh Realty LLC v. Singh, 87 Misc 3d 1234(A), 242 N.Y.S.3d 919 (NY Civ. Ct. 2025), which set forth that the GCEL statute must be read strictly, and consequently, because the notice of termination here was sent pursuant to 9 NYCRR2524.2(c), the statute does not require service of the GCEL Notice.

However, Latchmin specifically analyzed whether the GCEL Notice was required in cases where no landlord/tenant relationship exists. The Court found that it was not.

Notably, as part of the Court's analysis, it opined that "If the legislature intended for the GCEL notice be appended/incorporated in situations, such as this, where petitioner is not a landlord and respondent is not a tenant, then the GCEL notice would have had somewhere for the petitioner to note such exemption as RPL § 215 indicates that good cause is only required where a landlord is attempting to remove a tenant from a covered housing accommodation. This supports the determination in Muscat that a GCEL notice is not required when there is no landlord/tenant relationship between the parties." Latchmin & Singh Realty LLC v. Singh, 87 Misc 3d 1234(A), 242 N.Y.S.3d 919 (NY Civ. Ct. 2025).

In the instant proceeding it is evident that the subject-Petition was commenced pursuant to RPAPL § 741, and as such, the GCEL Notice was required to be served. It is further evident that from the statutory text, the case law and the language of the GCEL Notice itself, that it was intended to apply to nuisance holdover proceedings such as the instant one.

As such, Petitioner's failure to serve a GCEL Notice with the Notice to Cure and Notice of Termination and Petition requires dismissal. The petition is thus dismissed.

The Court does not address the balance of Respondent's Motion or Petitioner's OSC.

CONCLUSION

Motion Seq # 1 is GRANTED, and the proceeding is dismissed.

Dated: August 12, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Alberto Gonzalez

Alberto Gonzalez, J.