CCL v. VICTOR RODRIGUEZ (2026)

This case addresses whether a rear-end collision involving a vehicle stopped at a red traffic signal warranted summary judgment where the rear driver claimed that the lead vehicle abruptly and unexpectedly entered his lane immediately before the collision. This court also considered whether an unsigned deposition transcript could be considered on a motion for summary judgment where the transcript was properly certified and the deponent did not challenge its accuracy, even though the movant did not establish that the transcript was mailed to or received by the deponent. The court held that the unsigned transcript was admissible and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the rear driver's testimony that defendant abruptly cut into his lane presented a potentially non-negligent explanation for the collision and further raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the rear driver was faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which left no time for deliberation, and that his actions were reasonable and prudent in the emergency context.

Facts

On June 5, 2023, CLL Queens Inc. ("CLL Queens" or "plaintiff") commenced this action against Walter Heinzelman ("Heinzelman" or "defendant") seeking to recover $8,868.67 for property damage arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 2, 2023. The accident involved a vehicle owned and operated by defendant and a vehicle owned by plaintiff that was being operated by Victor Rodriguez ("Rodriguez" or "third-party defendant"). On August 25, 2023, defendant commenced a third-party action against Rodriguez seeking contribution and/or indemnification. Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting that he was free from negligence because his vehicle was stopped at a red traffic signal when it was struck in the rear by the front bumper of the vehicle operated by Rodriguez. In opposition, third-party defendant claimed that defendant abruptly cut him off prior to the collision, that he did not see defendant's vehicle prior to the collision, and that without success, he pressed the brake hard to avoid hitting defendant. Rodriguez admitted in his deposition testimony that he couldn't avoid hitting the rear of defendant's vehicle.

In support of his motion, defendant submitted the deposition transcripts of Heinzelman and Rodriguez. Heinzelman signed the transcript of his deposition testimony but Rodriguez did not. Justin Cruz certified that third-party defendant was duly sworn before testifying, that his testimony was transcribed, and that the transcript was a true record of his examination before trial. Officer Kathleen Fernandez Cruz certified that defendant was duly sworn prior to testifying and that she recorded the proceedings which were reduced to typewriting by a qualified transcriptionist, and that said audio recording was a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Defendant attached to his motion Exhibit E a copy of the letter which plaintiff's counsel sent to counsel for third-party defendant which stated as follows: "Enclosed please find digital copies of the transcripts of the depositions of your client, third-party defendant, VICTOR E. RODRIGUEZ. Kindly have said transcripts executed and notarized by your client, third party defendant, VICTOR E. RODRIGUEZ, and return same. Copies should also be retained for your file. Please take notice that pursuant to CPLR § 3116(a), your failure to return the executed originals within sixty (60) days will permit us to use the unsigned deposition transcripts for all purposes as though signed.." At oral argument, plaintiff pointed out that there was no proof that the letter requesting Rodriguez's signature was mailed. The parties do not dispute that both transcripts were properly certified in accordance with the requirements of CPLR 3116(b), which provides that the "officer" before whom a deposition is taken "shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness." However, plaintiff argued at oral argument that third-party defendant's deposition transcript cannot be considered on defendant's summary judgment motion because it was not signed by Rodriguez

Law and Analysis

Although plaintiff did not raise the argument regarding the lack of Rodriguez's signature as a basis for denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in its written opposition papers, this court, in its discretion, considers the argument raised at oral argument. Messam v Omeally, 2016 NY Slip Op 51282(U), 2016 NY Misc. LEXIS 3233, *2-3 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2016); Wallace Holdings, LLC v. Brown, 2024 NY Slip Op 51114(U), 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 5368, *3 (Civ. Ct. Bronx Co. 2024).

CPLR 3116(a) provides in pertinent part: "The deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him or her, and any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered at the end of the deposition with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the witness before any officer authorized to administer an oath. If the witness fails to sign and return the deposition within sixty days, it may be used as fully as though signed." The fact that the copy of Rodriguez's deposition transcript submitted by defendant was unsigned did not render it inadmissible under CPLR 3116(a) since it was certified and plaintiff did not challenge the accuracy of the transcript either in its opposition papers or during oral argument. Celestin v 40 Empire Blvd., Inc., 168 AD3d 805, 808 (2d Dept. 2019); Thomas v City of New York, 124 AD3d 872, 873 (2d Dept. 2015); Rosenblatt v. St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 51-52 (2d Dept. 2014). Although defendant did not submit proof that the transcript was actually mailed to Rodriguez or his counsel, the absence of such proof does not require its exclusion since the transcript was certified and third-party defendant did not challenge its accuracy. PSG Psychological, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 1002(A), 2004 NY Slip Op. 51701(U) (Civ Ct, Kings County 2004). See also, Pacheco v. 91 Cent. Park W. Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 52216(U), 2025 NY Misc. LEXIS 20328, *6 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2025) ("Contrary to defendant's contention, plaintiff's unsigned deposition transcripts are admissible evidence since defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the testimony as transcribed and the transcripts were certified as accurate.") Accordingly, the Court may consider Rodriguez's deposition testimony in determining this motion.

In determining a summary judgment motion, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 (2012). Summary judgment is a "drastic remedy," and may only be granted when the movant has "tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact." Id.; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986). "Where the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment cannot be granted, and the non-moving party bears no burden to otherwise persuade the court against summary judgment." William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 (2013). If the movant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. Shulamith Sch. for Girls, Inc. v. Shulamith Sch. for Girls of Brooklyn, 230 AD3d 822, 823 (2d Dept. 2024). The court may not assess credibility or weigh conflicting evidence on motions for summary judgment; "issue finding, rather than issue determination, is the court's proper function on such a motion." Chimbo v Bolivar, 142 AD3d 944, 945 (2d Dept. 2016). Thus, a motion for summary judgment "should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility." Lustig v. Brown, 248 AD3d 1223, 1224 (2d Dept. 2026).

"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle." Madrigal v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d 885, 887 (2d Dept. 2025). Thus, a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision. Radosta v. Caronia, 244 AD3d 890, 890-891 (2d Dept. 2025); Sroor v. Marziano-Fontana, 229 AD3d 581, 583 (2d Dept. 2024); Perez v Persad, 183 AD3d 771, 771 (2d Dept. 2020); Grant v Carrasco, 165 AD3d 631, 631-632 (2d Dept. 2018).

Furthermore, Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1128(a) provides: "A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." Thus, a non-negligent explanation includes a vehicle making a sudden lane change in front of a defendant's vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly and unexpectedly. Yearwood v. New York City Tr. Auth., 227 AD3d 843, 845 (2d Dept. 2024); Quinones v. Grace Indus., LLC, 219 AD3d 765, 766 (2d Dept. 2023). Furthermore, the emergency doctrine provides that "when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context." Burgess v. Little Wolf Cabinet Shop, Inc., 226 AD3d 957, 958 (2d Dept. 2024), citing Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 (1991).

Conclusion

In this case, defendant established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that his vehicle was stopped at a red traffic signal when third-party defendant's vehicle struck it from behind. The burden then shifted to third-party defendant to provide a non-negligent explanation for the collision. Rodriguez testified that defendant "just cut off on me" and "just cut in front of me" immediately before the collision but admitted that he did not look straight ahead or continuously observe defendant's vehicle in the moments immediately preceding the impact. Although Rodriguez's testimony that defendant abruptly entered his lane may be viewed as inconsistent with his admission that he did not continuously observe defendant's vehicle immediately before the collision, those inconsistencies concern credibility and the weight to be accorded to Rodriguez's testimony, matters that cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Chimbo, supra, 142 AD3d at 945. Rodriguez's testimony that defendant abruptly entered his lane immediately before the collision could constitute a non-negligent explanation for the rear-end collision and support a finding that third-party defendant was faced with a "sudden and unexpected circumstance " which left no time for deliberation, and that his actions were "reasonable and prudent" in the emergency context." Burgess, supra, 226 AD3d at 958. Since there are genuine questions as to how the accident occurred, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. See, Ashif v. Won Ok Lee, 57 AD3d 700, 701 (2d Dept. 2008). This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: July 26, 2026

_______________________________

Hon. Tehilah H. Berman

Judge of the Civil Court, Kings County

Tehilah H. Berman, J.