Tsering Dolma Wangdu and Chime Wangdu, Plaintiff, v. Flore F. Kengmeni, Ella Dogouo, Chris Rowan, and Xavieria Zime, Defendants. (2026)

This action was commenced by plaintiffs as landlords against their former tenants and/or occupants of the subject premises. Plaintiffs Tsering Dolma Wangdu and Chime Wangdu seek to recover nine months of unpaid rent against the tenant-of-record, defendant Flore F. Kengmeni as well as her three daughters, co-defendants Ella Dogouo, Chris Rowan, and Xavieria Zime, who occupied the premises at times during the relevant period.

The defendants' rent payment history is not in dispute. The principal issues in this case for trial are whether plaintiffs could both recover from all four defendants, and if so, what amount, including any offset for defendants' breach of the warranty of habitability and harassment counterclaims. Specifically, defendants claim there were recurrent floods in the basement caused by sewer drainage issues, mold, and an active vermin infestation which plaintiffs failed to repair and/or remediate.

Plaintiffs deny defendants' claims about the conditions of the subject premises, alternatively claim the defendants caused said conditions and that plaintiffs made good faith efforts to repair and remediate but defendants denied reasonable access to plaintiffs and/or their contractors. Plaintiffs further maintain that they did not harass the defendants but were simply struggling with the financial burden of leasing the house to uncooperative tenants.

A bench trial was held on March 17, April 13, and April 14, 2026, at which all parties appeared pro se, testified in the narrative and cross-examined one another. Plaintiffs admitted thirteen documents into evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-13). Defendants admitted into evidence eight documents (Defendants Exhibits 1-4, 6-8 and 11)¹ , two audio recordings (Defendant's Exhibit 9 and 13) and two video recordings (Defendant's Exhibit 10 and 12). Neither side called any witnesses.

After hearing the testimony of the parties and reviewing the admitted evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs are a married couple who at all relevant times owned the property at issue, a nearly one-hundred-year-old detached single-family house with two above-ground floors, a finished basement, a relatively small attic, three bedrooms, a garage, a small backyard and a front garden located at 2020 Tomlinson Avenue, Bronx, New York 10461, Block 4306, Lot 34 (the "premises").

Mrs. Wangdu, only, entered into a written lease for the premises with Ms. Kengmeni, only, for a one-year term beginning November 1, 2019 at $2,600 per month (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). Defendants testified that because they are a large family, a condition of renting the premises was for the basement to be "livable" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 68, L8 — L16). No Certificate of Occupancy was provided to the Court showing that the basement was legally habitable.

The first lease contained an occupancy provision which permitted Ms. Kengmeni's immediate family to use and occupy the premises, specifically naming co-defendants Ms. Dogouo and Ms. Rowan, as well as non-parties Murielle and Paule.

A. Immediate Issues with the Basement and Vermin

Defendants claimed that after moving into the premises, there were issues immediately. Ms. Kengmeni and Ms. Rowan testified that they discovered a vermin infestation within a month of moving in (4/13/26 Transcript, P 54, L 3 — L 16). Ms. Rowan further testified that in 2020, a water pipe broke which caused a flood in the basement forcing defendants to evacuate that portion of the premises (3/17/26 Transcript, P 54, L 18 — L22). At all relevant times, the defendants used the basement as an additional bedroom.

Defendants credibly testified that plaintiffs only told them that there was a known flooding issue in the basement after the defendants moved into the premises. The Court finds that plaintiffs expressly and implicitly admitted at trial that there were flooding and drainage issues in the basement before the defendants took possession.

For example, Mrs. Wangdu admitted she told the defendants "don't put anything in the basement" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 33, L 15) and because they lived in the premises for nine years, plaintiffs themselves did not "put any things that are not allowed to put" in the basement (4/14/26 Transcript, P 33, L 22). Mrs. Wangdu again claimed she warned the defendants about the basement, saying "I said all the houses that have a basement is a high risk for flooding. So don't put anything precious" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 67, L 18 — P 68, L 6).

Mrs. Wangdu further testified:

"Of course, when the tsunami comes, there is a little flooding happens. That happens in the whole New York City basement. And then, we have a drainage over there. When you see pull up the drainage, all the drains go there and you have to clean. They don't clean. I have to go to them to clean. When the plumber come, all the flooded feces and everything, plumber is going to clear. That's it. I go there and I clean their house. I don't know why I was doing that. And it's evidence showing that. And I have a video also. I said, I might be the only landlord who's doing this kind of thing. And we are the first time landlord. And they can behave like this to us. I am in shock. We got so frustrated that I said I'm never going to be a landlord. I'm going to get rid of this house no matter what. That's what we did."

4/14/26 Transcript, P 33, L 2 — P 34, L 9.

Throughout the course of the trial, Mrs. Wangdu repeatedly contradicted herself. When asked "Why did you say that the defendants couldn't use the basement?", Mrs. Wangdu evaded the question multiple times, but did eventually concede: "Because we thought, you know, we — so that they're educated about the house because they are — I think they have lived in another previous house" and "[b]ecause it's sometimes — yeah. When we were living, there was a one-time flooding, one time flooding" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 50, L 1 — P 51, L 16). The Court did not find credible Mrs. Wangdu's testimony that there was only one flood in the basement prior to defendants' move-in.

Mrs. Wangdu's lack of candor was further evidenced by her simultaneous claims that "all houses with the basement" have similar issues (4/14/26 Transcript, P 54, L 16 — L 22; see also 4/14/26 Transcript, P 60, L 10 — L 20 and 4/14/26 Transcript, P 62, L 23 — P 63, L 10) while refusing to admit that there was a prior issue in the basement: "There was no problem. . . . That is created by you" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 54, L 13 — P 55, L 7). The Court thus finds that plaintiffs knew there was a sewer drainage issue in the basement at or about the time they rented the premises to Ms. Kengmeni but failed to disclose same.

B. Only One Renewal Lease Executed

Meanwhile, on or about October 2020, Mrs. Wangdu and Ms. Kengmeni executed a two-year written renewal lease at the same rent with a term beginning November 1, 2020 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and 4). The second lease continued to list Ms. Dogouo, Ms. Rowan, and non-party Murielle as occupants, and additionally included the remaining co-defendant, Ms. Zime. The second lease provides in relevant part "if Tenant remains in possession of the premises with the consent of Landlord after the natural expiration of this Agreement, a new tenancy from month-to-month shall be created between Landlord and Tenant which shall be subject to all of the terms and conditions hereof . . . such tenancy shall be terminable upon fifteen (15) days written notice served by either party." Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, ¶ 15.

The parties never executed another written lease.

Plaintiffs testified that they attempted to have defendants sign a new lease in December 2022 but were unsuccessful. Although Ms. Kengmeni continued to pay monthly rent, she credibly explained why she chose not to sign another written lease for the premises:

"We were signing — the first lease that we signed for, I think one year after we signed for two years. And I wanted to sign the lease because I was still even believing in them, and I thought that they could fix a lot of things. The house was getting, the condition, the living condition was, were getting worse and worse. And every single time you speak with the wife and when you speak with the husband, the husband will say, like he didn't hear it from the wife. And it was a back and forth. And I said — and at this point, I don't know, I cannot sign a lease when I don't feel comfortable because the, the, the house condition is keep deteriorating. And that was the reason why I did not sign the lease, but we were keep paying. . . . And it — the, the, the, the — this — it happened the time where we had poop coming out of the sewer maybe more than once a week, sometimes twice a week. The house, the whole house was smelling. And we start looking for a place to go, to be honest. We start looking for a place to go, but it takes time. I couldn't sign the lease because the house condition was very uncomfortable. And I knew that at any time I will leave the place."

4/13/26 Transcript, P 98, L 16 — P 99, L 24.

C. Notice to the Plaintiffs Regarding Conditions in the Basement and the Vermin Infestation

Defendants admitted into evidence text messages between Ms. Zime and Mrs. Wangdu dated January 3, 2022 with a picture of a burst water pipe in the basement and additional messages beginning September 7, 2022 requesting repairs for conditions such as sewage flooding in the basement bathroom, broken locks on the bedrooms on the second floor, a broken/jammed back door, a clogged sink in the upstairs bathroom, as well as a request for the house to be inspected by pest control (Defendant's Exhibit 2).

Specifically, on September 7, 2022, Ms. Zime texted the following to Mrs. Wangdu: "The basement bathroom has been flooding with sewage for the past week even though it has not rained at all. The sewage/pipes need to be inspected and/or fixed. Please let us know when in September this will happen." Mrs. Wangdu texted Ms. Zime back: "Hi Xaviera, No one told me about the sewer and sink recent problem. If you are home today I will come to see today evening may be around 5-6 pm."

Also on September 7, 2022, Ms. Zime texted Mrs. Wangdu: "Since we have moved in back in 2019, pest control has not inspected the house. Please let us know what date this month you will be having them come over so we can have the house prepared." On September 14, 2022, Mrs. Wangdu texted: "Gm. Exterminator is available to come to make estimation (sic) on this coming Saturday. I hope some one will be available at home. Let me know."

On Saturday, September 9, 2022, Ms. Zime texted Mrs. Wangdu "Good morning Dolma, the basement bathroom shower had sewage come out of the drainage again. Here are the pictures." The pictures depict a mud-like filth covering the tiled-floor of the bathroom shower as well as evidence of water on the floor outside the basement bathroom. Ms. Zime further wrote: "This is now the fifth time this week this has happened. It did not happen yesterday when it rained. It seems to happen when people poop in the toilet upstairs regardless of the rain status. Please advise as soon as possible, especially since this is an emergency and hazard. Thank you."

Defendants admitted into evidence additional text messages between Ms. Zime and Mrs. Wangdu dated November 11, 2022, informing plaintiffs that the basement bathroom had flooded again (Defendant's Exhibit 3). Specifically, Ms. Zime texted Mrs. Wangdu: "Good evening Dolma. For the third time this week, my bathroom down in the basement has flooded. The water is coming out of the shower mainly so this is not due to weather."

There was gap in written communications between the parties in the record between November 2022 and September 2023.

In September 2023, Ms. Zime contacted plaintiffs and informed them that she was the point of contact for all communication with plaintiffs going forward. (Defendant's Exhibit 2). Defendants credibly testified that they made this change due to the increasingly hostile way Mrs. Wangdu treated Ms. Kengmeni. Additionally, Ms. Zime indicated she wanted everything in writing between the parties going forward; she texted Mrs. Wangdu: "All thing will agreed and recorded through text message. Please do not call unless it is an emergency or we have been unresponsive. . . . Please confirm everything over text as agreed upon today. Feel free to send your version of this agreement and **make your** suggestions over text and be as thorough and explicit as possible." Defendant's Exhibit 2, P 6.

Defendants admitted into evidence additional photographs and text messages showing that another flood occurred in the basement on September 10, 2023 because water backed up in the shower; defendants notified plaintiffs that another flood occurred on October 20, 2023 as well (Defendant's Exhibits 4 & 7). Defendants admitted a video recording into evidence (Defendant's Exhibit 12), recorded on October 21, 2023, wherein Mrs. Wangdu stated to Ms. Zime: "That's because you are clogging. I am responsible for malfunctions of electricity and, you know, hot water and all that. Not responsible for blockage. . . . Not responsible for blockage. Now, look at this. I'm not going to clean, okay? I am — because last time I cleaned for you — nobody does that. No landlord does cleaning and everything for you." 4/14/26 Transcript, L 6 — L 13.

Throughout the trial, plaintiffs repeatedly claimed that conditions at the premises were caused by the defendants' own conduct, to wit, the recurrent flooding/drainage issues were caused by defendants' hair and wipes which blocked the drains. Plaintiffs admitted photographs of the condition of the premises before defendants took possession (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6) as well as photographs which plaintiffs claim proved defendants caused the sewer blockages and the general condition of the premises while the defendants were in possession (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and 8). The Court was not persuaded by any of this photographic evidence, which did not definitively prove defendants caused the sewer drainage issues. Nor did plaintiffs submit any evidence of the repairs they conducted which would presumably support their theory that defendants caused the sewer problems (as opposed to a structural and/or systemic plumbing defect).

As for the vermin infestation, while there was evidence that plaintiffs responded to defendants' complaints in 2022, Mrs. Wangdu admitted that plaintiffs failed to take any action to remediate this issue afterwards. On this point, Mrs. Wangdu explained:

"And at one time, they were asking me for fumigation. Yes, I said, you know, at that point I have already asked to leave them, you know, six months. I said, if you are leaving, you have — since you have two dogs, when they do the fumigations they're going to throw the poison all over. And if your dogs are leaking here and there (sic), it's not good. I will try — if you stay longer, because I was requesting them to leave with — you know, I'm giving them a six months and requesting them to leave. I said, if you agree, I will try to look for an environmentally friendly, you know, fumigation, terminator so that, you know, your dog will not be harmed. But there's one thing that you really have to do. You have to put everything, you know, nicely so that they're able to fumigate properly. Your house is a mess. And I do not know. You are just saying that to give us trouble. You know if you live like that, fumigation is not going to help."

4/14/26 Transcript, P 48, L 8 — L 25.

The parties agreed that Ms. Kengmeni timely paid all rent due prior to December 2022 (3/17/26 Transcript, P 36, L 7-22 & P 37, L 11-13), at which time Plaintiffs raised the monthly rent to $2,650.00. Ms. Kengmeni continued to pay rent at the rate of $2,650.00 from December 2022 until April 1, 2024.

D. Defendants Receive a 90-Day Notice

On or about September 10, 2023, the same day that Ms. Zime advised Mrs. Wangdu that the basement had flooded again because water backed up in the shower, defendants received a 90- Day Notice of Intention to Terminate Tenancy and Notice to Quit signed by Mrs. Wangdu and dated September 10, 2023. The 90-day notice indicated that defendants were required to surrender possession of the premises within 90 days. According to said notice, plaintiffs sought to regain possession because: "We need the use of the house for our own family use as our children have and are graduate (sic) from college." Defendant's Exhibit 6.

Meanwhile, Defendant's Exhibit 4 contained a text message sent on September 10, 2023 from Mrs. Wangdu to Ms. Zime stating in pertinent part: "As we spoke earlier today, we will not be renewing the lease for the following year. . . . The previous two-year lease expired on October 31, 2022. We have requested you multiple times to sign a renewed lease, but you have not. Thus, . . . you are considered a month-to-month tenant. . . . you have 90 days to leave. As a courtesy, we will give you up to 6 months to find a new place and fully move out."

Defendants admitted an audio recording into evidence (Defendant's Exhibit 13), recorded on October 21, 2023, wherein Mrs. Wangdu made statements to the defendants about her reasons for wanting the defendants to vacate the premises which contradict the reason Mrs. Wangdu proffered in the 90-day notice to terminate Ms. Kengmeni's tenancy. Specifically, Mrs. Wangdu claimed she wanted to sell the premises because she was stressed and didn't "want to deal with this anymore." 4/14/26 Transcript, P 21, L 19 — P 12, L 3.

E. The Parties go to Housing Court

There were two prior, relevant, housing court proceedings between the parties which were commenced in this court regarding the premises: an HP proceeding brought by Ms. Kengmeni and a holdover proceeding filed by plaintiffs. The Court takes judicial notice of the file for each of these cases (see Weinberg v Hillbrae Builders, Inc, 58 NY2d 546 [1st Dept 1977]).

Index LT-002628-23 was commenced by order to show cause dated October 23, 2023 (the "HP Proceeding"). In this case, Ms. Kengmeni sought an order directing plaintiffs to correct housing violations including sewage drainage, pest control, painting, property damage, and recurrent flooding as well as an order restraining plaintiffs from harassing defendants. The petition specifically states:

"Over the past 4 years the landlord issued temporary fix to the sewage and plumbing. My room has routinely been flooded with sewage feces which has been bringing mold, roaches, bugs and odor bad odor to the home. Temporary fixes are not helping anymore, the situation has become worse over the past 4 years I have lost so many personal items. My landlord served me an eviction notice saying that I am becoming too demanding."

Ms. Kengmeni filed an inspection request, also dated October 23, 2023, requesting an inspection of the basement and the entire house for the following conditions: sewage drainage, pest control, mold removal/wall treatment, painting, belonging damage repair, and basement flooding. Meanwhile, Ms. Zime credibly admitted at trial that she was unaware of any issues except their request for "sewage repairs" until an inspector came to the house on October 23, 2023 (3/16/26 Transcript, P 39, L 40).

In an Order dated February 14, 2024, the Hon. Krzystof Lach, J.H.C., stated as follows:

"[Ms. Kengmeni] is directed to prepare the apartment including the basement area for repairs. [Plaintiffs], in turn, are directed to repair the outstanding violations issued by DHPD and are further directed to repair the flooring in the basement and the collapsed ceiling on February 24, 2024 and February 25, 2024. If the [plaintiffs are] unable to arrange for a contract on those dates, then the parties will arrange mutually agreeable access dates.

Work to be done between 9:00am and 5:00pm. Workers to arrive no later than 11:00am. If [Ms. Kengmeni] fails to provide access and/or to prepare the areas for work, then this Court will entertain an application to dismiss this proceeding."

Plaintiffs attempted to increase the rent again in January 2024 from $2,650.00 to $3,000.00, but defendants told Plaintiffs that they must be given three (3) months advance notice before rent could be increased. Plaintiffs consented and told defendants that the increase would go into effect on April 1, 2024. Plaintiffs testified that this rent increase was due to increased property taxes and repair expenses.

Ms. Kengmeni stopped paying rent as of April 2024. Meanwhile, plaintiffs retained and never returned Ms. Kengmeni's original security deposit of $2,600.00.

F. April 5, 2024 Altercation

Tensions between plaintiffs and defendants reached a breaking point on the evening of April 5, 2024, days after plaintiffs expected to receive defendants' April rent payment. Plaintiffs went to the premises to confront the defendants about the unpaid rent due April 1st. Ms. Zime testified that plaintiffs approached her outside as she was on her way home from work at approximately 8:00 PM. Video and audio recordings of portions of that interaction were admitted into evidence (Defendant's Exhibits 9 and 10). The evidence shows a heated exchange between the parties, with plaintiffs becoming increasingly agitated, screaming at defendants Rowan and Zime and making derogatory references to the defendants' national origin and ancestry.

Specifically, Mrs. Wangdu screamed: "We are not in Africa, okay? We are not in China. We are in America. . . . You understand? We are in America. Did you get it? Don't act smart. You know, my daughter is better than you. She has graduated as a doctor. But she doesn't act like you." (4/13/26 Transcript, P 14, L 8 — L 14.) "You live in my house. This is my house. This is a hard, hard-earned money. I didn't get any penny free like you guys got. We didn't get a single penny free. We have worked hard, okay, day and night." (4/13/26 Transcript, P 14, L 24 — P 15, L 2.)

Throughout the exchange, both plaintiffs menacingly baited Ms. Rowan and Ms. Zime to call the police. Towards the end of the exchange, after Ms. Zime entered the premises, Mr. Wangdu put his foot in the door to prevent defendants from closing it. Defendants reported the incident to police (Defendant's Exhibit 8). Defendants testified that the incident made them feel unsafe. 4/13/26 Transcript, P 8, L 12-14.

Mrs. Wangdu defended her conduct on cross examination, stating "[o]f course, I was screaming because I was frustrated" (4/14/26 Transcript, P 5, L 14-15). She further explained:

Mrs. Wangdu: I said, maybe you're from Africa, I'm from China. I'm not — we are not in China. We are not in Africa. We are in America. So we have to follow the rules and regulations. That's what I said.

. . .

Ms. Dugouo: So to clarify, and please correct this is a question, because — or if we are from Africa, right, we would not know what the said rules are. Is that correct?

Mrs. Wangdu: No, no way. If I -- you know, if I have discriminated you, I know — don't even know you guys. But why would I choose you to stay in my house? I'm not discriminating anybody here because I am also a colored person. I know it's not easy. So I don't discriminate. But when you do this, when you break our trust, and that's where we lose our control. We become frustrated. I have not done anything wrong. You — whatever you did is your fault.

4/14/26 Transcript, P 66, L 16 — P 67, L 7.

The Court finds that the April 5, 2024 exchange severely undermines plaintiffs' attempt to paint themselves as sympathetic first-time landlords. Their behavior transcended the ordinary bounds of the landlord-tenant relationship and was particularly outsized given that the April rent payment was just five days late at that point. Moreover, plaintiffs' inability to admit to the nature of their behavior and substance of their words warrants an adverse finding against them as to their credibility. This finding is not made in a vacuum. Plaintiffs conduct throughout the trial, particularly Mrs. Wangdu, evidenced a general lack of candor and willingness to accept responsibility for her role in the events that transpired between the parties.

G. Further Proceedings in Housing Court

On the next appearance date in the HP Proceeding, April 10, 2024, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that HPD would re-inspect the subject premises on May 8, 2024 and the case was adjourned to June 17, 2024 for the inspection results. An Open Violation Summary Report prepared by HPD as a result of an inspection which occurred on May 15, 2024, shows that there were eleven total Open Violations: ten B and one A. The open violations concerned mold, roof repair, water leaks, a roach infestation and cosmetic work (paint/plaster).

Meanwhile, Ms. Rowan credibly testified that she had fully moved out of the premises by May 2024 (3/17/26 Transcript, P 54, L 6).

Thereafter, the parties entered into a so-ordered stipulation dated June 17, 2024 requiring defendants to provide access for repair work to be conducted, including extensive repairs to the 15-year-old roof. The case was adjourned to August 16, 2024 for all purposes.

Defendants offered into evidence a computer printout of the Building Details report which indicates that it was generated by HPD on August 16, 2024 (Defendant's Exhibit 5). Plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of the document, stating: "I have an objection of paper they are submitting, and the explanation for that is not correct. So that's my objection." The Court reserved decision on the admissibility of this document. While the housing part of the Civil Court can take judicial notice of such documents (see MDL § 328[3]), the Civil Court itself is not granted that same statutory discretion. Insofar as the document is not certified by HPD as an accurate copy of the records in its files, and is not otherwise in admissible form, the Court must sustain plaintiffs' objection on the issue of accuracy of the document and Defendant's Exhibit 5 will not come into evidence.

The court file in the HP Proceeding also includes an HPD Open Violation Summary Report for an inspection of the premises on 9/7/24 listing four open violations remaining as of that date, including the three prior B Violations for mold tracing and abatement still outstanding with a Defect Letter sent on September 8, 2024, and one B Violation for mice infestation abatement needed throughout the entire first floor for which a NOV was issued October 27, 2023 with a status of "Not Complied". The HP Proceeding was eventually marked "dismissed without prejudice as Petitioner no longer resides in the subject premises" (Decision/Order dated February 11, 2025).

H. Plaintiffs commence a Holdover Proceeding and the Instant Action

On August 1, 2024, plaintiffs commenced the second housing court proceeding in this court as a holdover against the defendants under Index # LT-002511-24 (the "Holdover Proceeding"). The Holdover Proceeding resulted in a stipulation of settlement so-ordered on November 21, 2024 by Judge Lach which granted plaintiffs a final judgment of possession of the premises and defendants Ms. Kengmeni, Ms. Dogouo and Ms. Rowan were to vacate by 12/22/2024.² The 11/21/24 Stipulation indicates that all parties were unrepresented in the Holdover Proceeding and further provides that "[a]ll claims not adjudicated in this stipulation are severed for a plenary action; all parties reserve all defenses hereto."

Ms. Rowan testified that the defendants vacated the premises on November 22, 2024, but plaintiffs refused to accept the keys unless the parties met in person and thus plaintiffs delayed in meeting with the defendants to accept the keys until December 2024. At trial, plaintiffs testified that the defendants did not give them sufficient notice of the meeting date/time but admitted they wanted the keys exchanged in person.

The Court notes that Ms. Kengmeni filed an order to show cause in the Holdover Proceeding on December 2, 2024, wherein she stated in an affidavit in support: "They refuse to give us the receipt for the keys and take the keys." The Honorable Leslie A. Granger declined to sign the order to show cause, noting "Respondents have vacated and no longer allege possession. No need for further court intervention." After vacating the premises, Ms. Kengmeni moved into a new home that she purchased.

Plaintiffs commenced this action on November 22, 2024 seeking a money judgment for $27,000 for unpaid rent against all four defendants. Issue was joined with each defendant filing a separate answer, asserting the same defense, "I do not owe this debt", and counterclaims for harassment, property damage, emotional distress, unsafe living conditions, and that the house was not up to code. Defendants each seek a money judgment in the amount of $50,000 against plaintiffs on their counterclaims.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Defendants' Liability on Plaintiffs' Cause of Action for Failure to Pay Rent

A cause of action for unpaid rent sounds in contract. Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582, 589-590 (1995). Plaintiffs established, and defendants did not dispute, that Ms. Kengmeni did not pay rent due April 1, 2024, or any additional monies thereafter. The second lease provides in relevant part "if Tenant remains in possession of the premises with the consent of Landlord after the natural expiration of this Agreement, a new tenancy from month-to-month shall be created between Landlord and Tenant which shall be subject to all of the terms and conditions hereof . . . " (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, ¶ 15).

Upon expiration of the most recent lease on October 31, 2022, Mrs. Wangdu entered into a month-to-month tenancy with Ms. Kengmeni, by accepting $2,650.00 as monthly rent (RPL § 232-c; see Olympic Galleria, Co. v Sitt, 241 AD3d 1092 [1st Dept 2025]). None of the defendants signed a subsequent lease agreement with plaintiffs for the premises or entered into an oral lease. Thus, the month-to-month tenancy was between Mrs. Wangdu and Ms. Kengmeni and was pursuant to the same terms and conditions as the most recent written lease (see Decker Assoc. LLC v Kim, 81 Misc 3d 130[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2023]). Each month of a month-to-month tenancy constitutes a new lease term (Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v Bleeker Jones LLC, 65 AD3d 240, 245-246 [1st Dept. 2009] rev'd on other grounds 16 NY3d 272 [2011]; see also Mendez v Hidalgo, 82 Misc 3d 391 [Civ Ct, NY County 2023]).

The 90-day notice issued by Mrs. Wangdu to defendants on or about September 10, 2023, was vitiated by plaintiffs' acceptance of rent in January 2024. Plaintiffs established, and defendants did not dispute, that plaintiffs validly raised the rent due as of April 1, 2024 to $3,000.00 per month (RPL 226-c). In turn, Ms. Kengmeni failed to tender the rent due on April 1, 2024, nor did she provide the fifteen (15) days written notice required pursuant to the parties' last written lease to terminate Ms. Kengmeni's month-to-month tenancy (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, ¶ 15). By not properly terminating her tenancy before April 1, 2024, Ms. Kengmeni accepted the rent increase and is liable for breach of contract for the month of April 2024 at the rate that plaintiffs properly noticed the rent increase for, $3,000, less any applicable abatement (see infra).

Plaintiffs' month-to-month tenancy with Ms. Kengmeni ended as of April 30, 2024. However, Ms. Kengmeni remained in possession after April 2024, and the law permits a landlord to recover use and occupancy from a former tenant who remains in possession of a premises under a theory of quantum meruit (see Eighteen Associates, LLC v Nanjim Leasing Corp., 257 AD2d 559 [2d Dept 1999]). Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to recover use and occupancy until Ms. Kengmeni surrendered possession of the premises.

As for the remaining defendants, according to the most recent renewal lease, they were listed as occupants of the premises. "[I]n the landlord-tenant context, the occupant of a premises is liable to the owner of the property for use and occupancy irrespective of the existence of a lease in the name of another entity" (Carlyle, LLC v Beekman Garage LLC, 133 AD3d 510 [1st Dept 2015]; RPL § 220). It is plaintiffs' burden to establish that they are entitled to recover use and occupancy from Ms. Kengmeni's daughters (Mushlam, Inc v Nazor, 80 AD3d 471 [1st Dept 2011]).

Ms. Kengmeni's daughters were never tenants pursuant to a lease and simply being listed as occupants in a two-year-old expired lease does not prove that Ms. Kengmeni's daughters occupied the premises for the specific time period plaintiffs seek use and occupancy damages. The record reveals that while Ms. Kengmeni's daughters resided at the premises at times, at other times they did not, as they were away at college, etc. For example, the parties' leases list other occupants in the premises (Plaintiff's Exhibits 2-4), Ms. Rowan testified that she fully moved out of the premises in May 2024 (3/17/26 Transcript, P 54, L 6), and Ms. Zime did not appear in the Holdover Proceeding.

Plaintiffs presented no proof that any of Ms. Kengmeni's daughters lived in the premises from May 2024 onwards. Nor did plaintiffs give or elicit any testimony at trial on the issue of whether Ms. Kengmeni's daughters occupied the premises during the relevant time period. On this record, plaintiffs have failed to establish through testimony and admissible evidence that they are entitled to recover monies from Ms. Kengmeni's daughters for use and occupancy from May 1, 2024 through surrender. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims against defendants Ella Dogouo, Chris Rowan, Xavieria Zime are dismissed.

As for damages against Ms. Kengmeni, plaintiffs seek $3,000.00 per month from April 2024 through December 2024. While the most recent monthly rent which Ms. Kengmeni paid for the premises was $2,650, by remaining in possession after plaintiffs validly noticed the rent increase to $3,000 per month without terminating her month-to-month tenancy pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement, Ms. Kengmeni accepted the increased $3,000.00 monthly rent (see supra).

The prior agreed-upon rent is often a baseline for the calculation of use and occupancy, but it is the landlord's burden to establish its reasonable value (Mushlam Inc. v Nazor, 80 AD3d 471 [1st Dept 2011]; see e.g. 22 Holding Corp. v Rodriguez, 85 Misc 3d 1218[A] [Civ Ct, NY County 2025]). Based upon the particular facts and circumstances in this case, specifically the condition of the premises (see infra re: breach of the warranty of habitability), the illegal use of the basement for habitation without a valid Certificate of Occupancy, and the fact that plaintiffs testified that the April 1 rent increase was due to unsubstantiated property tax increases and repair expenses, the Court declines to set use and occupancy at $3,000 per month.

This result is supported by plaintiffs' yearlong acceptance of rent at the rate of $2,650.00 per month from defendants before they attempted to raise the rent. Given the parties' history and plaintiffs' desire to have defendants vacate the premises, raising the rent above what the market would bear for the premises so that Ms. Kengmeni would vacate is a likely reason to increase the rent to $3,000 rather than that amount being representative of the fair market value of the premises. Otherwise, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden and show that $3000.00 is the reasonable value of use and occupancy of the premises, particularly in light of the illegal use of the basement.

Accordingly, the Court sets use and occupancy for the premises at the rate of $2,650.00 per month, from May 2024 onwards.

B. Defendants' Counterclaim for Breach of the Warranty of Habitability Merits an Offset

The issue of whether Ms. Kengmeni is entitled to an abatement remains, as the issue was not addressed in the HP Proceeding, was preserved pursuant to the parties' stipulation in the Holdover Proceeding and was otherwise properly asserted in this action as a counterclaim. For the reasons that follow, the Court awards a rent abatement based upon the testimony and evidence about the condition of the premises.

Residential leases in New York have an implied warranty of habitability. "In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the premises so leased or rented ... are fit for human habitation and for the uses reasonably intended by the parties and that the occupants of such premises shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety" (RPL § 235-b[1]).

While a residential landlord is not required to ensure that the premises are in perfect or aesthetically pleasing condition, they warrant that there are no conditions which "materially affect the health and safety of tenants ... [such as] insect or rodent infestation, insufficient . . . plumbing facilities, . . . inadequate sanitation facilities or similar services which constitute the essence of the modern dwelling unit" (Park West Management Corp. v Mitchell, 47 NY2d 316, 328 [1979] cert denied 444 US 992 [1979]). "If, in the eyes of a reasonable person, defects in the dwelling deprive the tenant of those essential functions which a residence is expected to provide, a breach of the implied warranty of habitability has occurred" (id. at 329).

Housing code violations are not required to prove a warranty of habitability breach, and not every housing code violation constitutes an automatic breach of the warranty of habitability. "[O]nce a code violation has been shown, the parties must come forward with evidence concerning the extensiveness of the breach, the manner in which it impacted upon the health, safety or welfare of the tenants and the measures taken by the landlord to alleviate the violation" (id. at 328).

Damages for breach of the warranty of habitability may be awarded through rent abatement. In determining the value of the abatement, "[t]he Court must weigh the severity of the violation and duration of the conditions giving rise to the breach, as well as the effectiveness of steps taken by the landlord to abate those conditions" (Jeddah Madison Corp. v Vornea, 47 Misc 3d 1219[A] [Civ Ct, NY Co 2015] citing N. Town Roosevelt Assoc. v Mullen, NYLJ, Oct. 27, 1980. P.6, col. 45; Concord Village Management v Rubin, 101 Misc 2d 625 [Dist Ct, Suffolk Co 1979]). Further, while an abatement is often calculated based on a percentage of the rent, there are other measures of abatement damages (191 Street LLC v Roa, 88 Misc 3d 1260[A] [Civ Ct, Bronx Co 2026] citing 2363 S Blvd LLC v Liboy (2017 NYLJ LEXIS 3731 [Civ Ct Bx Co 2017] [$20 per day abatement for an approximately 8-month period found to be reasonable and appropriate]; AL Holdings Inc v Montanez, 44 Misc 3d 1230[A] [Civ Ct NY Co 2014] [$41 per day abatement awarded for three days]).

1. The Basement

The Court finds that Ms. Kengmeni has established through admissible evidence and credible testimony that serious conditions affected the habitability of the basement from September 7, 2022, when recurrent flooding and sewer drainage issues caused raw sewage to back up through the basement shower drain into the shower, which in turn caused water to flood throughout the basement. The record shows that this condition began as early as September 7, 2022 and persisted through November 11, 2022 and that plaintiffs knew about the condition or should have known. Accordingly, Ms. Kengmeni is entitled to a rent abatement from September 7, 2022 through November 11, 2022, due to the condition of the basement.

There was no additional evidence of flooding in the basement after November 11, 2022, until September 10, 2023, when the sewage drainage issues returned and flooding in the basement began again. Since it is Ms. Kengmeni's burden to establish the breach of the warranty of habitability, she has failed to meet her burden regarding the condition of the basement from November 11, 2022 through September 10, 2023. As defendants had previously thoroughly documented their issues, no issues concerning the basement were documented and admitted into evidence for this time period and defendants continued to pay rent throughout. Therefore, the court draws the logical inference from those facts that no recurrent flooding and sewer drainage issue occurred in the basement between November 11, 2022 through September 9, 2023. Thus, no abatement is awarded for that period.

However, defendants have established that the sewer drainage issues began to recur on September 10, 2023, flooding the basement and seriously impacting its usability. Defendants further established that these conditions continued through the date of Judge Lach's 2/14/24 Order, which directed repairs to be performed by February 25, 2024 to the basement flooring and collapsed ceiling. Accordingly, Ms. Kengmeni is also entitled to a rent abatement from September 10, 2023 through February 25, 2024, due to the condition of the basement.

Defendants have also shown that plaintiffs failed to take any and/or adequate action to address these conditions between September 7, 2022 and November 11, 2022, as well as between September 10, 2023 through February 25, 2024 (cf. 34-15 Parsons Blvd., LLC v Ming Hang Zhao, 74 Misc 3d 134[A] [App Term 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). In turn, plaintiffs did not prove that the defendants caused the sewer issues with hair and wipes. Not only is there no competent proof that the sewer was backed up because of hair and wipes as opposed to a structural issue, plaintiffs have failed to address defendants' credible evidence and testimony that the sewer would back up when the upstairs toilet was flushed. The Court believes defendants' version of events and plaintiffs have failed to show that hair and wipes would cause this to happen.

Plaintiffs failed to prove their defense to defendants' warranty of habitability counterclaim that defendants denied reasonable access to plaintiffs' and/or their contractors so that repairs could be conducted (515 E. 81st LLC v Weston, 86 Misc 3d 131[A] [2025]). Plaintiffs have not come forward with any specific evidence or testimony which would demonstrate their own good faith attempts to make repairs or correct any open HPD violations (see generally Torres v Sedgwick Avenue Dignity Developers LLC, 77 Misc 3d 1209[A] [Civ Ct, Bronx Co 2022]), i.e. what days which contractors attempted to gain access to the premises, but the defendants denied access. Indeed, defendants established through admissible evidence that Mrs. Wangdu denied any responsibility to fix blockages in the sewer as late as October 21, 2023 (4/14/26 Transcript, L 6 — L 13). It follows that Ms. Kengmeni was then left with no recourse but to commence the HP Proceeding two days later.

Even if plaintiffs met their prima facie burden on this defense, the Court credits defendants' testimony on this point over plaintiffs'. The Court found defendants to be generally credible, admitting to facts within their knowledge, and conceding points that weighed against them. Thus, the Court finds that defendants have established that when given reasonable notice to provide access, the defendants complied with plaintiffs' reasonable requests as it was in their best interest to do so and their communications and conduct with plaintiffs evidenced their general willingness to cooperate. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, showed a clear pattern of disregard for the defendants and their time. On this record, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to remedy and/or repair the basement conditions within a reasonable period of time during the aforementioned time periods.

Plaintiffs did eventually make adequate repairs to the basement, thus remedying the subject conditions. As of HPD's 5/15/24 Inspection, there were no open violations regarding sewage and other open violations in the basement could not be inspected on 5/15/24 due to failure to provide access to the HPD inspector. The next HPD inspection report from 9/7/24 shows that these open violations were fully resolved. Therefore, defendants have failed to show that the rent abatement for the basement conditions should extend past February 25, 2024.

Accordingly, Ms. Kengmeni is awarded a rent abatement for the condition of the basement from September 7, 2022 through November 11, 2022 and from September 10, 2023 through February 25, 2024. The basement was used as one of the four bedrooms, containing one of two full bathrooms in the premises, and defendants credibly testified that the sewage in the basement caused a bad odor to permeate the entire house.

Based upon this evidence and testimony about the impacts of the conditions in the basement on the habitability of the premises, the Court sets the abatement at 35%, which the Court finds also accounts for defendants' loss of use of one of the three levels of the premises during the relevant time periods. Further, although not argued by the parties, the Court will not reduce the abatement because the basement was not legally habitable. Plaintiffs should not be rewarded for failing to comply with occupancy laws.

2. Vermin

While defendants testified that there were vermin in the premises when they moved in, they did not establish that they provided notice to plaintiffs of an active vermin infestation until September 2022. Upon receiving notice of a vermin issue in September 2022 via text message, Mrs. Wangdu responded to Ms. Zime via text that she would retain an exterminator, and there is no evidence that Mrs. Wangdu failed to follow through with that service call. On this record, plaintiffs did not breach the warranty of habitability as to vermin in the premises on or before September 2022.

Defendants did however establish that there was an ongoing vermin infestation issue which affected the habitability of the premises, and that plaintiffs had notice of this condition as of October 23, 2023, the date Ms. Kengmeni initiated the HP Proceeding. While Ms. Zime admitted she was unaware of the vermin issue before HPD reported it at the inspection that day, Ms. Kengmeni's paperwork filed in the HP Proceeding shows that Ms. Kengmeni was aware of the vermin infestation. That proof, coupled with defendants' cumulative testimony and the evidence in the record, shows that plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the presence of both mice and roaches and the need for an exterminator to treat the premises prior to commencement of the HP Proceeding, and yet failed to take appropriate steps to remedy this condition.

In turn, plaintiffs failed to come forward with any proof to substantiate their claim that they ever retained sufficient extermination services to address and/or remedy this issue. Mrs. Wangdu conceded that plaintiffs made no efforts to abate the vermin infestation when she gave defendants six months to vacate (4/14/26 Transcript, P 48, L 8 — L 25). Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs were on notice of a vermin infestation as of October 23, 2023, and plaintiffs failed to remediate the vermin infestation on or after that date.

Similar to the court's discussion of the conditions in the basement, the court rejects as unsubstantiated plaintiffs' opinion testimony that defendants were the cause of the vermin infestation.

The Court awards defendants a 5% abatement from October 23, 2023, as a result of the vermin infestation, to run throughout the duration of Ms. Kengmeni's occupancy of the premises. Defendants did not provide sufficient testimony or evidence about the severity of the infestation and its impact on the habitability of the premises and/or defendant's health and safety to warrant a further abatement.

3. Mold

Next, the Court considers defendants' complaints about mold. Even if defendants could establish through admissible evidence and testimony that there was a mold condition which remained unabated for a particular period of time, defendants did not provide any testimony or evidence about how the mold affected their health and safety or the general habitability of the premises. Therefore, defendants have necessarily failed to prove that this condition seriously affected the habitability of the premises and thus warrants an abatement. Although the warranty of habitability also "protects against conditions that, while they do not render an apartment unsafe or uninhabitable, constitute deficiencies that prevent the premises from serving their intended function of residential occupation" (Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582, 589 [1995]), such conditions require proof on their impact. Since defendants failed to establish that the mold prevented any portion of the premises from being used for its intended purpose, no abatement can be awarded for the mold condition.

4. All Other Habitability Issues Claimed by Defendants

To the extent that defendants seek an abatement for any other issues at the premises, they have either failed to establish such conditions existed which breached the warranty of habitability or that plaintiffs had adequate notice of said conditions and failed to repair and/or remediate within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the balance of defendants' counterclaims for breach of the warranty of habitability is dismissed.

5. Remaining Issues as to Plaintiffs' Claims

The Court will permit both plaintiffs to obtain a judgment against Ms. Kengmeni for April rent and use and occupancy thereafter, since both plaintiffs owned the premises at all relevant times.

There is no dispute that plaintiffs retained Ms. Kengmeni's security deposit of $2,600 and plaintiffs did not assert any claims for property damage or otherwise establish any basis to retain those monies. Therefore, Ms. Kengmeni is entitled to a credit for $2,600.00.

Although plaintiffs seek to recover nine months of rent for defendants' purported occupancy between April 1, 2024, and December 31, 2024, the Court credits defendants' testimony that they offered to surrender possession of the premises to plaintiffs on November 22, 2024, which plaintiffs unreasonably refused to accept. Plaintiffs' refusal to meet with defendants and accept the keys, and their requirement that the keys be exchanged in-person, does not warrant a different result.

Further, the Court discredits plaintiff's testimony that defendants failed to give plaintiffs proper notice of their desire to surrender the keys. Indeed, plaintiffs commenced this proceeding and caused defendants to be served with the pleadings in this action at or about the time they claimed it was inconvenient for defendants to surrender possession. The Court also finds plaintiffs' testimony that surrender should happen in-person, particularly incredible, given the parties' acrimonious relationship. Plaintiffs otherwise failed to prove that Ms. Kengmeni retained possession of the premises after November 22, 2024.

Accordingly, Ms. Kengmeni's liability for use and occupancy ends as of November 22, 2024.

6. Calculation of Damages on Plaintiff's Claims with Ms. Kengmeni's Offset

Ms. Kengmeni's liability for rent for April 2024, and use and occupancy from May 1, 2024 through surrender on November 22, 2024, accounting for a 5% abatement due to a vermin infestation, is calculated as follows:

1. $2,850.00 ($3,000 x 0.95 [April 2024]

2. $15,105.00 ($2,650 x 0.95 x 6 [May 2024 through October 2024 with 5% abatement due to vermin])

3. $1,846.17 ($2,650 x 0.95 x 22/30 [November 1 through November 22, 2024 with 5% abatement due to vermin])

Subtotal Rent/U&O: $2,850.00 + $15,105.00 + $1,846.17 = $19,801.17

Credits owed to Ms. Kengmeni for the security deposit improperly withheld by plaintiffs and credits for rent paid during the active rent abatements awarded herein are calculated as follows:

1. $2,600.00 (security deposit withheld by plaintiffs)

2. Credit for rent paid during active 35% abatement for basement conditions from September 7, 2022, through November 11, 2022:

• $711.08 ($2,650.00 x 0.35 x 23/30 [abatement for September 7 through September 30, 2022])

• $927.50 ($2,650.00 x 0.35 [October 2022])

• $340.08 ($2,650.00 x 0.35 x 11/30 [abatement for November 1, 2022 through November 11, 2022])

• SUBTOTAL: $1,978.66

3. Credit for rent paid during active 35% abatement for basement conditions from September 10, 2023, through October 22, 2023:

• $649.25 ($2,650.00 x 0.35 x 21/30 [abatement for September 10 through September 30, 2023])

• $658.23 ($2,650.00 x 0.35 x 22/31 [abatement for October 1 through October 22, 2023])

• SUBTOTAL: $1,307.48

4. Credit for rent paid during active 35% abatement for basement conditions plus 5% abatement for vermin from October 23, 2023, through February 25, 2024:

• $307.74 ($2,650.00 x 0.40 x 9/31 [abatement for October 23 through October 31, 2023])

• $3,180.00 ($2,650.00 x 0.40 x 3 [abatement for 3 full months abatement November 2023 through January 2024])

• $913.79 ($2,650.00 x 0.40 x 25/29 [abatement for February 1, 2024 through February 25, 2024])

• SUBTOTAL: $4,401.53

5. Credit for rent paid during active 5% abatement for vermin from February 26, 2024, through March 31, 2024:

• $18.28 ($2,650.00 x 0.05 x 4/29 [abatement for February 26, 2024 through February 29, 2024])

• $132.50 ($2,650.00 x 0.05 x 1 [abatement for March 2024])

• SUBTOTAL: $150.78

Subtotal Credits to Ms. Kengmeni: $2,600.00 + $1,978.66 + $1,307.48 + $4,401.53 + $150.78 = $10,438.45

TOTAL Rent/U&O less Credits to Ms. Kengmeni: $19,801.17- $10,438.45 = $9,362.72

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to money damages against Ms. Kengmeni, only, for $9,362.72 before any credit for an award in connection with defendants' remaining counterclaims (see infra Section II. C.). Prejudgment interest for plaintiffs' loss of the use of money shall accrue from August 1, 2024 at 2%, which the Court sets as a reasonable intermediate date (CPLR 5004 [b]; see Sheridan One Company LLC v Chowdhury, 88 Misc 3d 1245[A] [Civ Ct, Bronx Co 2026]; Allen v Whidbee, 88 Misc 3d 319 [City Court, Yonkers Co 2025]; see generally CPLR 5001).

Plaintiffs' claims against the remaining defendants for unpaid rent are dismissed.

C. Defendants' Remaining Counterclaims

Defendants have also asserted a counterclaim for harassment. There is no civil cause of action for harassment in New York (Broadway Cent. Property Inc. v 682 Tenant Corp., 298 AD2d 253 [1st Dept 2002]). However, owners of rental properties have a duty to not harass tenants at their property (Administrative Code § 27-2005 [d]).

Administrative Code § 27-2004 [a] [48] defines harassment as "any act or omission by or on behalf of an owner that . . . causes or is intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a dwelling unit to vacate such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy . . . " The statute prohibits enumerated conduct, such as "repeated interruptions or discontinuances of essential services, or an interruption or discontinuance of an essential service for an extended duration or of such significance as to substantially impair the habitability of such dwelling unit (subparagraph b.) and repeated failures to correct B and C violations (subparagraph b-2.).

Meanwhile, pursuant to Administrative Code § 27-2115 (m) (2), upon a landlord's violation of Section 27-2005 (d), this Court "may determine that a class c violation existed at the time such conduct occurred . . . [and the] court shall impose a civil penalty in an amount not less than two thousand dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars for each dwelling unit in which a tenant or any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of such unit has been the subject of such violation, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate." (Emphasis added.)

Section 27-2115 (m) (2) also establishes as an affirmative defense to be raised by the landlord to violations of Section 27-2004 (a) (48) (b), (c) or (g) that: "(i) such condition or service interruption was not intended to cause any lawful occupant to vacate a dwelling unit or waive or surrender any rights in relation to such occupancy, and (ii) the owner acted in good faith in a reasonable manner to promptly correct such condition or service interruption, including providing notice to all affected lawful occupants of such efforts, where appropriate."

This court has jurisdiction to issue an award under Administrative Code § 27-2115 (m) (2), since the parties severed their claims in the underlying proceedings for a plenary action pursuant to the parties' so-ordered stipulation and this court is a court of competent jurisdiction (see e.g. Jobe v Chelsea Hotel Owner LLC, 198 AD3d 440 [1st Dept 2021]).

On this record, defendants have established that they were lawful occupants of the premises (Allen v 219 24th St. LLC, 67 Misc 3d 1212[A] [Civ Ct, NY Co 2020] ["Lawful occupancy of the subject premises establishes standing to commence . . . a harassment proceeding."]; see also Lendor v Moussavi, 72 Misc 3d 1220 [A] [Civ Ct, Kings Co 2021]; see also Moflhi v Wagner, 74 Misc 3d 1210(A) [City Court, Cohoes 2022]). Further, after a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that plaintiffs engaged in conduct which violates Administrative Code § 27-2005 (d).

Defendants have shown that plaintiffs repeatedly failed to repair the sewer and remedy the sewage drainage issues in the basement, and that the sewer and plumbing were defective for an extended duration of such significance as to substantially impair the habitability of the premises. As previously set forth herein, sewage would come up the drain in the basement bathroom and fill the shower and flood the basement. Defendants credibly testified that this condition caused the whole premises to smell of raw sewage.

Plaintiffs knew that there were flooding risks in the basement and not only failed to disclose the basement conditions when they rented the premises to Ms. Kengmeni, but blamed defendants without any basis in fact for the sewer and sewage drainage issues.

Sewer and sewage drainage is part of plumbing and sanitation which are essential services that every residential premises is expected to provide. The premises here did not provide adequate plumbing and sanitation services, through plaintiffs' acts and/or omissions. Instead of fixing the problem, plaintiffs blamed defendants and attempted to gaslight the defendants into believing they were the cause of the problems in the basement. Defendants experienced these issues from September 2022 until November 2022, and again when the issues recurred in September 2023. Indeed, Ms. Kengmeni was forced to commence the HP Proceeding in order to get necessary repairs.

Plaintiffs cannot establish through evidence and testimony that their acts or inaction was not intended to cause defendants to vacate or waive/surrender their rights in relation to such occupancy. Nor can they show that they acted in good faith in a reasonable manner to promptly correct the sanitation issues in the premises. When defendants advised plaintiffs in September 2023 that the sewer drainage issues had returned, plaintiffs' response was to tell defendants to move out. That is not sufficient. Even if plaintiffs were entitled to terminate defendants' month-to-month tenancy upon proper notice, they were still required to repair and remedy the habitability issues defendants faced while they remained in possession. Moreover, when plaintiffs accepted defendants' January rent, the 90-day notice was vitiated.

Yet there was no evidence on this record that plaintiffs adequately addressed the sewer drainage issues in the basement by retaining professionals to repair the sewer. At trial, plaintiffs still blame defendants for causing the sewer drainage issues, specifically because they have hair and may have flushed disposable wipes down the toilet. Plaintiffs are not expert plumbers, nor did they provide any evidence to substantiate these claims.

Plaintiffs' conduct towards the defendants, as evidenced by the video and audio recordings in evidence, showed a pattern of disrespect for the defendants, and explains why plaintiffs thought they could disregard defendants' complaints about the premises with no consequences. Plaintiffs knew about the issues in the basement but left Ms. Kengmeni and her daughters to struggle with the raw sewage and recurrent flooding, the noxious odor which permeated the premises, and the rapidly deteriorating house which plaintiffs wanted to collect rental income for but did not want to adequately maintain in reasonably good condition due to costs.

Thus, plaintiffs permitted repeated interruptions or discontinuances of essential plumbing and sanitation services, or an interruption or discontinuance of an essential service for an extended duration or of such significance as to substantially impair the habitability of the premises. Further, defendants have established that there was an active vermin infestation from October 2023 through their vacatur of the premises, and plaintiffs conceded that they did not take any steps to remediate this issue. The vermin infestation was a B violation, and repeated failures to correct B and C violations also constitute harassment (Administrative Code § 27-2004 [a] [48] [b-2]). On this point, plaintiffs have no defense because they unreasonably claim that vermin were at the premises due to the manner in which defendants maintained their home without any proof or evidence to support that claim, either.

HPD is not a party to this proceeding and therefore the Court cannot impose a civil penalty under Administrative Code § 27-2115 (m) (2). Based upon the Court's finding of harassment, the Court deems it appropriate to award Ms. Kengmeni two thousand dollars against plaintiffs, jointly and severally as co-owners, for compensatory damages due to plaintiffs' harassment in violation of Administrative Code § 27-2004 [a] [48]. This amount serves as just compensation for the conduct which Ms. Kengmeni experienced at the hands of the plaintiffs and will discourage plaintiffs from behaving in a similar manner if they are ever landlords again.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' judgment against Ms. Kengmeni is offset by the harassment award and reduced to $7,362.72 ($9,362.72 — $2,000.00).

The Court does not find it appropriate to award any additional monies to the remaining defendants for harassment damages and thus their respective counterclaims for harassment are dismissed. Defendants' remaining counterclaims for property damage and emotional distress are also dismissed. No proof regarding damages as to any property that the defendants seek to recover was presented during the course of the trial. As for defendants' remaining claim for emotional distress, while the Court does not condone the parties' conduct and laments the uncivil nature of their relationship, the Court cannot say that plaintiffs' conduct rose to an actionable level which would warrant damages for the distress which defendants experienced. (Kickertz v New York University, 110 AD3d 268, 277-278 [1st Dept 2013] citing Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 11 NY3d 15 [2008] [Defendants must prove conduct that is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency ... and [is] utterly intolerable in a civilized community.")

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance herewith, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter a money judgment in favor of plaintiffs Tsering Dolma Wangdu and Chime Wangdu, jointly and severally, against defendant Flore F. Kengmeni, only, for $7,362.72, with prejudgment interest from August 1, 2024; and it is further

ORDERED that the balance of plaintiffs' claims, and defendants' remaining counterclaims, are dismissed and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

This decision has been mailed to the parties at their addresses on file with the Court and which the parties gave to the Court on the record at trial, as well as HPD. Plaintiffs' exhibits have been mailed to them, and defendants' exhibits have been mailed to Ms. Kengmeni. The parties should retain their exhibits in the event of appellate review.

Dated: 6/22/2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Eric J. Wursthorn, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court reserved decision on the admissibility of Defendant's Exhibit 5 and for the reasons set forth herein, that document is not admitted into evidence (see infra Section I. G.).

2.   Although Ms. Zime was a named party in the caption of the Holdover Proceeding, she did not appear in that matter, which was scheduled for inquest against her. It does not appear that the inquest ever occurred, and the matter continues to remain marked Active according to the court file.

Eric J. Wursthorn, J.