60 LLC v. Orville Blissett, Respondents. (2026)

Introduction

The court ordered Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, PC, to show cause why the court should not impose rule 130-1.1 sanctions for filing a frivolous motion. After a hearing at which counsel appeared, the court imposes sanctions on Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, PC in the amount of $4,500.00.

Facts

The parties in this nonpayment eviction proceeding entered into a settlement agreement on January 13, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. 12). The agreement 1) acknowledged payment of $2,800.00 in money orders; 2) granted Petitioner a judgment and warrant of eviction, execution of which was stayed on condition Respondent pay the remaining balance of $918.17; and 3) acknowledged receipt of a personal check in the amount of $918.17. The check cleared within days and was posted to Respondent's account before the end of the month.

Four months later, Petitioner moved to amend the petition. The basis for the motion was to correct the petition, which named Petitioner as "60 Rogers Ave LLC" instead of "260 Rogers Ave LLC." That error had resulted in Petitioner's application for a warrant being rejected by the clerk. On the return date of the motion, Petitioner's counsel and Respondent (appearing without counsel) met in the court hallway. Counsel then drafted and Respondent signed an agreement granting the motion and permitting Respondent's eviction if he failed to make certain payments.

The agreement was handed to the court, which proceeded to discuss it with Respondent as required by RPAPL § 746. Respondent informed the court that he had been unable to pay rent since January because he had been locked out of Petitioner's payment portal and there had been subsequent issues with Petitioner's acceptance of his paper payments. Upon further inquiry by the court, Respondent alleged that he had complied with the requirements of the January agreement and that his account had reached a zero-rent balance.

With this information, the court summoned Petitioner's counsel back to the courtroom and informed them as to Respondent's claims. Counsel immediately responded that they had "authorization to discontinue" and explained that the (baseless) motion had been made because of confusion resulting from the fact that Respondent's post-dated personal check had been cashed late. However, the rent ledger provided at the time (NYSCEF Doc. 17) belied this claim. It clearly shows that all payments were credited by January 21, 2026, and that at that time Respondent had no rent arrears.

On these facts, the court ordered Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel to show cause why the court should not impose sanctions pursuant to 130-1.1 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator for frivolous conduct.

Discussion

Rule 130-1.1

Section 130-1.1 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator authorizes the court to award costs or impose financial sanctions against a party for frivolous conduct (Rules of the Chief Admr of Cts [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1). Frivolous conduct includes that which is "completely without merit in law" and "asserts material factual statements that are false" (id.). "In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues, the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party" (id.).

"Sanctions are retributive, in that they punish past conduct. They are also goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the Bar at large" (Levy v Carol Mgt. Corp., 260 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept 1999]). "The intent of [sanctions] is to prevent the waste of judicial resources and to deter vexatious litigation and dilatory or malicious litigation tactics" (Matter of Kernisan v Taylor, 171 AD2d 869, 870 [2d Dept 1991]). "Relitigating already-decided matters is sanctionable, as is imposing on the judicial system an unnecessary burden" (Matter of Hoppenstein, 209 AD3d 492 [2d Dept 2022] [internal citations omitted]).

Parties and attorneys have been sanctioned for conduct as varied as moving to vacate default judgment asserting material factual statements that are false (Couteller v Mamakos, 244 AD3d 556, 558 [1st Dept 2025]); continuing to pursue claims that the tenant defaulted under their lease "well after it was apparent or should have been apparent that those claims lacked merit" (Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 78 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2d Dept 2010]); for commencing a foreclosure action without leave where a judgment of foreclosure had already been issued in a prior action (Private Capital Group LLC v Connor, 242 AD3d 1236 [2d Dept 2025]); for maintaining an action after the defendant asserted a valid jurisdictional objection (Viacom, Inc. v Silverwood Dev., 188 AD2d 1057 [4th Dept 1992]); for a frivolous appeal (Bell v State of New York, 96 NY2d 811 [2001]); and for interruptive, insulting, and meritless behavior at a deposition (Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Sol Greenberg & Sons Intl., Inc., 94 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2012]).

Petitioner's/Counsel's defense

Petitioner's counsel appeared as ordered and asserted that the motion was made without even consulting Petitioner, and thus no sanctions should be imposed upon Petitioner. The court agrees.

By way of explaining why sanctions should not be imposed against Petitioner's counsel, counsel explained that the motion was made necessary because the petition contained a typographical error, naming Petitioner as "60 Rogers Ave. LLC" instead of "260 Rogers Ave. LLC." When Petitioner's marshal submitted the warrant requisition request with the correct name, the request was rejected by the warrant clerk. According to counsel, instead of rejecting the warrant request, "the court" should have simply sent an email to counsel so that it could have corrected the mistake, instead of necessitating a motion by Petitioner.

Next, counsel attempted to shift the blame to Respondent for Respondent's decision to waste his day attending court. According to counsel, because Petitioner was seeking to simply correct a clerical error, there was no need for Respondent to appear in court. In other words, the pro se Respondent should have assumed that he was free to ignore a notice to come to court because, according to counsel, he should have known that there would be no consequence to his default.

Counsel then offered an explanation for why, when the pro se Respondent did appear, the parties entered into an agreement permitting Petitioner to evict him for nonpayment of sums that had accrued after he had already reached a zero balance. Instead of simply acknowledging the error and withdrawing the motion, which is what should have happened, counsel asserted that the agreement was an effort to "resolve everything."

Finally, counsel asserted that there was no bad faith, that there was no intent to harm Respondent, and that he was "sorry there was a clerical error [the original typographical error on the petition]."

Frivolous conduct

The court finds that Petitioner's counsel's filing of a motion to amend the petition so that Petitioner could obtain a warrant of eviction four months after Respondent complied with the parties' agreement and paid all his rent arrears is frivolous within the meaning of section 130-1.1. It was also frivolous conduct to present an agreement to Respondent putting him at further risk of eviction, instead of notifying the court that the motion had been made in error. There is no dispute that Respondent's rent was paid in full through January 2026 and there was therefore absolutely no basis for Petitioner to obtain a warrant of eviction (see Harry Silver Hous. Co., Inc. v Bell, 83 Misc 3d 126[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50629[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024] [jurisdiction of the court in nonpayment proceeding was terminated upon satisfaction of payment of arrears]). Rather than acknowledge responsibility or show any contrition for making a motion that had no basis, counsel focused on the typographical error in the petition and attempted to blame Respondent for the time he wasted attending court on a baseless motion.

This lack of contrition was mirrored by counsel's colleague who induced Respondent into signing an agreement that put him at risk of eviction, well after the case was over and done with. In view of the colleague's behavior, counsel's assertion that Respondent did not need to come to court on the date the motion was returnable is disingenuous. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that had Respondent defaulted, Petitioner would have asked for the motion to be granted on default, never informing the court that in fact the case was over four months before.

Counsel sufficiently defended Petitioner from sanctions by acknowledging that it was not consulted before making the motion. But this acknowledgment is damning to counsel: perhaps had counsel consulted its client they would have learned that Respondent had held up his end of the bargain and wouldn't have made the motion.

Conclusion

The court therefore imposes a sanction of $4,500.00 on the firm Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, PC for engaging in frivolous conduct. This amount is warranted 1) to deter counsel from undertaking similar conduct in the future and to incentivize it to take the necessary steps to prevent it ($1,500.00); 2) to punish counsel for wasting judicial resources, haling Orville Blissett needlessly into court, and putting him at risk of eviction ($1,500.00); and 3) because of both counsel's lack of contrition and cavalier attitudes towards Respondent and the court.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, PC shall deposit $4,500.00 with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (see Rules of the Chief Admr of Cts § 130-1.3); and it is further

ORDERED that Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, PC shall transmit a copy of this decision to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection and to Respondent within 20 days of this decision's upload to NYSCEF, with proof thereof filed within 5 days thereafter; and it is further

ORDERED that said deposit shall be made within 20 days of this decision's upload to NYSCEF, with proof thereof filed within 5 days thereafter.

This is the court's decision and order.

Dated: June 12, 2026

Michael L. Weisberg, JHC

Michael L. Weisberg, J.