Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, Petitioner(s) v. GIFROCK LLC AP 114 GIFROCK LLC SHERMAN DROPKIN CENTURION FAMILY HOLDINGS LLC (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion: NYSCEF Doc Nos., 1, 13, 26, 40, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79, 80, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96.

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on the Motion (Seq No. 3) is as follows:

I. The Relevant Background and Procedural History:

The Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York ("HPD" or "Petitioner"), commenced this proceeding by Order to Show Cause against Aaron Parnes, Gifrock LLC, AP 114 Gifrock LLC, Sherman Dropkin, and Centurion Family Holdings LLC ("Respondents"), the owners and responsible parties for the property located at 22-88 Mott Avenue, Far Rockaway, New York 11691 ("Subject Premises"). Petitioner seeks to compel correction of Housing Maintenance Code violations, recover civil penalties, and obtain injunctive relief and penalties relating to harassment. (CCA § 110[c]; N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 27-2115, 27-2121; Ny St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc. No. 1).

The parties first settled part of the proceeding by a consent order signed on January 31, 2024, and filed on February 21, 2024 ("First Consent Order"). (NYSCEF Doc. No. 13). The First Consent Order required respondents to correct all class "C" violations within fourteen days of signing, all class "B" violations within thirty days of signing, and all class "A" violations within ninety days of signing, and it further provided that respondents would be subject to civil penalties for noncompliance. (Id.)

The parties later entered a second consent order, signed on September 26, 2024, and so-ordered on September 27, 2024 ("Second Consent Order"). (NYSCEF Doc No. 26). The Second Consent Order expressly provided that the First Consent Order "remains in full force and effect," and it separately required correction of violations issued after January 31, 2024, and listed on the September 16, 2024, violation summary report annexed to that stipulation. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, ¶¶ 1-2; NYSCEF Doc No 56.). The Second Consent Order also required respondents to "correct all conditions listed on petitioner's Alternative Enforcement Program order in the manner set forth on the instructional sheet annexed thereto, on or before November 15, 2024, or be subject to a fine of $1,000 per dwelling unit at the Premises pursuant to N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2091 (c) (5)" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, ¶ 3).

The annexed Alternative Enforcement Program ("AEP") order to correct required respondents to "Replace Roof," and the attached instructional sheet made plain that compliance meant more than patching. The instructional sheet required asbestos testing of the roof and parapet walls, asbestos abatement if necessary, removal of all roofing material down to the sheathing, and installation of a new roof with insulation. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 27-2005, 27-2125, 27-2153[k]; NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, Appendix 2.) The Second Consent Order also set forth a broader enforcement structure. Paragraph 7 resolved certain preexisting civil-penalty claims for $30,000 and preserved all other civil-penalty claims not expressly settled, including per diem penalties upon default. (NYCEF Doc No 59 ¶ 8).

In December 2024, after the November 15, 2024, roof-replacement deadline had expired, Respondents moved to vacate or modify the roof-replacement provision of the Second Consent Order. This. That application was denied by this Court on December 10, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 51).

On Petitioner's June 2025 motion showed that, as of that time, respondents still had not replaced the roof and still had twelve violations open that were covered by one or the other consent order, namely five class "C" violations, five class "B" violations, and two class "A" violations. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2115; NYSCEF Doc. No. 56, ¶ 4; NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 57, 81.)

Petitioner now moves pursuant to Judiciary Law §§ 753, 773, and 774, CCA § 110 (e), CPLR 5104, and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2124 to hold Respondents in civil contempt for violating the First and Second Consent Orders. Petitioner also seeks: civil penalties accruing from the correction dates set forth in the Consent Orders; entry of a $60,000 judgment pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Second Consent Order and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2091 (c) (5) for failure to comply with the AEP roof-replacement order by November 15, 2024; a further order to correct violations issued after September 27, 2024; and an order requiring Respondents to file weekly NYSCEF updates concerning their compliance efforts, including roof replacement. (NYCEF Doc No 55-59).

The motion is fully submitted. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in substantial part.

II. Law and Its Application:

a. Evidentiary Standards Required to Prove the Existence of an HPD Violation

Petitioners may prove the continued existence of open HPD violations through HPD's own records. No live witness is required. In Housing Part proceedings, HPD's printed or computerized violation records constitute prima facie evidence of "any matter stated therein." (MDL § 328 [3]; Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Knoll, 120 Misc 2d 813, 813-814 [App Term, 2d Dept 1983]; Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Joseph, 2025 NY Slip Op 50501[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2025]). Those records may be submitted through an attorney affirmation and need not be authenticated by live testimony. (Hoya Saxa, Inc. v Gowan, 149 Misc 2d 191 [App Term, 1st Dept 1991]; Barcher v Radovich, 183 AD2d 689 [2d Dept 1992]; Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Omole, 2015 NY Slip Op 50477[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2015]).

An owner's failure to file a certification of correction with HPD likewise establishes a prima facie case that the violation remains uncorrected (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2115 [f] [7]; Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Living Waters Realty, Inc., 14 Misc 3d 484, 487 [Civ Ct, NY County 2006], citing Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v De Bona, 101 AD2d 875 [2d Dept 1984]). Once HPD makes that showing, the burden shifts to Respondents to rebut it with competent proof of correction. Without such proof, the Court may presume that the condition continued through the relevant penalty period. (Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Deka Realty Corp., 208 AD2d 37 [2d Dept 1995]). Bare denials, generalized assertions, and speculation are insufficient. (Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v JIMS Realty LLC, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 2251 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2022], affd sub nom. Joseph, 2025 NY Slip Op 50501[U]; Mackof v 407-413 Owners Corp., 19 Misc 3d 131[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]).

Here, Petitioner submitted HPD computerized violation reports showing that, as of the filing of the motion, five immediately hazardous Class "C" violations, five hazardous Class "B" violations, and two Class "A" violations remained open. (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13, 24, 26, 32, 63.). Respondents have not rebutted those records with competent documentary proof of correction. The Court therefore finds that those violations remained uncorrected and that Respondents remain in continuing violation of the Consent Orders.

b. The Petitioner has Established Civil Contempt

The Housing Part is expressly authorized to issue orders enforcing housing standards, to retain continuing jurisdiction until violations are removed, and to punish disobedience by contempt. (CCA § 110(c) [a] [4], [c], [e]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2115 [h] [1], [i]). A motion to punish for civil contempt is granted where the movant establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawful order containing a clear and unequivocal mandate was in effect; that the respondent had knowledge of the mandate; that the respondent disobeyed the mandate with reasonable certainty; and that the disobedience defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced the movant's rights or remedies in the proceeding. (Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983]; El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19 [2015]; Mollah v Mollah, 136 AD3d 992, 993 [2d Dept 2016]; Various Tenants of 446-448 W. 167th St. v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 153 Misc 2d 221, 222 [App Term, 1st Dept 1992]).

Willfulness is not a required element of civil contempt. Civil contempt turns on whether the order was disobeyed and whether that disobedience impaired or prejudiced a protected right or remedy. (Great Neck Pennysaver, Inc. v Cent. Nassau Publs., Inc., 65 AD2d 616, 616-617 [2d Dept 1978], affd 47 NY2d 954 [1979]; El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d at 35). Nor is substantial compliance a defense where the act commanded by the order was not performed (Matter of McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 225-226 [1994]). Vague or conclusory claims of inability to comply are likewise insufficient. (El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d at 36).

Once the movant establishes the elements of civil contempt, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to rebut the showing or establish a legally sufficient defense. Tedesco v Elio, 211 AD3d 1074 [2d Dept 2022]. Where the record presents no material factual dispute as to contempt, the Court may decide the motion without a hearing (New York City Hous. Auth. Seth Low Houses v Ingram, 86 Misc 3d 1229[A] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]).

The First and Second Consent Orders were lawful orders of this Court directing respondents to correct violations of the Housing Maintenance Code (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 13, 26). The orders identified the premises, identified the respondents, incorporated the relevant violation summary reports, and fixed correction deadlines by hazard class. The Second Consent Order also imposed a separate and express roof-replacement deadline, with an express monetary consequence for default. The mandates were therefore clear and unequivocal (See generally CPLR 2104; [NYSCEF] Doc. Nos. 13, 59).

The record also establishes Respondents' knowledge of the Orders. Respondents were named parties to both stipulations and entered into those stipulations through counsel. Counsel's knowledge is imputed to the client for contempt purposes. (Matter of Dep't of Envtl. Protection of City of NY v Dep't of Envtl. Conservation of State of NY, 70 NY2d 233, 242 [1987]; Baker v Rudolph, 2019 NY Slip Op 51009[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County 2019]). Additionally, Respondents' later motion seeking to avoid the roof-replacement provision in the Second Consent Order further confirms their knowledge of that mandate (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 27-37, 51). It is axiomatic that a party cannot move to vacate or modify a term as burdensome while simultaneously maintaining that it lacked knowledge of the term.

The record further establishes Respondents' disobedience of this Court's Orders. As discussed supra, the Housing Maintenance Code creates a presumption that violations continue until they are properly corrected and certified. (Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2115 [a], [k].) HPD's July 17, 2025, open-violation report confirmed that numerous violations covered by the Consent Orders remained open, including roof violation no. 17210557; apartment 4C violation nos. 17189267 and 17189268; apartment 4D violation no. 16035289; apartment 6E violation nos. 15986560 and 15986566; apartment 2H violation nos. 15926316 and 15926322; apartment 4D violation nos. 15015136 and 15015143; and apartment 3K violation no. 10103510 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 81).

Petitioner also submits competent proof from HPD Construction Project Manager Mohammad Alam that the violations were not cured as required by the Consent Orders. Project Manager Alam avers that he inspected the roof on May 29, 2025, and observed no evidence of roof-replacement work in progress, no workers, no roofing materials, no posted roof-work permits, continued pooling water, and solar panels still in place on the roof. He further observed that roof-related class "C" violations remained uncorrected (NYSCEF Doc. No. 57). On this record, there is no reasonable dispute that respondents failed to comply with the Consent Orders.

The prejudice element is also satisfied. Prejudice exists where disobedience defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices a party's rights or remedies. Petitioner is statutorily charged with enforcing the Housing Maintenance Code and preserving housing free from dangerous and unhealthy conditions. Continued noncompliance with court orders requiring correction of housing-code violations impairs petitioner's statutory enforcement mandate as a matter of law (Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of the City of NY v Highpoint Assoc. X, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 30921[U] [Civ Ct, NY County 2025]; Various Tenants of 446-448 W. 167th St. v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 153 Misc 2d 221, 222 [App Term, 1st Dept 1992]).

Respondents' opposition does not refute any element of civil contempt and does not establish a viable defense.

First, Respondents' renewed attack on the roof-replacement provision is barred and, in any event, meritless. Respondents principally contend that full roof replacement should not be required because, in their view, a lesser repair would suffice. ([NYCEF] Doc No 71 ¶ 45, 51). That contention is foreclosed. Respondents already presented that issue to the Court when they moved in December 2024 to vacate or modify the roof-replacement provision. The Court denied that application on December 10, 2024. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a court ordinarily will not revisit an issue previously determined in the same action absent materially changed facts, a change in the law, or extraordinary circumstances. (See Baron v Baron, 128 AD2d 821, 821 [2d Dept 1987]; Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 [1975]; Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d 519, 520 [2d Dept 2010]). No such showing has been made here.

Second, Respondents also invoke cost, lack of financing, and economic infeasibility. ([NYCEF] Doc No 78 ¶ 67-75). Those assertions, however, do not create a factual issue. The doctrine of impossibility is narrow. It applies only where performance has been rendered objectively impossible by an unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against. Mere financial difficulty, increased expense, or lack of available financing is insufficient (Kel Kim Corp. v Central Mkts., 70 NY2d 900, 902 [1987]; Warner v Kaplan, 71 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2009].)

Even assuming the Court were to consider the narrow equitable doctrine of economic infeasibility recognized in housing-code cases, respondents still would not prevail. That doctrine requires competent proof that the cost of repair exceeds the value of the property after repair. It does not permit an owner to defer or neglect required work until compliance becomes financially unattractive (Hous. & Dev. Admin. of City of NY v Johan Realty Co., Inc., 93 Misc 2d 698, 703 [App Term, 1st Dept 1978]; Eyedent v Vickers Mgt., 150 AD2d 202, 205 [1st Dept 1989]). Respondents submitted estimates suggesting that full roof replacement might cost approximately $410,000 and that a membrane replacement might cost approximately $105,000 (NYCEF Doc No 93 ¶ 7). Those submissions do not establish impossibility or economic infeasibility. Respondents submitted no appraisal, no proof of the building's value after repair, and no competent proof that the property cannot support the required work. At most, respondents have shown that they would prefer to perform less expensive work than the work required by the Court's Order. That preference does not excuse noncompliance with a so-ordered stipulation.

Third, Respondents' access defense is likewise insufficient. Access issues may, in an appropriate case, bear upon a particular apartment violation where the proof is specific, timely, and tied to the violation, the unit, the correction period, and the owner's statutory access efforts (Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2115 [f] [7]; Multiple Dwelling Law § 328 [3]; Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Knoll, 120 Misc 2d 813, 813-814 [App Term, 2d Dept 1983]). But claimed access issues in individual apartments do not explain respondents' failure to replace the roof. Respondents do not show that any tenant prevented them from obtaining permits, removing solar panels, staging roofing materials, retaining a contractor, or commencing exterior roof work (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 83, 94, 96).

Here, respondents' access letters were sporadic. They were not tied with precision to each violation, each apartment, each relevant correction period, or each claimed statutory access effort. Petitioner's unrebutted supplemental submission further shows that those letters stopped no later than December 17, 2024. Moreover, HPD's later records show that, in some apartments for which respondents claimed access problems, violations were later dismissed or marked "not complied." Those records demonstrate that access was at least sometimes obtained, and that the remaining defect was nonperformance, not impossibility of access. ([NYSCEF] Doc. Nos. 83, 94, 96).

After reviewing the motion papers, the Court finds no material issue of fact requiring a hearing. The Court further finds that petitioner has established civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence.

Where civil contempt is established but actual damages are not separately quantified, the Court may impose the statutory fine of $250.00, award the aggrieved party reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and grant coercive relief designed to secure future compliance. (Judiciary Law §§ 773, 774; Matter of Barclays Bank v Hughes, 306 AD2d 406, 408 [2d Dept 2003]; Matter of Ferrante v Stanford, 172 AD3d 31, 39 [2d Dept 2019]).

The Court therefore imposes the statutory contempt fine of $250.00, awards petitioner its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in making this motion, and affords respondents ninety days after service of this order with notice of entry to purge their contempt. To purge the contempt, respondents must replace the roof in strict conformity with the AEP instructional sheet and correct all Consent Order violations that remain open on the date of service. This relief is remedial, coercive, and calibrated to secure obedience to existing court orders rather than to punish respondents for punishment's sake.

The Court declines, at this time, to order immediate incarceration or an immediately accruing of additional daily contempt fine. That determination should not be understood as condoning respondents' noncompliance. Rather, civil contempt remedies must remain remedial or coercive, not punitive, and the Court concludes that a firm purge period, fee shifting, the statutory contempt fine, and the civil penalties imposed for the remaining violations are sufficient at this stage. If Respondents fail to comply with this court order, more severe coercive relief may be warranted upon proper application. (Judiciary Law § 774; Matter of Dept. of Envtl. Protection of City of NY v Dept. of Envtl. Conservation of State of NY, 70 NY2d 233, 239-240 [1987].).

c. The Second Consent Order Requires Monetary Penalties

Paragraph three of the second consent order required respondents to comply with the AEP order to correct on or before November 15, 2024, and further provided that failure to do so would subject respondents to a fine of $1,000 per dwelling unit. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, ¶ 3).

The premises contains sixty dwelling units, as reflected on the violation summary report annexed to the second consent order. Respondents did not replace the roof by November 15, 2024. They had not done so by the time the motion was made, by the time of oral argument, or by the time of the later supplemental submissions. Judgment in the sum of $60,000.00 must therefore enter. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2091[c][5]; NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, ¶ 3.)

That award is separate from, and cumulative to, the stipulated violation-based civil penalties discussed below. The Court is not fashioning that amount as a matter of discretion. It is enforcing the amount the parties chose and the statute permits. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 59, ¶¶ 3, 8; See generally McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 302 [2002]).

d. Petitioner Is Entitled to Civil Penalties Under the Consent Orders

Where a respondent fails to timely correct violations after notice or after the issuance of an order to correct, civil penalties are properly awarded upon proof of the continued existence of the conditions. (See NYC Admin Code §§ 27-2115, 27-2116; see also Hayes v Toju Realty Corp., 74 Misc 3d 1223[A], 1124 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2021], on rearg, 74 Misc 3d 446 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2022] [awarding civil penalties in tenant-initiated HP proceeding following noncompliance with correction order]). Importantly, the Court's authority to impose such penalties is independent of, and in addition to, its contempt powers. (CCA § 110[c]; NYC Admin Code § 27-2115; Judiciary Law § 753).

As discussed above, Respondents fail to offer a viable defense for their failure to cure the outstanding HPD violations. Importantly, the Consent Orders expressly adopted penalty consequences for violations not corrected within the stated class-based deadlines. (NYCEF Doc No 13, 26]; See generally Matter of Banos v Rhea, 25 NY3d 266, 276 [2015]). As such the Consent order deadlines, not the original notice-of-violation dates, govern this motion because the present penalty claim is for breach of the stipulations. (Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of NY v Living Waters Realty Inc., 14 Misc 3d 484 (Civ Ct, NY County 2006); NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 13, 59).

Where the Consent Orders provide penalty ranges rather than fixed amounts, the Court must select an amount within the agreed range. The Court fixes the penalties at the low end of the stipulated ranges. Even at the low end, the resulting penalty is substantial and sufficient to vindicate the orders and enforce compliance.

For this motion, the court will calculate penalties through July 17, 2025, the date of oral argument, as Petitioner expressly sought civil penalties through the last day of any hearing or argument. For any covered violation dismissed before that date, penalties stop on the date of dismissal shown by the latest HPD records. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2115; Deka Realty Corp., 208 AD2d at 46; NYSCEF Doc. No. 56, ¶ 61; NYSCEF Doc. No. 96.)

The court does not include in the civil-penalty calculation violations that were issued after September 27, 2024, because those violations were not covered by the penalty provisions of the existing consent orders. Those later-issued violations support further injunctive relief only. The court also does not include the information violation regarding AEP enrollment. (CCA § 110 [c]; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2121; NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 81, 94).

The second consent order required Class "C" violations covered by that stipulation to be corrected within fourteen days of signing. Because respondents' own papers and access letters treated October 10, 2024, as the Class "C" deadline, the Court uses October 10, 2024, as the operative correction date for those violations (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 59, 77, 83).

Four Class "C" violations covered by the second consent order are relevant here: roof violation nos. 17219146 and 17210557, and apartment 4C violation nos. 17189267 and 17189268. The July 17, 2025, open-violation report shows that nos. 17210557, 17189267, and 17189268 remained open on that date. The later closed-violation report shows that no. 17219146 was not dismissed until July 10, 2025. (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 81, 96).

Under paragraph 2(a) of the second consent order, the Court fixes the Class "C" penalty at the minimum amount of $150.00 per violation plus $150.00 per day.

Violation nos. 17210557, 17189267, and 17189268 each remained uncorrected for 280 days after the October 10, 2024, deadline, from October 10, 2024, through July 17, 2025. The penalty for each of those three violations is therefore $42,150.00, consisting of a $150.00 base amount plus 280 days at $150.00 per day. The combined penalty for those three violations is $126,450.00.

Violation no. 17219146 remained uncorrected for 273 days after the same October 10, 2024 deadline, because the latest HPD record shows that it was not dismissed until July 10, 2025. The penalty for that violation is therefore $41,100.00, consisting of a $150.00 base amount plus 273 days at $150.00 per day. The total civil penalty recoverable under the second consent order is therefore $167,550.00.

The first consent order measured its deadlines from the date of signing. Because the parties signed that stipulation on January 31, 2024, the Class "C" deadline expired on February 14, 2024, the Class "B" deadline expired on March 1, 2024, and the Class "A" deadline expired on April 30, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 13).

One Class "C" violation covered by the first consent order remained open on July 17, 2025: violation no. 16035289 in apartment 4D. Under paragraph 1(a) of the first consent order, the Court fixes the penalty at the minimum amount of $50.00 per violation plus $125.00 per day. That violation remained uncorrected for 519 days after the February 14, 2024, deadline. The penalty is therefore $64,925.00, consisting of a $50.00 base amount plus 519 days at $125.00 per day.

Five Class "B" violations covered by the first consent order remained open on July 17, 2025: violation nos. 15986560 and 15986566 in apartment 6E, violation nos. 15926316 and 15926322 in apartment 2H, and violation no. 10103510 in apartment 3K. Under paragraph 1(c) of the first consent order, the Court fixes the penalty at the minimum amount of $25.00 per violation plus $10.00 per day. Those five violations remained uncorrected for 503 days after the March 1, 2024, deadline. The penalty for each of those five violations is therefore $5,055.00, consisting of a $25.00 base amount plus 503 days at $10.00 per day. The combined penalty for those five violations is $25,275.00.

Two Class "A" violations covered by the first consent order remained open on July 17, 2025: violation nos. 15015136 and 15015143 in apartment 4D. Under paragraph 1(d) of the first consent order, the Court fixes the penalty at the minimum amount of $10.00 per violation. Because Class "A" penalties under that stipulation accrue as a per-violation amount commencing at the end of the compliance period, the total penalty for those two violations is $20.00.

The total civil penalty recoverable under the first consent order is therefore $90,220.00. The civil penalties recoverable under the second consent order, in the amount of $167,550.00. The total civil-penalty award as a result of the instant motion is $257,770.00.

e. Aaron Parnes is properly bound individually

The request to excuse Aaron Parnes individually is denied. This is not a veil-piercing case in which Petitioner seeks to impose liability on a nonparty merely because of ownership based on alleged control. Parnes is himself a named respondent; he is expressly named in both consent orders, and those orders recite that respondents admitted owner status as defined by the Housing Maintenance Code. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2004 [a] [45]; CPLR 2104; NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13, 59).

The record additionally shows that AP 114 Gifrock LLC is the managing member of Gifrock LLC and that Aaron Parnes is the sole member of AP 114 Gifrock LLC. The record also contains access letters signed by Parnes as "Member." He is therefore bound both because he stipulated as a named party and because the record supports owner or controlling-person status within the broad meaning of the Housing Maintenance Code. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2004[a][45]; NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 77, 80). Given the aforementioned information, it is clear respondent Aaron Parnes is a proper party to this action.

f. Petitioner Is Entitled to Further Injunctive Relief and but Not Weekly Status Reports

The Housing Part may retain continuing jurisdiction over a building until all violations have been removed. It may also issue such additional orders as are necessary to assure continued compliance with the Housing Maintenance Code. CCA § 110(c); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2121; Double A. Prop. Assoc. v Spears, 144 Misc 2d 935, 938 [App Term, 2d Dept 1989].

HPD's July 17, 2025, open-violation report shows that numerous additional violations issued after September 27, 2024, remained open as of that date. Those later violations are not covered by the penalty provisions of the existing Consent Orders. They do, however, support a new order to correct. (See generally N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2121).

The request for weekly status reports, however, is denied. Petitioner has not shown that weekly NYSCEF updates would materially advance compliance. Respondents remain obligated to correct the violations and file proper certifications of correction or otherwise prove correction through competent evidence. If they fail to do so, they remain subject to additional civil penalties and, where appropriate, further contempt relief.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's motion is granted to the extent set forth below. Petitioner has established civil contempt, entitlement to the AEP penalty, entitlement to violation-based civil penalties, and entitlement to a further order to correct. Petitioner's request for weekly status reports is denied.

Accordingly, it is so:

ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking a finding of civil contempt is granted, and respondents Aaron Parnes, Gifrock LLC, AP 114 Gifrock LLC, Sherman Dropkin, and Centurion Family Holdings LLC are adjudged in civil contempt of court for violating the first consent order and the second consent order, including at a minimum the roof-replacement mandate contained in paragraph 3 of the second consent order; and it is

ORDERED that respondents shall pay to petitioner the statutory contempt fine of $250.00 within thirty days after service of this order with notice of entry; and it is

ORDERED that petitioner is awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in making this motion, and petitioner shall file and serve an affirmation of legal services with supporting billing records within thirty days after service of this order with notice of entry, after which respondents may file and serve opposition limited to reasonableness within fourteen days; and it is

ORDERED that respondents may purge their contempt within ninety days after service of this order with notice of entry only by fully replacing the roof in strict conformity with the AEP order to correct and the annexed instructional sheet incorporated into the second consent order, including all required asbestos-testing, removal, and installation work stated therein, and by correcting all violations covered by the first and second consent orders that remain open on the date of such service; and it is

ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking immediate incarceration or an immediately fixed additional coercive daily contempt fine is denied without prejudice to renewal upon proof that respondents failed to purge within the time fixed above; and it is

ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of petitioner and against respondents, jointly and severally, in the sum of $60,000.00 pursuant to paragraph 3 of the second consent order and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 27-2091 (c) (5) which may be enforced as a lien against Block 15663, Lot 0009, in the borough of Queens; and it is

ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of petitioner and against all respondents, jointly and severally, in the sum of $257,770.00 as civil penalties for breach of the first and second consent orders which may be enforced as a lien against Block 15663, Lot 0009, in the borough of Queens, calculated through July 17, 2025, except that civil penalties for violation no. 17219146 are calculated only through July 10, 2025, the date the latest HPD records show that violation was dismissed; and it is

ORDERED that the total monetary award fixed by this decision at this time, exclusive of the statutory contempt fine and exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs still to be fixed, is $317,770.00; and it is

ORDERED that respondents shall correct all HPD violations issued after September 27, 2024 that remain open on the date of service of this order with notice of entry, with class "C" violations to be corrected within fourteen days after such service, class "B" violations to be corrected within thirty days after such service, and class "A" violations to be corrected within ninety days after such service; and it is further

ORDERED that an all purpose conference will be held on September 30, 2026, for review of respondents' purge efforts, for determination of petitioner's fee application and for all other outstanding matters.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

May 9, 2026

Hon. Vijay M. Kitson

Housing Court Judge

Vijay M. Kitson, J.